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Chapter V 
THE TANKER WAR AND THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT (LOAC) 
T he 1980-88 Tanker War nearly ran the gamut of issues related to the law of armed conflict (LOAC), or the law of war (LOW) and its component, the law 
of naval warfare (LONW). The general law of maritime neutrality, general issues 
of necessity and proportionality, and issues of specific concern-visit and search 
including operations against convoyed, escorted or accompanied neutral mer-
chant ships; commerce of belligerents including belligerents' convoys and contra-
band; acquisition of enemy character; blockade, maritime exclusion and other 
zones and other uses of the ocean for warfare; capture of neutral vessels; humani-
tarian law and belligerents' personnel interned by neutral governments; targeting 
of ships and aircraft including convoys; conventional weapons; mine warfare; 
treatment of noncombatants, e.g., merchant seamen; deception (ruses of war) dur-
ing armed conflict-all figured during the Tanker War. These are the subjects of 
this Chapter as they applied to belligerents and neutrals during the war. 
Chapter III analyzed UN Charter law with particular reference to the law of 
self-defense and its relationship to the law of neutrality, the law of treaties, custom-
ary law, andjus cogens-based norms, and the general principles of neutrality as they 
apply to war at sea, and to conduct between neutrals and belligerents. This Chapter 
will not repeat that analysis, except as it interfaces with the LOAC in situations in-
volving neutrals, e.g., mine warfare, discussed in sub-Part G.2. 
Chapter IV analyzed the law of the sea, and those principles will not be repeated 
in here, except as LOS concepts, e.g., due regard for others' uses of the sea, 1 apply 
by analogy in the LOAC. The LOS conventions are subject to the LOAC during 
war because of operation of these treaties' "other rules of international law" 
clauses.2 Because these clauses, at least for high seas areas and perhaps other parts 
of the ocean, restate customary law,3 LOS customary rules are also subject to the 
LOAC for countries not party to the LOS conventions. This Chapter tries to give 
content to those other rules ofinternationallaw, the LOAC, to which the law of the 
sea is subject. Law of treaties principles declaring suspension or termination of 
treaties' operation during war may also apply.4 This Chapter also attempts to place 
LOS principles in the LOAC context, e.g., by analyzing how the LOS rules for the 
territorial sea interact with LOAC principles governing war at sea. 
While many international agreements governing land, sea and air warfareS 
remain primarily subject to customary norms, general principles of law, com-
mentators' research including military manuals,6 occasional judicial decisions, 
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resolutions of international organizations, e.g., the UN General Assembly and Se-
curity Council/ and perhapsjus cogens-based norms.8 Council "decision" compli-
ance is mandatory for UN Members,9 but other international organizations' 
resolutions can restate or help crystallize rules ofinternationallaw, 10 and this was 
the Tanker War experience. 
As in the case of LOS analysis, law of treaties principles may apply to agree-
ments governing the LOAC, e.g., impossibility,l1 fundamental change of circum-
stances,12 desuetude,13 or material breach.14 Some LONW treaties have "escape 
clauses," e.g., "do their utmost" and the like, IS and these treaties' force majeure and 
distress clauses mayor may not amount to a restated form of impossibility or fun-
damental change, 16 but the possibility remains for these kinds of claimsP Armed 
conflict does not vitiate treaties governing humanitarian law,18 e.g., the 1949 
Geneva Conventions,19 or agreements governing the law of warfare, including the 
law of neutrality. Law of treaties principles cannot operate to suspend or terminate 
custom, including custom derived from or restated in international agreements, 
e.g., those governing armed conflict. Thus claims of impossibility, fundamental 
change of circumstances or desuetude cannot be applied to customary law derived 
from treaties. If a treaty has an exception clause, e.g., for entry in distress,20 and if 
that exception is also a customary rule, that exception must be applied to the basic 
rule in the treaty that has become custom. If treaty-based custom has lapsed into 
disuse, a new custom or treaty norm may have taken its place. There is always the 
possibility of application of other sources, e.g., general principles oflaw including 
humanity and chivalry, and rules laid down by courts and commentators. 
Part A. Basic Principles: Necessity and Proportionality; 
ROE; the Spatial Dimension 
The principles of necessity and proportionality apply when the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defense is invoked.21 However, the law of armed 
conflict also requires application of necessity and proportionality; it has its own 
standards for these principles,22 now firmly embedded in CUl>tom. Necessity is, of 
course, not the same as military necessity or kriegsraison, a defense rejected by the 
Nuremberg trials.23 NWP 9A Annotated, published at the end'of the Tanker War, 
ably recites the customary rules of necessity, proportionality and the rule against 
perfidious conduct during armed conflict: 
The law of armed conflict seeks to prevent unnecessary suffering and destruc-
tion by controlling and mitigating the harmful effects of hostilities through 
minimum standards of protection ... accorded to "combatants" and "noncomba-
tants." ... [T]he law of armed conflict provides that: 
1. Only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of 
armed conflict, required for the partial or complete submission of the 
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enemy, with a minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources 
may be applied. 
2. The employment of any kind or degree of force not required for ... partial 
or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of 
time, life, and physical resources, is prohibited. 
3. Dishonorable (treacherous) means, ... expedients, and ... conduct dur-
ing armed conflict are forbidden.24 
However, the LOAC is not intended to impede waging war: 
Its purpose is to ensure that the violence of hostilities is directed toward the 
enemy's forces and is not used to cause purposeless, unnecessary human misery and 
physical destruction .... [T]he law of armed conflict complements and supports the 
principles of warfare ... in the concepts of objective, mass, economy of force, surprise, 
and security. 
The LOAC and principles of warfare underscore the importance of concentrating 
forces against critical military targets while avoiding expending personnel and re-
sources against militarily unimportant persons, places and things.25 
NWP 9A Annotated also explains policies behind the customary rules of neces-
sity and proportionality: 
As long as war is not abolished, the law of armed conflict remains essential. 
During such conflicts the law of armed conflict provides common ground of 
rationality between enemies. This body oflaw corresponds to their mutual interests 
during conflict and constitutes a bridge for a new understanding after the end of the 
conflict. The law of armed conflict is intended to preclude purposeless, unnecessary 
destruction oflife and property and to ensure that violence is used only to defeat the 
enemy's military forces. If followed by all participants, the law of armed conflict will 
inhibit warfare from needlessly affecting persons or things oflittle military value. By 
preventing needless cruelty, the bitterness and hatred arising from armed conflict is 
lessened, and thus it is easier to restore an enduring peace. The legal and military 
experts who attempted to codify the laws of war more than a hundred years ago 
reflected this when they declared that the final object of armed conflict is the 
"reestablishment of good relations and a more solid and lasting peace between the 
belligerent States.,,26 
The return of Tanker War prisoners of war illustrates the point of a potential for 
"bitterness and hatred" long after the shooting stops. Humanitarian law requires 
that prisoners of war be repatriated promptly after hostilities end, if they have not 
been returned previously because of wounds or illnessP Nevertheless, a decade af-
ter the war ended, most prisoners of war had not been repatriated, and this was a 
central issue in protracted final settlement negotiations.28 This might be con-
trasted with rapid US turnover of surviving Iran Ajr crew after that incident.29 
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Beyond the broad sweep of the customary rules of necessity, proportionality 
and prohibition against perfidy, problems in law and practice remain. 
1. Necessity and Proportionality in Self-Defense and in the Conflict Context 
The same terms, necessity and proportionality, are employed in thejus ad bello 
context of the inherent right of self-defense, and particularly anticipatory self-de-
fense,30 as injus in bello situations. What passes muster as a necessary and propor-
tionate response in self-defense may not necessarily pass muster as a necessary and 
proportionate response against the same object once armed conflict has begun, and 
vice versa. Comparing the definition of anticipatory self-defense and the LOAC 
principles demonstrates this. NWP I-14M Annotated, differing slightly from its 
predecessor, says: "Anticipatory self-defense involves the use offorce where attack 
is imminent and no reasonable choice of peaceful means is available. " Under either 
. this view or Caroline Case principles,31 it is clear that necessity in combat need not 
await the enemy's attack or threat of attack. LOAC necessity principles apply in 
that context, to be sure, but also when a belligerent attacks orifit is necessary to de-
fend against a belligerent's attack. The same can be said about proportionality dur-
ing combat; the principle applies for attack or defense during war as well as in 
self-defense situations, but what is proportional for LOAC situations mayor may 
not be proportional in a self-defense scenario. Moreover, the law of self-defense 
says little, if anything, about the third LOAC principle, prohibition against per-
fidy, although it should. Lawful ruses should be part of the law of self-defense as 
well as the LOAC, although their content and what is permitted as a lawful ruse 
will necessarily differ from LOAC situations.32 
In a situation involving multiple States,e.g., three countries, two of whom are at 
war, LOAC principles of necessity and proportionality apply as to the two 
belligerents. If a third State individually (and not pursuant to a defense treaty) at-
tacks either belligerent, the attacked belligerent may respond in self-defense but 
must observe necessity and proportionality principles attached to that inherent 
right,33 which may be different from those attaching to defenses under the law of 
armed conflict. Once in a war situation, the attacked belligerent (the target in the 
latter scenario) and the new belligerent (the attacker) must observe LOAC princi-
ples. It is, of course, entirely possible that necessity and proportionality standards 
may be the same in a given self-defense or LOAC scenario. 
It is impossible to lay down black-letter rules for LONW necessity, proportion-
ality and humanity principles to be observed during war. The San Remo Manual, 
relying on Protocol I land warfare provisions by analogy, does about as good a job 
as any in its Precautions in Attack principles: 
With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken: 
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(a) those who plan, decide upon or execute an attack must take all feasible mea-
sures to gather information which wiII assist in determining whether or not 
objects which are not military objectives are present in an area of attack; 
(b) in the light of the information available to them, those who plan, decide upon 
or execute an attack shall do everything feasible to ensure that attacks are lim-
ited to military objectives; 
(c) they shall furthermore take all feasible precautions in the choice of methods 
and means [of warfare] ... to avoid or minimize collateral casualties or dam-
age; and 
(d) an attack shall not be launched if it may be expected to cause collateral casual-
ties or damage ... excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military ad-
vantage anticipated from the attack as a whole; an attack shall be cancelled or 
suspended as soon as it becomes apparent that the collateral casualties or dam-
age would be excessive .... 34 
"Attack" includes defensive as well as offensive measures and includes measures 
taken against shipping or aircraft that have acquired enemy character as well as the 
enemy.35 
The question then arises as to whether, and how, these general principles relate 
to other LOAC principles, e.g., prohibitions against attacking coastal traders or 
coastal fishermen when engaged in their usual occupations and not contributing 
to the enemy war effort.36 The traditional, correct view is that necessity and pro-
portionality must be considered when attacking or defending any target. If a target 
is a forbidden object, e.g. a coastal trader or fisherman, customary necessity and 
proportionality principles cannot be weighed against customary or treaty-based 
rules forbidding attacks on that object. The same might be said about using ne-
cessity and proportionality as qualifying use of a means of warfare otherwise for-
bidden. Thus attack on a coastal fishing vessel engaged in its trade and not 
contributing to the enemy war effort cannot be legitimized by factoring in neces-
sity; to do so would be to invoke the military necessity (kriegsraison) doctrine con-
demned at Nuremberg.37 Similarly, necessity does not enter into the equation of 
using gas warfare the Geneva Gas Protocol forbids; again, to do so would be to in-
voke the condemned kriegsraison doctrine.38 A target, e.g., a coastal fishing boat, 
can lose protected status if it aids the enemy, and under those conditions it may 
properly be an object of attack, subject to LOAC necessity and proportionality 
principles.39 Similarly, if an opponent uses gas warfare, the Protocol no-first-use 
reservation is triggered, and the target State can respond. Other options are 
proportional reprisals involving use of force or other unlawful means not involv-
ing force to compel compliance with the law, or retorsions, i.e., unfriendly but law-
ful acts to compel compliance with the law. Here again the law of jus ad bellum 
differs from the LOAC, the law of jus in bello; by the majority view only reprisals 
not involving use offorce can be used before war begins, but afterward, during war, 
reprisals involving use of force or non-force reprisals can be used. Retorsions can 
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be used in either context. The US and perhaps other States' policy is that only the 
national command authority, i.e. at the presidential level, can order reprisals.40 
The relationship between objects of attack, whether during the offensive or in 
defense, should be understood to mean that if an object is a lawful target, necessity 
and proportionality dictate that methods and means of attack should be chosen to 
minimize or avoid, if at all feasible, damage to or destruction of objects that enjoy 
protected status. Where there is no specific prohibition against attacking an object 
defensively or offensively, here too the principles require using methods or means 
that best achieve the objective without damage to other objects that are not neces-
saryfor achieving the objective. Therefore, the two concepts-the customaryprin-
ciples of necessity and proportionality, and in some cases, rules against attacking 
some objects or using some means of warfare-travel alongside each other as sepa-
rate rules oflaw. 
2. The Temporal Factor: When Does Liability Accrue? 
I have urged application of a rule from the law of armed conflict, that a 
decisionmaker should be held to what he or she knew or should have known at the 
time the decision is made as to the necessity for or proportionality of a response 
when these issues arise incident to a claim of a right of self-defense.41 That princi-
ple arises from the LOAC and is in four States' declarations of understanding to 
Protocol ~2 and in two Conventional Weapons Convention protocols,43 interna-
tional agreements governing the LOAC. Because of widespread acceptance of Pro-
to col I and the Convention as treaty law,44 and these provisions as customary 
norms by those States that have not ratified,45 this principle is well on its way to ac-
ceptance as a rule of law among all States for the LOAC. This rule also follows 
Nuremberg principles for initiating armed conflict46 and recognizes a com-
mon-sense observation that hindsight can be 20/20, but decisions at the time may 
be clouded with the fog ofwar47 and should be judged accordingly. 
3. Rules of Engagement (ROE) 
The place of rules of engagement (ROE) in the context of the law of self-
defense 48 has its analogue in the relationship of ROE to the law of armed conflict. 
As with the supremacy of Charter-based norms, including the right of individual 
and collective self-defense, over treaties and perhaps the customary LOAC,49 a 
military commander has the option, indeed the duty under US ROE, to defend his 
or her unit, ship or force. ROE may impose limitations on options for actions the 
law of armed conflict would permit, or they may allow a commander a full range of 
options the law permits. 50 In the context of neutral merchant ship visit and search 
operations, for example, current law allows a belligerent to visit and search or di-
vert a neutral-flag merchantman for later visit and search.51 A belligerent's ROE 
might direct a commander to divert and not search immediately. However, that 
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commander always retains the right to defend his or her ship, unit or force. If dur-
ing a merchant ship interception that vessel displays hostile intent, a commander 
of a belligerent warship, unit or force may initiate appropriate necessary and pro-
portional self-defense measures. 52 
The same is true for the law of self-defense if, e.g., a warship of a belligerent or 
neutral country exercises its analogous law of the sea right of approach and visit of 
a merchant vessel on the high seas upon suspicion of piracy, slave trading or pirate 
radio broadcasting, if the ship has no nationality, or the ship is of the warship's na-
tionality.53 In this case the law of armed conflict does not apply through the LOS 
other rules clauses,54 and the sole basis for force, unit or ship protection is neces-
sary and proportional self-defense, which preempts the law of the sea under the cir-
cumstances.55 The right of visit and search, part of the LONW and therefore the 
LOAC, does not and cannot apply to merchant ship visits on suspicion of piracy, 
slave trading, etc. 
4. The Spatial Dimension 
Robertson has aptly analyzed the differences between oceans areas, and areas 
above the oceans, under the law of the sea and under the law of naval warfare. The 
LOS has developed a relatively detailed structure oflaw for the high seas, the EEZ, 
fishery zones, the continental shelf, the Area and the contiguous zone.56 The 
LONW, still mostly stated in custom and older treaties, recognizes only two sea ar-
eas, territorial waters and their correlative, internal waters, and the high seas and 
airspace above these sea areas; belligerents may conduct warfare on the high seas, 
in their side's territorial and inland waters, in opposing States' territorial and in-
land waters and airspace above these areas, but not in neutrals' territory, territorial 
or inland waters and airspace above these areas, with certain exceptions.57 The 
high seas are a legitimate arena for combat, subject to neutrals' rights ~o navigate or 
overfly the high seas, with neutrals' and belligerents' having due regard for the 
other's exercise of high seas freedoms,58 and neutrals' right to exercise propor-
tional self-defense.59 Writing in the context of the impact of changes in jurisdic-
tional zones upon the law of neutrality, Robertson notes modern military manuals' 
acceptance of the expanded territorial sea for LOAC purposes, adoption of LOS 
straits principles for the LONW, and advocates applying LONW principles to the 
EEZ, fishing zones in the high seas whether qualified by an EEZ claim or not, the 
continental shelf and the contiguous zone inasmuch as these areas are subject to 
high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight for LOS purposes.60 NWP I-14M 
and the San Remo Manual continue the view that these areas are subject to high 
seas freedoms, and that belligerents may exercise straits passage in accordance 
with LOS principles.61 
Robertson and the Manual also make the important point that belligerents 
must have due regard for neutrals' rights under the law of the sea in the newer areas 
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(e.g., EEZ, continental shelf) recognized by the LOS Convention and the 1958 
LOS conventions, in addition to the high seas, where there is no explicit LOAC 
rule to cover the point.62 
5. Necessity, Proportionality, ROE and the Spatial Dimension in the Tanker War 
The historical record is slim with respect to belligerents' general observance of 
the principles of necessity, proportionality and prohibitions against perfidy dur-
ing the Tanker War. Parts B-J of this Chapter comment on observance of them in 
specific circumstances of warfare, e.g., mine warfare, attacks on shipping, etc. Simi-
larly, the historical record does not disclose what Iranian or Iraqi decisionmakers 
knew or should have known when planning offensive or defensive measures. Nor 
is there any record of perfidy or ruses of war in the self-defense context.63 That in-
formation, if it exists, is in government intelligence and military archives. 
The US self-defense response and other States' potential responses to Iranian 
attacks, including those during the Airbus tragedy, were necessary and propor-
tional. 64 This is an example of the three-State scenario discussed above.65 At the 
time of this and similar attacks on neutrals and opposing belligerent platforms, as-
suming they were thought to have acquired enemy character, Iran and Iraq were 
required to use LOAC principles of necessity and proportionality in attacks and 
defensive measures. There is no published record of what any country knew, or 
should have known, during these situations, apart from information the US had on 
origins of the attacks, i.e., from platforms, helicopters and ships involved.66 
There is no published record ofIranian or Iraqi ROE, if any. US and other coun-
tries' ROE, to the extent that they have been published,67 deal largely with 
self-defense issues,68 although their other aspects, undoubtedly classified, might 
cover LOAC subjects such as neutral convoy protection of neutral merchantmen. 
These have not been published; therefore analysis ofLOAC topics like convoy and 
accompanying merchant ships must look to the facts and the law, and not to any 
self-imposed restrictions imposed by ROE. ROE dealing with self-defense show 
awareness of necessity and proportionality principles for self-defense reasonable 
under the circumstances.69 
Iran appeared not to observe the distinction between restricting its territorial 
waters, i.e., its territorial sea, for military operations and its territorial waters that 
were within the Strait ofHormuz, the implication from Iran's announcements be-
ing that it could restrict Strait transit passage?O Under the LOS and the LONW, 
Iraq or Iran could not deny straits passage to neutral vessels.71 Iran's using neutrals' 
territorial waters for naval maneuvers, besides being a clear LOS violation,n also 
violated the LOAC. 73 The same is true concerning Iran's attacks on merchantmen 
or facilities in or landward of neutral territorial waters?4 Whether Iran or Iraq 
showed due regard for neutrals' high seas freedoms in air attacks on neutral mer-
chantmen and warships75 is also questionable. 
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Part B. Visit and Search; Capture, Destruction or Diversion 
Warships have had an LOS right to approach and visit vessels on the high seas 
as an exception to the rule that ships sailing the high seas are immune from the ju-
risdiction of any country other than the flag State. This includes merchant ships, 
fishermen, boats,etc., if the vessel to be approached and visited is a suspected pirate 
ship or slaver, refuses to show its flag, or flies a flag of another State but is in reality 
registered under the warship's flag. The LOS Convention adds two categories: 
ships without nationality, or a ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the 
warship's flag State has jurisdiction as the Convention provides. The approach and 
visit right does not extend to warships or government vessels on noncommercial 
service, e.g., naval auxiliaries; they are immune from this procedure?6 
States have also concluded treaties, sometimes bilateral, with other countries, 
to allow high seas approach and visit of the other country's merchant ships, etc., to 
inspect ships suspected of carrying illicit cargoes destined for that State, e.g., the 
Prohibition Era treaties,77 or more recently, drug interdiction agreements. In the 
latter cases permission to board may be obtained by telecommunications as the 
agreement provides.78 Agreements also exist for suppressing terrorist acts against 
maritime navigation and offshore oil platforms?9 
In either case, traditional LOS approach and visit or interdiction operations, a 
warship retains its right of self-defense.80 The LOAC applies through the LOS 
conventions' other rules clauses, or applying treaty suspension or wartime termi-
nation principles, in war situations.81 
1. Visit and Search Pursuant to the Law o/Naval Waifare 
The right of warship visit and search on the high seas and in a belligerent's terri-
torial sea during armed conflict differs from the LOS right of high seas approach 
and visit.82 First, visit and search rights obtain through the other rules clauses of 
the LOS conventions or applying treaty suspension or termination principles dur-
ing wartime situations.83 Second, the right applies only incident to the visit and 
search, and does not spill over into a right of approach and visit; the right of ap-
proach and visit is governed by LOS principles.84 If a warship closes on a mer-
chantman with visit and search and approach and visit in mind during an armed 
conflict situation, the rules for each procedure must apply. Third, neutral war-
ships and neutral noncommercial vessels retain immunity they have under the law 
of the sea from visit and search.85 Fourth, warships conducting visit and search re-
tain a right of self-defense. 86 
Visit and search may be conducted in belligerents' territorial seas and internal 
waters and on the high seas, including areas subject to States' contiguous zone, 
EEZ, fishing zone or continental shelf claims, and in the Area. Visit and search 
may not be conducted in neutral States' territorial seas, in international straits 
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overlapped by territorial seas in that part of a strait whose waters comprise neutral 
States' territorial seas, and in a neutral's archipelagic sea lanes. Hague XIII, art. 2, 
forbids visit and search in neutral State "territorial waters," a customary rule,87 
but the previous formula takes into account Hague XIU's more general language 
in a context of modern LOS principles.88 Although coastal States have rights in 
the contiguous zone, EEZ, fishing zone and the continental shelf, these zones' wa-
ters remain subject to high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight as do waters 
above the Area,89 i.e., the deep seabed the LOS Convention reserves as human-
kind's common heritage.90 Visit and search operations in these areas, and on high 
seas not subject to any of these claims, are subject to a requirement that a belliger-
ent observe due regard for neutral States' rights, whether that be high seas rights, 
neutrals' rights in these zones, or humankind's rights in the Area, besides specific 
LOAC rules applying to the situation.91 A belligerent may conduct visit and 
search in its territorial sea and internal waters without applying the due regard 
principle; that is part of its sovereign territory.92 Even here, however, belligerents 
must apply LOAC rules, including humanitarian and neutrality law principles. 
Similarly, a belligerent may conduct visit and search in an opposing belligerent's 
territorial sea and internal waters, but here visit and search must observe due re-
gard for neutral State rights, i.e., innocent passage by neutral shipping in an oppos-
ing belligerent's territorial sea,93 in addition to positive rules of the law of armed 
conflict. However, this innocent passage in a belligerent's own territorial sea 
might be subject to the LOS rule that a coastal State may suspend innocent passage 
temporarily for security reasons,94 and the LOAC rule that belligerents may order 
neutral shipping away from the immediate area of naval operations or may impose 
special restrictions on this shipping.95 In an opposing belligerent's territorial sea, 
only the LOAC naval operations rule would apply, territorial sovereigntycontinu-
ing to reside in the coastal State. In either case belligerents may not deny territorial 
sea access to a neutral nation unless there is a route of equal access.96 
Hague XIII and customary law say nothing specific about visit and search in 
straits; however, the customary rule against visit and search in neutral waters 
should apply by extension for straits bordered by neutral State territorial seas. If 
one side of a strait is belligerent territorial seas and the other is neutral territorial 
seas, visit and search may be conducted in the belligerent's territorial sea but not in 
the neutral's territorial sea. Besides this restriction, a belligerent must observe due 
regard for high seas rights through straits with a high seas passage in the middle, 
neutral State transit passage, or innocent passage through a strait, or treaties gov-
erning a particular strait, depending on the kind of strait involved.97 As a practical 
matter, this could well mean barring visit and search in a particular strait, depend-
ing on the strait's geographic, navigational and hydrographic configurations; the 
nature of the vessel to be searched; methodology of visit and search (e.g., surface 
vessel, small boat or helicopter); and other factors.98 If a littoral State cannot close 
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a strait under the law of the sea99 for temporary security protection as it may for ter-
ritorial sea innocent passage,IOO a belligerent cannot cite this reason for closing its 
side of a strait, even if incident to an otherwise valid visit and search. The same 
principle applies to invoking the rule that a belligerent may order neutral shipping 
out of the immediate area of naval operations or impose special restrictions on 
them; this LOAC rule cannot have the effect ofimpeding neutral shipping straits 
passage, unless another route of similar convenience is open to neutral traffic.IOI 
Recent operational law manuals restate traditional visit and search rules: 
1. Visit and search should be exercised with all tact and consideration. 
2. Before summoning a vessel to lie to, the warship should hoist its national flag. 
The summons is made by firing a blank charge, by international flag signal ... , 
or by other recognized means. The summoned vessel, if a neutral merchant 
ship, [must] ... stop, lie to, display her colors, and not resist. (If the sum-
moned vessel is an enemy ship, it is not so bound and may legally resist, even 
by force, but thereby assumes all risk of resulting damage or destruction). 
3. If the summoned vessel takes flight, she may be pursued and brought to by 
forcible measures if necessary. 
4. When a summoned vessel has been brought to, the warship should send a boat 
with an officer to conduct the visit and search. If practicable, a second officer 
should accompany the officer charged with the examination. The officer(s) 
and the boat crew may be armed at the discretion of the commanding officer. 
5. If visit and search at sea is deemed hazardous or impracticable, the neutral 
vessel may be escorted by the summoning, or another, ... warship or by a ... 
military aircraft to the nearest place (outside neutral territory) where the visit 
and search may be conveniently and safely conducted. The neutral vessel is 
not obliged to lower her flag (she has not been captured) but must proceed ac-
cording to the orders of the escorting warship or aircraft. 
6. The boarding officer should first examine the ship's papers to ascertain her 
character, ports of departure and destination, nature of cargo, manner of em-
ployment, and other facts deemed pertinent. Papers to be examined will ordi-
narily include a certificate of national registry, crew list, passenger list, 
logbook, bill of health clearances, charter party (if chartered), invoices or 
manifests of cargo, bills oflading, and on occasion, a consular declaration or 
other certificate of noncontraband carriage certifying the innocence of the 
cargo [navicert]. 
7. Regularity of papers and evidence of innocence of cargo, employment, or des-
tination furnished by them are not necessarily conclusive, and, should doubt 
exist, the ship's company may be questioned and the ship and cargo searched. 
8. Unless military security prohibits, the boarding officer will record the facts 
concerning the visit and search in the logbook of the visited ship, including 
the date and position of the interception. The entry should be authenticated 
by the signature and rank of the boarding officer, but neither the name of the 
visiting warship nor the identity of her commanding officer should be dis-
closed.1oz 
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Although once a debatable issue, today the diversion option (11 5) instead of visit 
and search on the spot is accepted practice.l03 "Although there is a right of visit 
and search by military aircraft, there is no established international practice as to 
how that right should be accomplished.,,104 The common practice today, given 
availability of seaborne helicopters on smaller surface warships or perhaps land-
based aircraft, is to launch a helicopter. Under those circumstances, the same rules 
for approach and visit using boats, which are frequently impracticable, given the 
size of modern merchantmen and frequently sea conditions, should prevail. lOS 
Aircraft may also be used for scouting for merchantmen and escorting the mer-
chant ship to a diversion point for search or to a belligerent port, instead of using 
warships for those purposes.l06 
As the visit and search principles suggest, a resisting merchant ship, or one that 
attempts to flee, risks capture, damage or destruction, like merchantmen who as-
sist the enemy's intelligence system by signaling or are otherwise integrated into 
the enemy's war effort, unless exempted under the law of naval warfare. l07 If the 
vessel is found to carry contraband or warfightingfwar-sustaining cargo, she may 
be declared a prize of war. 108 The right to visit and search continues during an ar-
mistice, unless the armistice's or other ceasefire's terms provide otherwise. l09 
A right of belligerent visit and search extends to other vessels beyond typical 
merchant ships, e.g., ships carrying cultural property, 110 hospital ships, III perhaps 
mail ships,112 and other vessels exempt from capture, etc., e.g., coastal trading and 
fishing vessels, 113 although there are no specific treaty provisions permitting visi t-
ing and searching these other exempt vessels. They are subsumed under the gen-
eral rubric of being merchant ships for this purpose. 
Two exceptions to belligerents' right of visit and search, besides neutral war-
ships or neutral-flag government ships operated for noncommercial purposes,114 
are neutral-flag vessels not engaged in an opposing belligerent's war effort or not 
carrying contraband and under convoy by a neutral warship, or neutral-flag vessels 
not engaged in a belligerent's war effort or not carrying contraband and escorted or 
accompanied by a neutral warship. Under the London Declaration, only neu-
tral-flag convoys are subject to exemption; however, practice during other wars or 
crises (e.g. World War II, before the United States entered the war, during the 
Formosa Straits crisis) confirms that neutral warships flying a country's flag other 
than that ofthevessel(s) convoyed may escort or convoy neutral merchantmen not 
in support of the belligerents' war effort and not carrying contraband if the mer-
chantman's flag State so requests. Traditional practice has been for a belligerent 
warship to request information as to the character of cargo and vessels convoyed or 
escorted, and for the escort or convoy commander to certify the innocent nature of 
the convoy or escorted shipes) by signal to the belligerent warship. Given modern 
practice of instant, reliable worldwide communications, the 1998 Helsinki Princi-
ples on Maritime Neutrality rightly advocate authorizing communications between 
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neutral and belligerent States' governments and their ships at sea for this purpose 
as a progressive development. Even if the belligerent warship believes the privi-
lege of neutral convoy or escort has been abused, it is up to the neutral warship 
escort or convoy commander to withdraw protectionYS If a neutral warship com-
mander does not do so, a belligerent government may protest this. For a belligerent 
to attack a neutral warship, or its convoyed, escorted or accompanied merchant-
men, invites self-defense responses. 1 16 
The traditional law of naval warfare states no principles for neutral militaryair-
craft convoy, escort or accompaniment of merchantmen that do not carry contra-
band or material contributing to a belligerent's war effort. However, the same 
principles should apply. The main problem is communications with a belligerent 
warship or aircraft proposing to conduct visit and search. Aircraft must have capa-
bility to communicate with belligerent warships or aircraft wishing to conduct 
visit and search; this is usually the case with today's aircraft. Even if there has been 
prior communication between governments, prudence suggests a clear under-
standing between the platform proposing visit and search (perhaps another air-
craft, perhaps a warship) and the convoying, escorting or accompanying aircraft. 
The same principles for risk of self-defense response also apply to this situation.117 
In the case of "mixed" convoy, escort or accompaniment situations, i.e., when 
neutral military aircraft and warships operate together, the same principles should 
apply. This should be true whether there is symmetry of flag between the aircraft 
and warships or situations where aircraft of one flag convoy, escort or accompany, 
along with warships of other nationalities. Here communications are critical, not 
only between neutrals and belligerents, but also among neutrals. The traditional 
law, including the law of self-defense, has nothing to say about this situation, yet 
another reason for clear communications, particularly with belligerents. 1 IS 
Different principles apply ifbelligerent warships and/or aircraft convoy, escort 
or accompany merchantmen, however; these merchantmen are subject to attack 
and destruction by opposing belligerents. 1 19 
Under the customary law of naval warfare, the flag the merchantman flies, and 
not the LOS genuine link analysis, counts for prima facie attribution of vessel na-
tionality, 120 yet another example of the operation of the LOS conventions' other 
rules clauses.12l (Different rules apply if a belligerent transfers flags from its 
merchantmen to neutral flags,122 not a Tanker War issue, insofar as the historical 
record shows.) If there is a transfer from one neutral flag to another, this may raise 
LOS issues,123 but the LONW rule of prima facie attribution of neutrality covers 
the transfer to attribute prima facie neutral flag status to the reflagged vessel.124 
(The principle is different if a vessel flies the UN or ICRC flag; under the LOS and 
presumably the LONW jurisdiction remains vested in the registry State.)12S Thus 
neutral-flag warships may convoy, escort or accompany neutral-flag merchantmen 
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that have been reflagged under the same circumstances as they could if no 
reflagging has taken place. 
Transfers of goods follow the same kind of rules. If there has been a bona fide 
transfer of cargo from a belligerentto a neutral before a voyage from a neutral coun-
try to another neutral begins, that is considered neutral cargo. Rules concerning 
delivery of neutral cargo to a belligerent from a neutral, or transfer of title from a 
belligerent to a neutral, once the cargo has been lifted and is on its way, i.e., the con-
tinuous voyage rule, do not apply. The continuous voyage rule might apply, for ex-
ample, to contraband consigned to an enemy destination with intermediate 
overland transportation from a neutral port to a belligerent.126 
2. Visit and Search: -Tanker War Issues 
There are no reported cases of attempts by belligerent or neutral warships to 
conduct approach and visit on suspect merchant ships under the law of the sea, nor 
were there any accounts of terrorist attacks on vessels or Persian Gulf oil platforms, 
during the Tanker War. If there had been, principles applying to these situations, 
and not LONW principles, would have governed.127 
Iran conducted visit and search operations with ships and aircraft against neu-
tral merchant ships inbound to Iraq through Kuwaiti or other ports, and vessels 
outbound with Kuwaiti or other cargo destined for neutral ports, throughout most 
of the war.128 Despite neutral governments' protests on some occasions, Iran was 
within its LOAC rights to conduct these visits and searches, including visit and 
search after the cease-fire, if international law criteria for these operations were 
met. For example, it was not proper to shoot up a merchantman before conducting 
visit and search, unless that ship tried to evade visit. Iran complied with visit and 
search rules some of the time, but in other cases the evidence maypointtoward vio-
lations of the law. It is not clear, e.g., whether vessels that were attacked tried to 
evade visit, or whether Iran shot first and asked questions later. In the latter cases 
Iran violated LOAC rules. Although Iran threatened to close the Strait ofHormuz 
from time to time,129 the purpose of threatened closure appeared notto be incident 
to visit and search operations. If visit and search occurred near or in the Strait, 
there are no reports of these actions impeding neutrals' straits passage. 
Belligerents kept merchant ships plying the Gulf pursuant to their high seas 
and straits passage rights under surveillance, Iraq primarily through aircraft and 
Iran through aircraft and surface vessels.130 This surveillance, ifinterpreted as the 
first step in a projected visit and search, was legitimate under the LOS as high seas 
overflight, freedom of navigation or straits transit rights, as long as it did not inter-
fere with the merchant ships' high seas or transit passage rights.131 These States' 
warships and military aircraft also could conduct surveillance as a self-defense 
measure.132 However, once the visit and search process began with notice to the 
merchantman, Iran and Iraq were bound by its LONW procedures. This did not 
Law of Armed Conflict 363 
include initial indiscriminate attacks by aircraft or surface vessels, or mines, par-
ticularly if a vessel's identity, cargo and destination were not known. 133 Whatever 
the result under Charter law analysis,134 these were also violations of the law of na-
val warfare proportionality and necessity principles as they related to visit and 
search. 
The United States and other neutral nations were within their rights to form 
convoys of neutral-flag merchant ships, or to escort or accompany neutral-flag 
merchant ships, carrying cargoes to and from neutral States, e.g., Kuwait, where 
cargoes did not directly contribute to a belligerent's war effort, i.e., were not prop-
erty of a belligerent or destined to a belligerent when lifted. The fact that the cargo 
may have been legitimately sold to a neutral or may have been legitimately ex-
changed before lift from a belligerent did not change the cargo's characterization 
when on the high seas. There is no evidence that the convoyed or escorted neutral 
flag merchant ships, reflagged or otherwise, carried belligerents' cargoes that con-
tributed to war efforts.135 
Early in the war, Iraq rejected overtures to allow neutral merchant, ships 
trapped in the Shatt aI-Arab to leave under a UN or ICRC flagP6 Toward war's 
end, there was no consensus on substituting a UN naval flotilla, supported by Italy 
and the USSR, for warships operating in the Gulf pursuant to each country's or-
ders, 137 (The UN ensign has been used on several prior occasions.)138 If vessels re-
leased from the Shatt had traveled in convoy or had been escorted or accompanied 
by warships, an issue might have arisen on whether these ships were legitimately 
reflagged under the LOAC for purposes of the evacuation.139 If they were re-
flagged legitimately, a further question would be whether the United Nations or 
the ICRC could legitimately request convoy protection for these ships. The United 
Nations, possessing legal personality,140 could request protection, preferably 
through a Security Council decision,141 but the ICRC as a nongovernmental orga-
nization would not have had status necessary in international law to request con-
voy, unless the ICRC were placed in UN service.142 If the merchantmen had flown 
a UN or ICRC flag under these circumstances, presumably the same principles 
would have applied for convoying, i.e., a warship with a different ensign143 could 
have convoyed, escorted or accompanied the merchant ships, provided there had 
been a request for protection from the flag State and, as a precautionary measure, 
from the United Nations. If a Security Council decision had established terms, 
those would be mandatory, even if they were different from the usual LOAC rules 
for these operations.l44 The same issues could have arisen, except perhaps re-
flagging questions unless merchantmen as well as warships flew the UN flag, in 
connection with the UN flotilla proposal late in the war. They did not because the 
flotilla was never approved. 
Indiscriminate shooting at, damage to, and destruction of, neutral merchant 
ships by surface ship or aircraft weapons subjected both belligerents to possibilities 
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of self-defense responses. If a merchantman was flagged under the same ensign as 
its convoying, escorting or accompanying warships, the right of self-defense 
stemmed from a right to protect the merchant ship as an act of individual self-de-
fense. If the merchantman was flagged under an ensign different from the war-
ship's, and convoy, escort or accompanying had been requested, there was a right 
to protect those merchant ships under an informal collective self-defense the-
ory.14S Merchant ships painted grey to simulate warships, feigning convoys, or 
which snuggled close to convoyed, escorted or accompanied ships without request 
for protection,l46 were not entitled to self-defense protection on those accounts, 
whatever might be said of these measures as ruses.147 
To the extent that belligerents used mines to deter, threaten or attack convoyed, 
escorted or accompanied merchantmen, 148 this too was a violation ofLONW prin-
ciples. Besides neutral warships' rights to remove the mines, neutrals could also 
defend against these by removing the source of the mines, e.g., Iran Ajr,149 as inci-
dent to legitimate self-defense of their warships; as legitimate self-defense of ves-
sels convoyed, escorted or accompanied; or as incident to legitimate self-defense of 
their and others' neutral flag shipping if assistance had been requested. Nothing in 
the law of naval warfare forbade removal of the mines. ISO 
3. Projections for the Future 
The Tanker war thus strengthened traditional visit and search rules, albeit with 
some cases where neutral countries wrongly protested the actions. Valid protests 
against belligerents' indiscriminate attacks on innocent neutral merchant ships 
vindicated the strength of those principles. Traditional principles of convoy, es-
cort or accompaniment of neutral merchantmen were reinforced, with added di-
mensions of developing rules for potential use of aircraft with surface ships as part 
of operations, and using warships of one neutral flag for convoy, etc., of another 
neutral flag's merchantmen when requested by that neutral. 
Given downsizing of naval forces worldwide, and ready availability of aircraft, 
particularly helicopters aboard ship but perhaps shore-based, a trend of conduct-
ingvisit and search by aircraft, perhaps operating with warships and perhaps alone 
(i.e., helicopters), is likely to continue. The same is true with respectto neutral con-
voys of merchantmen; it is likely that this kind of operation, i.e., use of aircraft as 
part of a convoy, escort or accompaniment operation, will be seen in future wars. 
Similarly, convoying operations employing aircraft and warships of different flags 
are likely. Traditional principles should apply in these situations as well. Because 
of relative ease of communications between governments, and a risk oflack of com-
munications on the high seas, the Helsinki Principles option of government-to-
government communications during convoy operations should be adopted as a 
rule oflaw. 
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Part C. Belligerents' Seaborne Commerce; Belligerents' Convoys 
Part B discussed the law of naval warfare relating to neutral flag commerce during 
the Tanker War. This Part analyzes issues of the belligerents' seaborne commerce, 
principles of convoying applicable to belligerent-flag shipping, and principles of 
contraband. 
1. The Law o/Naval Warfare and Belligerents' Seaborne Commerce 
Enemy warships and military aircraft, including naval and military auxiliaries, 
are subject to capture, attack, or destruction anywhere beyond neutral territory, 151 
i.e., outside neutrals' inland waters or territorial seas, including the high seas and 
areas governed by contiguous zone, EEZ, fishing zone, continental shelf, or Area 
regimes. Captures, attacks and destruction of vessels in these areas are subject to 
the principle of due regard for neutrals' uses of these areas and a belligerent's right 
to exclude neutrals from the immediate area of naval operations.152 Capture of a 
warship, naval auxiliary or military aircraft immediately vests title in a captor. 153 
Crews of captured, attacked or destroyed aircraft or military vessels become pris-
oners of war when captured.154 If the wounded, sick or shipwrecked are taken 
aboard a neutral warship or military aircraft, "it shall be ensured, where so re-
quired by international law, that they can take no further part in operations of 
war.,,155 
Although enemy merchantmen sailing outside neutral territorial seas or inland 
waters may be subject to visit and search,156 they may be captured without visit 
and search if positive determination of enemy status may be made by other 
means.
157 (Hague VI principles, regulating conduct toward belligerents' mer-
chant ships in enemy ports at war's outbreak,158 are considered not to reflect cus-
tomary law.159 Before 1907 some countries observed a usage that enemy merchant 
ships in a belligerent port could not be captured; there was no rule oflaw to that ef-
fect.160 Today they too may be captured.) Enemy merchant ship officers and crews 
must be made prisoners ofwar.161 If military circumstances preclude sending it in 
as prize, a captured ship may be destroyed after all possible measures are taken to 
provide for passenger and crew safety. Ship and cargo documents and papers and, 
if possible, passenger and crew personal effects should be preserved.162 
Enemy merchant ships may be attacked and destroyed without prior warning 
or an attempt to capture them if they are a legitimate militaryobjective163 and: (1) 
persistently refuse to stop upon being summoned to do so, e.g., incident to visit and 
search; (2) actively resist visit and search or capture; (3) are armed, i.e., equipped 
with weapons or other equipment capable of inflicting serious battle damage on a 
warship or aircraft; (4) are incorporated in or assist in any way the enemy's intelli-
gence systems; (5) engage in belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy; (6) act as a na-
valor military auxiliary; (7) sail under convoy of enemy warships or military 
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aircraft; or (8) are integrated into the enemy war-fighting or war-sustaining ef,. 
fort. 164 (Principles relating to belligerent convoy of neutral merchantmen are ad-
dressed in Part D.) This list follows NWP 9A, published at the end of the Tanker 
War, with an addition from the San Remo Manual and modifications suggested, for 
reasons stated below.165 
The NWP 9A and Manual enumerations differ slightly from customary law, 
and they divide on minor points and one major issue. Categories (1), (2), (4), (6) 
and (7) are essentially the same in NWP 9A and the Manual and correspond with 
customary and treaty norms.166 
The traditional rule for armed merchant ships, Category (3), has been that they 
may have defensive armament, e.g., pistols or rifles for defense against pirates, but 
that armament of a kind to enable the ship to conduct warfare is forbidden. 167 
NWP 9A and the Manual sensibly drop the distinction between defensive and of-
fensive weapons. NWP 9A comments: 
In light of modern weapons, it is impossible to determine, if it ever was possible, 
whether the armament on merchant ships is to be used offensively or merely 
defensively. It is unrealistic (0 expect enemy forces to be able to make that 
determination. 
The Manual is to the same effect.168 While shoulder-fired missiles and rockets 
would likely be considered arming a vessel, equipping an enemy merchantman with 
chaffwould not. Although a ship's bow can be an effective ramming weapon, hav-
ing a sharp bow, perhaps reinforced against collisions, does not mean that a merchant 
ship is thereby armed. 169 NWP 9A recites that an enemy merchant ship is subject 
to attack and destruction "If armed.,,170 The Manual says an enemy merchantman 
is a proper military objective ifit "[is] armed to an extent that [it] could inflict dam-
age to a warship; this excludes light individual weapons for the defence of per son-
nel, e.g., against pirates, and purely deflective systems such as "chaff[.]" ... 171 Both 
definitions must be read with their explanatory comments to determine, for NWP 
9A, the limitation on offensive armament; for the Manual, what is meant by "dam-
age to a warship," i.e., it does not include using a bow to ram. Being armed, under 
the Manual definition, may not mean the capability to damage another merchant 
vessel, however. The Manual does not say.l72 IfNWP 9A might seem too broad on 
its face, the Manual statement might seem to lack precision in definition. Given 
advances in weapons technology, it is almost impossible to describe banned or law-
ful weapons within a definition or to anticipate the future.173 It is better, asNWP 
9A does, to avoid lists or definitions, whether by inclusion or exclusion.174 
I suggest this as a more workable restatement of the law on this issue: 
Enemy merchant ships may be attacked and destroyed if they are armed, i.e., 
equipped with weapons or other equipment capable of inflicting serious battle 
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damage on a warship or aircraft. This does not include equipment aboard an enemy 
merchant ship for its protection from collision, pirates, or riots; for maintaining 
internal order aboard the vessel, e.g., to quell a mutiny; or for deflecting incoming 
weapons, e.g. special paint to deceive homing missiles, chaff and like devices to 
deceive missiles, or extra shell plating to protect against projectiles or missiles as well 
as against collisions, ice or other maritime perils. 
"Weapons or other equipment" covers armament, e.g., missiles or naval guns but 
also equipment that could damage or destroy sensing systems, e.g., offensive elec-
tronic warfare equipment, etc. 175 As a matter of theory, pistol bullets could inflict 
some battle damage against close aboard warships, e.g., the Iranian speedboats dur-
ing the Tanker War,I76 but side arms are not considered arms within the meaning 
of the definition. "Battle damage" is common parlance well understood in naval 
warfare. Use of the generic word "equipment" would cover not only weapons, but 
also devices, e.g., tear gas or high pressure water hoses that might be used to deflect 
an attempt to rush a ship.I77 Similarly, having heavier than usual shell plating or a 
reinforced bow to protect against ice or collision should not qualify a vessel as an 
armed merchantman. With good reason, NWP 9A, its successor and the Manual 
depart from the traditional law; perhaps their definitions could be refined, 
however. 
The San Remo Manual adds Category (5), permitting attack on and destruction 
of enemy merchant ships if they "engag[e] in belligerent acts on behalf of the en-
emy, e.g., laying mines, minesweeping, cutting undersea cables and pipelines, en-
gaging in visit and search of neutral merchant vessels or attacking other merchant 
vessels[.],,178 This has no direct counterpart in other sources, e.g., NWP 9A, but it 
is a restatement of the law. There are problems with the statement, however, if 
there are no other considerations. Hague VII, reciting conditions for converting 
merchant ships into warships, lays down customary standardsI79 but does not 
cover situations where merchantmen engage in belligerent acts. The 1856 Paris 
Declaration condemns privateeringI80 but does not cover a situation when priva-
teers commit belligerent acts from a merchant ship. Category (5), taken from the 
Manual, would cover these situations. There are problems with the law of the sea. 
The LOS, e.g., condemns and sets standards for jurisdiction over the universal 
crime of piracy. 1 81 here the conventions' other rules clausesI82 have no impact, 
and pirates can be pursued, captured, tried and convicted by belligerents or neu-
trals during armed conflict as in other situations. If it is assumed that pirates and 
other LOS violators183 cannot be assumed to commit belligerent acts when they 
engage in LOS-condemned activity, then the Manual definition is a correct state-
ment of the law. The problem is with the clause, "e.g., laying mines, ... attacking 
other merchant vessels." Suppose, for example, a patriotic pirate attacks a mer-
chant ship of the enemy. Is the pirate subject to the LOS rules or those of the 
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LONW? Perhaps itwould have been betterto omitthe examples, as stated above in 
Category (5).184 
Category (7), a residual clause,185 copies its principles from NWP 9A: 
... [E]nemy merchant vessels may be attacked and destroyed by surface warships, 
either with or without prior warning, in any of the following circumstances: 
. . . If integrated into the enemy's war-fightinglwar-sustaining effort and 
compliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would, under the 
circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the surface warship to imminent 
danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment.l86 
The San Remo Manual is more defense-oriented: "The following activities may 
render enemy merchant vessels military objectives: ... otherwise making an effec-
tive contribution to military action, e.g., carrying war materials." 187 This was be-
cause the Manual conferees agreed, after considerable discussion, that the NWP 
9A descriptive phrase "integration into the enemy's war-fightinglwar-sustaining 
effort" was too broad to use for a residual category.188 Three years later, however, 
the Helsinki Principles defined contraband as "goods ... designed for the use of war 
fighting and other goods useful for the war effort of the enemy.,,189 Although con-
traband only involves goods shipped to a belligerent port,190 if the Principles 
drafters were willing to accept such a broad definition for goods shipped to a bellig-
erent's port in a neutral-flag merchantmen, then logically they might well have ac-
cepted the NWP view of a residual category of integration into the enemy 
war-fighting or war-sustaining effort. Al though the issue is close, given worldwide 
use of NWP 9A and its successor,191 Category (7) follows the NWP model. To be 
sure, "war-sustaining" is not subject to precise definition, "effort" that indirectly 
but effectively supports and sustains a belligerent's warfighting capability is 
within the scope of the term. The varying language of the NWPs, the Manual and 
the Principles represents distinctions without differences for practice. 192 There is 
nothing unusual about this kind of phraseology. Naval targeting is governed by 
concepts like necessity and proportionality,193 the LOS recites a due regard 
principle194 to describe oceans usage sharing. "War-sustaining" is neither more 
nor less precise. State practice will determine what constitutes "war-sustaining," 
precisely as State practice has determined and will determine proportionality. 
On its face, the London Protocol would require, except for Categories (1) and 
(2) (persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or active resistance to visit 
and search) that a surface warship or submarine may not sink or render incapable 
of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and 
ship's papers in a safe place. The Protocol says the vessel's boats are not regarded as 
a safe place unless passenger and crew safety are assured under existing sea and 
weather conditions by proximity ofland or presence of another ship that can take 
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them aboard.195 The Protocol does not mention air attacks,196 although by 1936, 
when the Protocol was negotiated, attacks from the air were part of the experience 
of armed conflict. The 1923 Hague Air Rules, however, had restated the general 
rule of the military objective, and although the Rules recited this in a context of 
land targets, this general principle could be said to apply to maritime targets.197 
The issue is the vitality and scope of these London Protocol requirements, ne-
gotiated in 1936 with World War I experience in mind, in to day's law of naval war-
fare. The law of the sea,198 and since 1949 the Second Geneva Convention and 
Protocol 1,199 restate a customary rule200 requiring rescue of those in peril on the 
sea, and status of these persons, helpless against the elements unless assisted by 
others, undoubtedly has played an emotional role even though these principles do 
not apply to the Protocol issue. Sinking merchantmen, particularly ships with pas-
sengers aboard, e.g., liners, had been a highly charged issue during the Great 
War,201 and it was an emotional and legal issue in World War II, particularly dur-
ing the early years.202 Even after the currents of war swept liners from the seas, ex-
cept for use as troopships, for which they were (and are) liable to attack and 
destruction, 203 losses of merchant mariners after attacks was considerable.204 The 
Allies and the Axis did not follow Protocol standards during World War II, ini-
tially on a theory of reprisal and later because merchant ships were armed, con-
voyed, used as intelligence collectors, or otherwise incorporated into the war 
effort. Besides attacks from surface ships and submarines, merchantmen were also 
attacked by enemy aircraft.20S 
The Nuremberg trials of German Admirals Karl Doenitz and Erich Raeder did 
not resolve the issue. The admirals, inter alia found guilty of failing to rescue the 
shipwrecked, received no sentence on these counts because of evidence of wartime 
UK and US practice.206 
Post-World War II commentator opinion has also divided. Some say the Lon-
don Protocol is of no effect todar07 or not relevant in modern warfare,208 some say 
it has been cast in ambiguous light or is unrealistic,z°9 others say it remains in ef-
fect,210 and still others say it applies only to Categories (1) and (2), i.e., where a mer-
chant ship persistently refuses to stop upon due summons or actively resists visit 
and search, the Protocol's exact language,211 or does not apply to attacks from the 
air.212 
Military manuals show similar ambiguity. For example, the 1900 US Naval War 
Code said that prizes could be destroyed under certain conditions, e.g., un-
seaworthiness,213 reflecting the law and times when visit and search, as distin-
guished from diversion, was the typical way to deal with merchantmen. The US 
Navy's 1917 Instructions said a prize could be destroyed "in case of military neces-
sity," but only after visit and search and "persons on board have been placed in 
safety and also, if practicable, their personal effects." Documents aboard the prize 
were to be preserved. A neutral ship engaged in unneutral service "must not be 
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destroyed ... save in ... the gravest military emergency which would not justify 
[the capturing warship ] in releasing the vessel or sending it in for adjudication.,,214 
World War II US Navy manuals published the Protocol word for word but in a 
context of visit and search. They declared that since title to an enemy vessel vested 
in a captor through capture, "enemy ships made prizes may in case of military ne-
cessity be destroyed ... when they cannot be sent or escorted in for adjudication." 
In the ordinary case, if a neutral flag prize could not be sent or escorted in for adju-
dication, they should be released. Neutral prizes could also be destroyed, but be-
cause "responsibility ... for destroying a neutral prize is so serious that [a 
capturing warship] should never order such destruction without being entirely 
satisfied that the military reasons therefor justify it .... " In cases of enemy or neu-
tral prizes Protocol provisions for protecting passengers, crew and papers had to be 
observed.21S 
NWIP 10-2, published and revised by the US Navy as a naval warfare publica-
tion between September 1955 and October 1974,216 and declared not to be "a legis-
lative enactment binding upon courts and tribunals applying the rules ofwar,,,217 
was a major watershed in US naval thinking. The 1955 version, published as an 
Appendix to Tucker's Law o/War and Neutrality at Sea, written in 1955 but printed 
in 1957,218 represented the thinking of the US Navy when it was the largest naval 
power on Earth.219 The NWIP 10-2 text continues recitation of Protocol princi-
ples of safety of passengers, crew and papers as applicable to prize destruction.220 
In a note to this requirement, however, NWIP 10-2 refers these terms to its list of 
merchantmen that could be attacked and destroyed before capture. The note de-
clares in part: 
According to the customary and conventional law of naval warfare valid prior to 
World War II, a belligerent warship or military aircraft was forbidden to destroy an 
enemy merchant vessel or render her incapable of navigation without having first 
provided for the safety of passengers and crew; exception being made in the 
circumstances of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned or of active 
resistance to visit and search (or capture). 
After reciting the Protocol rules, the note says: "These rules, deemed declaratory 
of customary international law, have been interpreted as applicable to belligerent 
military aircraft in their action toward enemy merchant vessels," but that they 
have not been considered applicable to nonmilitary enemy aircraft. The note then 
recites World War II experience and mentions the Doenitz acquittal without say-
ing how these square with the prior analysis.221 The final version of NWIP 10-2 
(1974) follows the 1955 edition.222 
One reading ofNWIP 10-2 is that it means what it said, i.e., the Protocol recites 
customary law and attacking aircraft are bound by them too. Under this analysis, 
the result is that the NWIP 10-2 drafters at the Naval War College 223 came to a 
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different conclusion from Professor Tucker, a Stockton Professor ofInternational 
Law at the College (and later a consultant there),224 author of The Law afWar and 
Neutrality at Sea, which precedes the 1955 version of NWIP 10-2 in the same 
book.225 A second is that the drafters omitted a final part of the note, which would 
have concluded the law had changed because of World War II experience, the 
Doenitz judgment and perhaps treaty interpretation principles of desuetude, im-
possibility of performance (perhaps the situation of an aircraft which attacks an 
enemy merchantman), or fundamental change of circumstances because of the 
universal use of merchantmen, often armed and in convoys, lifting goods for the 
war effort in a global conflict.226 This is negated by earlier language in the note227 
and lack of amendments in six later manual supplements over nearly 20 years.228 A 
third is that the War College drafters intended the World War II experience as a 
"soft law" coda to the "hard law" of the Protocol and a parallel customary norm.229 
The difficulty with this is that these concepts were not part of international law 
analysis in 1955 and were only beginning to appear in 1974, when the last NWIP 
10-2 supplement was published. 230 The reason for the difference is thus not clear. 
The 1976 US Air Force manual quoted NWIP 10-2, noted trends in practice, 
and concluded: "The extent to which this traditional immunity of merchant ves-
sels, still formally recognized, will be observed in practice in future conflicts will 
depend upon the nature of the conflict, its intensity, the parties to the conflict and 
various geographical, political and military factors.,,231 
Ambiguities of the first round of post-World War II military manuals thus 
match the differences (and difficulties) among commentators. NWP 9A andNWP 
I-14M represent improvement. Besides adopting NWIP 1O-2's category approach 
for vessels subject to attack and destruction without warning, they publish the 
Protocol text, review World War II practice, note debate over the Protocol's valid-
ity as a current rule oflaw, and close thus: 
• . . [E]nemy merchant vessels may be attacked and destroyed by surface 
warships, ... with or without prior warning, in any of the following circumstances: 
. . . If integrated into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort and 
compliance with ... the ... Protocol would, under the circumstances of the specific 
encounter, subject the surface warship to imminent danger or would otherwise 
preclude mission accomplishment. 
TheNWPs then say that rules for surrender and search for the missing and collec-
tion of the shipwrecked, wounded, sick and the dead also apply to enemy mer-
chantmen and civil aircraft that may become subject to attack and destruction.232 
The NWPs then recite the same rules for submarines, including a statement that 
the Protocols apply to submarine attacks, but noting the "impracticality of 
imposing on submarines the same targeting constraints as burden surface warships 
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(being] reflected in the practice of belligerents of both sides during World War II 
when submarines regularly attacked and destroyed without warning enemy mer-
chant shipping[,]" justified as reprisal or as "a necessary consequence of the arm-
ing of merchant vessels, of convoying, and of the general integration of merchant 
shipping into the enemy's war-fightinglwar-sustaining effort." Like surface ships, 
submarines must search for the missing and collect the shipwrecked, sick and 
wounded, to the extent military exigencies permit, after an engagement. 233 A third 
analysis for aircraft attacks follows the pattern of those for surface warships and 
submarines, except that NWP I-14M adds armed merchantmen to the list, and 
places Category (2), active resistance to visit and search, in a footnote that would 
not be part of the commander's version of the manual. Moreover, the NWPs omit 
reference to the Protocol for aircraft attacks, a change from the NWIP 10-2 view, 
although they require military aircraft to search for the missing and collect the 
shipwrecked, wounded and sick, to the extent military exigencies permit.234 
The San Remo Manual, published in 1995 in between the NWPs, discusses the 
"failure" of the London Protocol235 but adopts its principles as a standard for cap-
tured merchantmen: 
... [A] captured enemy merchant vessel may, as an exceptional measure, be 
destroyed when military circumstances preclude taking or sending such a vessel for 
adjudication as an enemy prize, only if the following criteria are met beforehand: 
(a) the safety of passengers and crew is provided for; for this purpose, the ship's 
boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers 
and crew is assured in the prevailing sea and weather conditions by the prox-
imity of land or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take 
them on board; 
(b) documents and papers relating to the prize are safeguarded; and 
(c) if feasible, personal effects of the passengers and crew are saved. 
Destruction of enemy passenger vessels carrying only civilians at sea is prohibited. 
For passenger safety, these liners must be diverted to an "appropriate area" or port 
to complete capture. Thus except for a prohibition on destruction of passenger 
ships carrying only passengers, which must be diverted for completion of capture, 
the Manual adopts the Protocol's literal language, which says it applies to destruc-
tion of enemy merchantmen if they persistently refuse to stop upon being duly 
summoned or if they actively resist visit and search. The Manual does not state an 
alternative for disabling a vessel, mentioned in the Protocol. The Manual applies 
its terms to aircraft attacks under these circumstances.236 
The Manual treats the Protocol rules, like the rules for visit, search and destruc-
tion as alternatives to attack.237 In effect they are indicia of proportionality; the 
Manual says that "Indeed, it could be argued that according to the wording of the 
[London Protocol] ... destruction of merchant ships can be considered legal as 
long as passengers, crew and ship's papers have been placed in safety.,,238 One 
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should add that any right to destroy a merchantmen is subject to categories permit-
ting destruction239 and exemptions, e.g., for hospital ships.240 In effect, the Manual 
sees the Protocol principles as indicia of proportionality for particular situations 
in naval war.241 
Given the divergence among individual commentators, the collective effort of 
the Manual, and among operational law manuals, what is the status of the Protocol 
today? While it would appear that its literal language is not binding law, many of 
its policies are reflected in rules oflaw. A perhaps oversimplified analysis might 
be: 
1. If an enemy-flag merchantman falls within any of the categories listed 
above, clearly recognized in international law, it may be attacked and de-
stroyed without warning.242 
2. This principle is subject to an important qualification: Certain classes of 
merchantmen may never be attacked if they are operating within excep-
tions granted by law, e.g., hospital ships operating as such.243 
3. As an option to attack, a belligerent's warship may choose to visit and 
search, followed by destruction as an alternative to sending in as prize, 
with diversion as an option to completing visit and search on the high 
seas. As a further alternative to the foregoing, a warship may first order a 
merchant ship to divert to an appropriate place where visit and search 
may be conducted.244 
4. Principles of necessity and proportionality apply to all attacks.245 
5. Preserving crew's and passengers' lives and property, and ship's papers, 
are very important proportionality factors if necessity indicates an en-
emy merchantman's destruction is appropriate. The London Protocol 
states specific principles of necessity and proportionality. Even here, 
however, there are gradations, with passenger and crew effects having a 
lower priority than the lives of crew and passengers and ship's papers.246 
By the same token, a decisionmaker must take into account possible costs 
in his or her force members' lives, and property, if, e.g., visit and search as 
opposed to attack without warning is considered.247 While the LONW 
sets a high premium on humanity aboard the target ship through law 
flowing from the London Protocol and humanitarian law after destruc-
tion of a ship, where assistance is subject to circumstances after attack,248 
humankind aboard a belligerent platform before projected destruction of 
the target also has high value. Admiral Service has emphasized the value 
of human beings aboard a belligerent platform,249 risk of loss of life 
aboard each platform, the attacking platform(s) and the merchant ship, 
and the military value of the merchantman, must be thrown into the ne-
cessity and proportionality balance. It might be argued that this point is 
new to the LOAC and humanitarian law in particular, i.e., that lives 
aboard an attacking ship should not be taken into account in striking the 
proportionality balance. This argument does not square with emerging 
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basic principles of human rights law, which inter alia declare an "inherent 
right to life," which cannot be derogated during public emergency.250 
Nor does it square with the possibility that loss of "smart" attacking plat-
forms engaged in rescue may result in more casualties when that belliger-
ent must resort to less sophisticated weaponry that may entail greater loss 
oflife for both sides. Last, the argument flies in the face of a basic policy 
of the law of warfare, that it be conducted by means calculated to engen-
der the least bitterness and hatred, so that a more lasting and just peace 
can be more easily achieved at war's end.251 And while the latter is usu-
ally considered a problem of the defeated State, one might ask whether 
the Versailles victors' decisions for the vanquished Central Powers were 
partly motivated by the enormous loss oflife on the Western Front, and 
that these decisions contributed to what many have seen as onerous peace 
treaties that led to Adolf Hitler and World War II? Suppose the British 
invention of the tank had worked, the German lines had broken with rel-
atively light loss oflife, and there had been an armistice at that point? 
6. The foregoing apply to all modalities of attack, i.e., by surface warships, 
submarines, or aircraft.252 Different principles of proportionality and 
necessity may dictate different options for different platforms, indeed 
different options for the same platform under different conditions, e.g., 
size of the merchant ship, military value of its cargo, heavy or moderate 
seas, cold or temperate weather, relative nearness of enemy forces, etc. It 
does not seem logical, e.g., to say that aircraft attacks should not be con-
sidered in the light of London Protocol requirements. To be sure, an at-
tack jet cannot do much about placing crew and passengers in safety 
pursuant to strict Protocol standards, but a method of attack (e.g., ship-
disabling fire instead of ship-destroying weapons) might be appropriate, 
given the nature and military value of the cargo and ship, so that the crew 
could use lifeboats. By the opposite token, a large helicopter might be 
able to winch a surviving crewman of a small craft to safety aboard the he-
licopter under some circumstances, and that might be taken into ac-
count. Moreover, if attack will be coordinated among, e.g., three or more 
platforms, e.g., aircraft, surface warship and submarine, having different 
basic rules for each invites confusion. Operational plans or orders and 
ROE can spell out proportionate actions dictated by the situation. 
7. Although this Part has discussed attacks on enemy merchant ships in the 
LOAC context, the same kinds of necessity and proportionality are at 
play in the conditioning factors of necessity and proportionality in the 
self-defense253 context. The content of necessity and proportionality will 
be different; e.g., while a deliberate confrontation with an enemy mer-
chantman might dictate visit and search of e.g., a suspected intelligence-
transmitting merchantman (perhaps to have a look at its equipment be-
fore ordering destruction or other action) with Protocol provision for 
crew and passengers, while in a self-defense situation, particularly with 
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an immediate problem of anticipatory self-defense, destruction might be 
appropriate under self-defense necessity and proportionality principles. 
8. In any case, after the merchant vessel has been sunk, the attacking plat-
formes) must search for the missing and collect the shipwrecked, sick, 
wounded and dead in accordance with humanitarian law, taking into ac-
count "all possible measures," i.e., risk of hazard to the platform that has 
conducted an attack or destruction with the possibility of loss of addi-
tional life if the platform engages in this effort, the capabilities of the 
platform, etc. Thus a submarine, having legitimately attacked and sunk a 
ship, might not be able to conduct search and rescue because of danger to 
it from enemy attack while on the surface, with resultant loss of more life, 
because of hull configuration, or because of capacity on board to accom-
modate more people, the case of a small submarine. An attack jet might 
be able to do no more than report that there are survivors in the water, 
while some helicopters, depending on the operational situation and their 
size and capabilities, might be able to pick up some or all. A surface war-
ship might be able to pick up all, unless there is the possibility of success-
ful fatal attack on the warship with more resultant casualties or heavy 
seas; this occurred after sinking of the Bismarck during World War II. On 
the other hand, if destruction occurs after visit and search, and there is no 
possibility of attack on the visiting platform(s) with resultant loss of crew 
in perhaps a combined surface ship and helicopter operation, humanitar-
ian law dictates picking up survivors if, e.g., the merchantman's lifeboats 
do not operate properly or it appears London Protocol requirements can-
not otherwise be met.254 
9. Principles 1-8 are subject to UN Security Council decisions and actions 
taken pursuant to them.255 
This seems an appropriate way to cut the Gordian Knot of responding to mod-
ern warfare's technological realities,256 London Protocol requirements and Sec-
ond Convention and Protocol I principles for an attack or destruction otherwise 
legitimate under the LOAC or self-defense principles. 
The foregoing assumes a potentially legitimate target. The LOAC, and human-
itarian law in particular, has declared that certain objects, enemy-flag vessels or en-
emy-flag civil aircraft, are not legitimate objects of capture or attack, if they are 
employed in their capacity exempting them from capture or attack, do not commit 
acts harmful to an opposing enemy, immediately submit to identification and in-
spection when required, do not hamper combatants' movements, and obey bel-
ligerents' orders to stop or move out of the way when required.257 If, e.g., they are 
not so employed or do not obey orders to stop for, e.g., visit and search, they may be 
subject to other action, e.g., attack and destruction under some circumstances. Ex-
empt vessels include: 
376 The Tanker War 
1. Hospital ships;258 
2. Small craft used for coastal rescue operations and other medical trans-
ports;259 
3. Cartel ships, i.e., vessels belligerents grant safe conduct for transporting 
prisoners of war, diplomats or other noncombatants, e.g., civilians from a 
war zone or repatriated civilians;260 
4. Ships engaged in humanitarian missions, including those carrying sup-
plies indispensable to civilian population survival, and ships engaged in 
relief or rescue operations, pursuant to the belligerents' agreement;261 
5. Ships transporting cultural property under special protection;262 
6. Passenger vessels when engaged only in carrying civilian passengers;263 
7. Ships on religious, scientific or philanthropic missions;264 
8. Small coastal fishing vessels or small boats in local coastal trade;265 
9. Vessels designed or adapted exclusively for responding to pollution inci-
dents involving the marine environment, perhaps not a customary norm 
but introduced by the San Remo Manual;266 
10. Ships or vessels of any size (e.g., boats) or aircraft that have surren-
dered;267 
11. Life rafts and lifeboats;268 or 
12. Vessels a belligerent gives a unilateral safe-conduct or license, perhaps by 
proclamation.269 
There is no customary exemption for ships driven ashore by force majeure.270 Mail 
ships are not exempt; there seems to be no custom to exempt them, although the is-
sue is not free of doubt. 271 However, if a mail ship, e.g., R.M.S. (Royal Mail Ship) Ti-
tanic (lost in 1912) is exempt for another reason, e.g. Titanic, as a passenger liner 
carrying only passengers and no military cargo, it normally would not be subject to 
capture or attack.272 Enemy merchant vessels in an belligerent's port, unless they 
are otherwise exempt, e.g., a hospital ship or a passenger vessel with only civilian 
passengers aboard, are not exempt from capture or attack.273 
By the opposite token, if a ship othenvise exempt from attack is used for war ef-
fort,274 or if it is otherwise used in activity that removes it from exempt status,275 
that ship may be subject to capture or attack, depending on circumstances.276 
Rules of engagement or operational plans or orders can direct options, e.g., diver-
sion instead of visit and search, limit capture or destruction of vessels not other-
wise exempt, etc. 277 
Certain kinds of enemy civil aircraft are also exempt from attack: 
1. Medical aircraft;278 
2. Aircraft granted safe conduct by belligerents;279 or 
3. Civil airliners.280 
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As with exempt enemy merchant vessels and exempt ships, enemy aircraft other-
wise exempt can lose this status under certain conditions,281 they are subject to 
self-defense considerations282 and UN Security Council decisions.283 Rules of en-
gagement or operation plans or orders can further limit capture or destruction of 
aircraft not otherwise exempt.284 
2. Acquiring Enemy Character 
Neutral merchantmen may acquire enemy character by acting in various capac-
ities on behalf of belligerents. Part D discusses this. 
3. Convoying by Belligerents 
Principles applicable to neutral warships' convoying, escorting or accompany-
ing neutral merchantmen that are not carrying goods for a belligerent's war effort 
have been discussed.285 When a belligerent's warships or military aircraft convoy, 
escort or accompany merchantmen flying its flag, the result is quite different. 
These convoys are presumed to be military convoys and, being lawful military ob-
jectives,286 are subject to attack, with or without warning, and may be defended by 
the convoying State, just as independently steaming merchantmen may be pro-
tected.287 The exception is if the convoy, escorted ship or accompanied ship is en-
titled to protected status, i.e., coastal fishing vessels engaged in their trade and not 
contributing to the enemy war effort.288 An enemy warship or military aircraft, 
unless exempted, e.g., as part of a cartel ship operation, is subject to attack even if 
the convoyed, escorted or accompanied vessels are not. 
4. Principles of Contraband 
The law of contraband in naval warfare only applies to goods inbound to a bel-
ligerent.289 Goods with a neutral destination coming from a belligerent's port can-
not be contraband.290 This is not to say, however, that these goods may not be 
classified as aiding the enemy war effort, i.e., warfighting or war-sustaining goods, 
and therefore subject to an opponent's options, discussed in Parts C.l - C.Z, which 
include visit and search, diversion, and in some circumstances, e.g., when under 
enemy direction or control, attack and destruction of the vessel. Contraband was 
associated with neutral-flag merchantmen during the Tanker War, if at all, and the 
principal discussion is in Part D. 
5. The Tanker War 
Did Iran and Iraq comply with the principles of attack and destruction of en-
emy-flag merchantmen291 during the Tanker War? Iran conducted visit and search 
operations on numerous merchant ships during the war,292 but there is no firm ev-
idence of attempts to destroy these ships incident to these operations. Iraq, lacking 
much of a navy or aircraft capable of visit and search, did not use these procedures. 
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The question then comes to the legitimacy ofIraqi air attacks on Irani-flag mer-
chantmen, and oflranian air and surface attacks on Iraqi-flag merchantmen. Un-
fortunately, the record is not clear as to whether these attacks, as distinguished 
from attacks on neutral-flag merchant ships,293 occurred. Analysis proceeds on an 
assumption that these attacks occurred. 
The record is fairly clear that these attacks did not involve destruction of ex-
empted vessels or aircraft, e.g., hospital ships or civil airliners.294 There were no 
claims of self-defense attacks on them. There were no Security Council decisions 
affecting these aspects of the war. All belligerent attacks were conducted under the 
law of naval warfare. 
Given Iraqi propensity to use long-distance weapons to attack merchantmen of 
whatever flag, without discrimination between those carrying war-fighting or 
war-sustaining goods or otherwise subject to attack without warning295 and those 
with other cargoes, the attacks clearly lacked proportionality, unless in the case of 
cargoes subject to attack Iraq knew, or had reason to know at the time,296 of the na-
ture of the cargoes. Attacks on vessels not carrying these goods might be excused if 
it is assumed that these were cases oflegitimate collateral damage,297 e.g., where an 
attack conducted against a proper target results in a missile's seeking and hitting 
another vessel, despite the attacking platform's best efforts. The same can be said 
of similar Iranian attacks. Since attack jets conducted these attacks, as a practical 
matter of this ,:varfare mode (and as a matter oflaw, ifit is accepted thatthe London 
Protocol does not apply to aircraft attacks298) there was little to no opportunity for 
humanitarian law survivor assistance. Perhaps the belligerents notified other ves-
sels of the survivors;299 the record is silent on the point. Iflran and Iraq had reason 
to know there were survivors (which cannot be assumed, given the fog of war and 
the distances from which some attacks were conducted), and did not do what was 
feasible under the circumstances, there were humanitarian law violations. 
Iranian attacks by surface warships, whether destroyer types or speedboats, and 
its helicopter attacks stand on different footing. Here Iran had a much better op-
portunity for other options. In some situations, to be sure, there was a risk oflraqi 
attack on belligerent forces at sea, and under these circumstances, attack in lieu of 
other operations was a permissible mode. However, in cases where there was no 
possibility of attack, the option of visit and search or diversion should have been 
given strong,perhaps imperative, consideration, if this option was feasible. Ifvisit 
and search had been conducted, and destruction were ordered by a surface combat-
ant, compliance with London Protocol and humanitarian law requirements was 
mandatory. Given that attack was a valid option, the issue is whether the attack was 
necessary and proportional under circumstances known or which should have 
been known at the time.300 The record on this issue is less than clear, and will 
likely be forever enshrouded. The same can be said oflran's duty to attend to survi-
vors in the water. If it was possible, Iran should have searched for the missing, 
Law of Armed Conflict 379 
shipwrecked, sick, wounded or dead after an engagement.301 In many cases, partic-
ularly those involving surface ship attacks, Iran probably had a capability to do so 
and did not. If so, Iran was guilty of humanitarian law violations. 
Iranian warships and perhaps other platforms (e.g., military helicopters, fixed-
wing aircraft) convoyed tankers carrying petroleum down its coast, using Iranian 
coastal waters as much as possible.302 Iranian-flag merchantmen were subject to 
Iraqi attack while being convoyed; Iran could defend these ships under the LOAC, 
like any other Iraqi target.303 As will be seen, neutral flag merchantmen participat-
ing in these convoys were also subject to attack.304 These convoys should be distin-
guished from situations where neutral-flag warships convoyed, escorted or 
accompanied neutral-flag merchantmen carrying cargoes that were not part of the 
belligerents' war efforts; these convoys were not subject to belligerent attacks as le-
gitimate targets.305 In either case, however, the humanitarian law or LOS rules for 
survivors, etc., applied.306 
Neutral-flag warships could respond in self-defense to belligerents' air and sur-
face ship attacks on merchant vessels flying the warship's flag, or the flag of an-
other neutral if that neutral requested it, if the merchantmen were not lifting 
belligerent war-fighting or war-sustaining goods,307 the merchantmen steamed 
independently, or were convoyed, escorted or accompanied.308 Neutral warships 
and merchantmen they convoyed, escorted or accompanied had obligations to see 
to the missing, shipwrecked, sick, wounded or dead after each engagement.309 
Other merchantmen in the area of the engagement but not involved in the attack 
also had an LOS duty to assist with search and rescue.310 Duties of ships involved 
in the engagement devolved from the LOAC as applied under the law of self-
defense311 through the LOS conventions' "other rules" clauses, the customary law 
of the sea, and Article 103 of the Charter,312 other ships in the area but not involved 
in the engagement only had LOS obligations.313 
Similarly, neutrals could respond to what were perceived to be air, mine or sur-
face ship attacks on their military aircraft or warships314 in self-defense,315 but in 
these cases neutrals also had obligations to see to the missing, shipwrecked, sick, 
wounded or dead after each engagement.316 In these situations as well, the LOS 
did not apply during the engagement; duties to rescue, etc., devolved from the 
LOAC as applied under the law of self-defense317 through the LOS conventions' 
other rules clauses, the customary law of the sea, and Article 103 of the Charter.318 
Merchantmen in the area but not involved in the engagement were obligated to at-
tempt rescue pursuant to the LOS.319 
Although the record is not clear, perhaps owing to the fog of war or incomplete 
reporting, there is no indication that neutral military aircraft, warships and mer-
chantmen involved in air or surface attacks on them did not attempt to succor vic-
tims after these attacks by Iran or Iraq, or the occasional erroneous and tragic 
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attacks by neutral forces on neutral aircraft (e.g. the U.S.S. Vincennes incident) or 
neutral-flag shipping (e.g., firings on dhows or fishing vessels).320 
There appear to have been no incidents of battles between Iranian and Iraqi na-
val, air or other military forces over the high seas; their territorial seas, continental 
shelves, EEZs, or contiguous zones; or neutrals' EEZs or continental shelves. Con-
sequently, the general rule (subject to important qualifications) allowing belliger-
ent combat in these areas, as well as belligerents' inland waters and territories,321 
was not at stake during the Tanker War. Similarly, there was no application of the 
requirement to recover those lost at sea or the dead.322 The story was far different 
on land and in belligerents' inland waters, but these aspects of the conflict are be-
yond this volume's scope. 
Part D. Neutral Flag Merchantmen: Enemy Character; 
Reflagging; Contraband 
During the Tanker War, neutral flag merchantmen carried much of the trade 
between the belligerents and the outside world,323 apart from petroleum Iraq 
pumped through pipelines to Turkey, Syria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,324 Iran 
through pipelines to its southern Gulf ports, 325 and perhaps through pipelines to 
the USSR 326 Iran conducted visit and search operations aboard neutral flag mer-
chantmen, looking for cargoes destined to benefit the Iraqi war effort;327 both 
belligerents attacked and damaged or destroyed some of these ships, sometimes by 
surface ship or aircraft attacks, but also by mining.328 Iran published a contraband 
list late in the war.329 
This Part examines claims related to these issues, specifically whether and 
when neutral flag merchantmen acquired enemy character so as to render them 
amenable to attack because they, e.g., lifted warfightinglwar-sustaining goods for a 
belligerent's war effort; the effect of reflagging; and the doctrine of contraband, in-
cluding the continuous voyage rule. If a neutral merchant ship or aircraft has not 
acquired enemy character, it may be subject to approach and visit under the law of 
the sea,330 or visit and search pursuant to the law of armed conflict,331 but it is oth-
erwise exempt from capture or attack and destruction, and doubly so if it is an 
exempt vessel or aircraft.332 Neutral exempt vessels may also acquire enemy 
character. 
1. Vessels and Aircraft that Have or Acquire Enemy Character 
A ship operating under an enemy flag or an aircraft with enemy markings pos-
sesses enemy character. Just because a merchant ship flies a neutral flag or an air-
craft has neutral markings does not necessarily establish neutral character. Any 
merchantman or aircraft a belligerent owns or controls has enemy character, re-
gardless of whether it is operating under a neutral flag or has neutral markings.333 
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An opposing belligerent may treat ships or aircraft acquiring enemy character as if 
they are enemy vessels or aircraft.334 
Neutral ships and civil aircraft are primafacie neutral in character iffiying a neu-
tral flag or bearing neutral markings.335 They acquire enemy character, and a bel-
ligerent may treat them as enemy warships or military aircraft if they take direct 
part in hostilities on the enemy's side or act in any capacity as a naval or military 
auxiliary in enemy armed forces. This unneutral service makes them subject to 
capture, attack and destruction as though they were enemy-flag warships.336 
Neutral merchant ships and civil aircraft acquire enemy character, and a bellig-
erent may treat them as enemy merchantmen or civil aircraft, if they are operating 
directly under enemy control, orders, charter, employment or direction, including 
operating in convoys escorted by belligerent aircraft and/or warships.337 Under 
these circumstances they may be subject to visit and search, diversion, capture, at-
tack or destruction, depending on the situation and perhaps whether they are in an 
exempt category of ship.338 Neutral merchant ships or civil aircraft that retain 
neutral character also may be captured and perhaps destroyed, and may be at-
tacked if they resist visit and search or diversion,339 if they: 
1. Avoid attempts to identify them; 
2. Resist visit and search; 
3. Carry contraband; 
4. Break or attempt to break blockade; 
5. Present irregular or fraudulent ship's papers, lack necessary ship's pa-
pers, or destroy, conceal or deface ship's papers; 
6. Violate rules a belligerent establishes for the immediate area of naval 
operations; 
7. Carry personnel in the enemy's military or public service; or 
8. Communicate information in the enemy's interest, e.g., by communicat-
ing belligerent warship movements on the high seas.340 
A neutral platform may be liable to capture if it engages in more than one of these, 
e.g., by resisting visit and search while carrying an opposing belligerent's military 
personnel. Neutral merchantmen are not liable to capture because they carry mili-
tary or public service personnel or for communicating information in the enemy's 
interest, at the beginning of a war, if the ship is unaware of the opening ofhostili-
ties or, in the case of military, etc., passengers has not been able to disembark them 
after learning of the opening of hostilities. A vessel is deemed to know about a war 
ifit leaves an enemy port after war begins, or ifit leaves a neutral port after notice of 
hostilities has been made in sufficient time to a neutral whose port the merchantman 
departs. Because of the ease of worldwide communications today, there is a pre-
sumption that the merchantman knows of the outbreak ofhostilities.341 Captured 
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vessels are sent in for adjudication as prize; they may be destroyed under certain 
circumstances.342 
As in the case of enemy flag merchantmen, these specific principles are subject 
to the general principles of necessity and proportionality, either in the context of 
self-defense or the LONW, depending on the circumstances.343 Under the LOAC 
the belligerent whom these vessels serve may defend them, like any legitimate mil-
itary target. They are also subject to any UN Security Council decisions on the sit-
uation.344 
If a neutral merchant vessel or civil aircraft has taken direct part in hostilities, 
e.g. by operating as a military auxiliary for enemy forces,345 its officers and crew 
may be made prisoners of war. On the other hand, officers and crew of neutral ships 
or aircraft that have acquired enemy character by other means, e.g., operating in an 
enemy convoy,346 must be repatriated as soon as circumstances permit.347 Enemy 
nationals who are armed forces members, employed in the enemy's public service 
or are suspected of service in the enemy's interests, may be prisoners of war. They 
may be removed from the neutral vessel or aircraft regardless of whether the plat-
form is subject to capture as prize. Other enemy nationals are not subject to capture 
or detention.348 These humanitarian law principles may be subject to Security 
Council decisions.349 
2. The Effect of Reflagging 
The law of the sea has developed detailed, ifless than clear, provisions for vessel 
nationality and therefore when a vessel may fly a State's flag.350 These do not apply 
during armed conflict.3S1 During war a merchantman flying an enemy flag is con-
clusively presumed to have enemy character.352 A merchantman flying a neutral 
flag is prima facie presumed to have neutral character.353 The question of when 
there is a proper transfer of flag from a belligerent to a neutral is less than clear; 
prize court decisions go either way on whether the test is nationality or domi-
cile.354 This issue cannot arise if a neutral-flag vessel validly transfers its flag pur-
suant to the law of the sea to another neutral as long as the nature of the carriage 
does not change. These principles are subject to any Security Council decisions on 
the subject in a particular conflict.355 
3. Contraband Issues 
The law of contraband deals with cargoes inbound to a belligerent.356 Outbound 
cargoes from a belligerent cannot be classified as contraband under traditional 
law.357 However, they may be subject to other principles, e.g., material that con-
tributes to a belligerent's warfightinglwar-sustaining capability.358 
Traditionally goods shipped to the enemy have been divided into absolute con-
traband, goods whose character makes it obvious they are destined for use in war; 
conditional contraband, goods that can either be used for war or for other 
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purposes, e.g., food; "free goods," cargo that is not considered contraband under 
any circumstances. Belligerents sometimes published contraband lists,359 which 
often varied according to circumstances of the war.360 Practice during the World 
Wars distorted differences between absolute and conditional contraband;361 nev-
ertheless, in some recent conflicts belligerents have published contraband lists.362 
Treaties tried to define rules for absolute and conditional contraband and free 
goods. For example, the unratified 1909 London Declaration said these might be 
treated as absolute contraband without notice to other States: 
(1) Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive 
component parts. 
(2) Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their distinctive compo-
nentparts. 
(3) Powder and explosives specially prepared for use in war. 
(4) Gun-mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons, field forges, and 
their distinctive component parts. 
(5) Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character. 
(6) All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character. 
(7) Saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war. 
(8) Articles of camp equipment, and their distinctive component parts. 
(9) Armour plates. 
(10) Warships, including boats, and their distinctive component parts of such a 
nature that they can only be used on a vessel of war. 
(11) Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of muni-
tions of war, for the manufacture or repair of arms, or war material for use on 
land or sea. 
Articles used exclusively for war might be added to a list of absolute contraband, 
which had to be published.363 The Declaration had a similar long list for condi-
tional contraband, which could be captured without notice to other States ifused 
for war purposes: 
(1) Foodstuffs. 
(2) Forage and grain, suitable for feeding animals. 
(3) Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes, suitable for use in war. 
(4) Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money. 
(5) Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their component parts. 
(6) Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds; floating docks, parts of docks and their 
component parts. 
(7) Railway material, both fixed and rolling-stock, and material for telegraphs, 
wireless telegraphs, and telephones. 
(8) Balloons and flying machines and their distinctive component parts, together 
with accessories and articles recognizable as intended for use in connection 
with balloons and flying machines. 
(9) Fuel; lubricants. 
(10) Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war. 
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(11) Barbed wire and implements for fL;::ing and cutting the same. 
(12) Horseshoes and shoeing materials. 
(13) Harness and saddlery. 
(14) Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of nautical instrumen ts. 
More items could be added to a conditional contraband list by notice to States.364 
Countries could also publish items for which they had waived status as contra-
band.365 World War I belligerents soon rejected this list as all-inclusive.366 
The Declaration also stated that "Articles which are not susceptible of use in 
war may not be declared contraband of war," i.e., they would be considered free 
goods. It then attempted a comprehensive list of these: 
(1) Raw cotton, wool, silk, jute, flax, hemp, and other raw materials of the textile 
industries, and yarns of the same. 
(2) Oil seeds and nuts; copra. 
(3) Rubber, resins, gums, and lacs; hops. 
(4) Raw hides and horns, bones, and ivory. 
(5) Natural and artificial manures, including nitrates and phosphates for agricul-
tural purposes. 
(6) Metallic ores. 
(7) Earths, clays, lime, chalk, stone, including marble, bricks, slates, and tiles. 
(8) Chinaware and glass. 
(9) Paper and paper-making materials. 
(10) Soap, paint and colors, including articles exclusively used in their manufac-
ture, and varnish. 
(11) Bleaching powder, soda ash, caustic soda, salt cake, ammonia, sulphate of am-
monia, and sulphate of copper. 
(12) Agricultural, mining, textile, and printing machinery. 
(13) Precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, mother-of-pearl, and coral. 
(14) Clocks and watches, other than chronometers. 
(15) Fashion and fancy goods. 
(16) Feathers of all kinds, hairs, and bristles. 
(17) Articles of household furniture and decoration; office furniture and 
requisites. 
(18) Articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded, which in case of"ur-
gent military necessity" and subject to payment of compensation could be req-
uisitioned if not destined for the enemy. 
(19) Articles intended for the use of the vessel in which they are found, as well as 
those intended for use of her crew and passengers during the voyage.367 
These lists' very length and complexity articulates problems States discovered five 
years later when World War I began. As with weapons development and arms con-
trol agreements today, technology had already begun to outrun the lists.368 Abso-
lute contraband lists began to swell, and there were constant disputes over 
conditional contraband. The free goods lists shrank.369 A modern list, of free 
goods, reflecting recent humanitarian law conventions, includes: 
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(a) Religious objects; 
(b) Articles intended exclusively for treatment of the wounded and sick and for 
disease prevention; 
(c) Clothing, bedding, essential foodstuffs, and means of shelter for the civilian 
population in general, and women and children in particular, provided there 
is not serious reason to believe such goods will be diverted to other purpose, or 
that a definite military advantage would not accrue to the enemy by their sub-
stitution for enemy goods that would thereby become available for military 
purposes; 
(d) Items destined for prisoners of war, including individual parcels and collec-
tive relief shipments containing food, clothing, educational, cultural and rec-
reational articles; 
(e) Goods otherwise specifically exempted from capture by international treaty or 
by special arrangement between belligerents; and 
(1) Other goods not susceptible of use in armed conflict.31O 
Modern LONW manuals and other publications have abandoned distinctions 
between absolute and conditional contraband.371 US Navy W orId War I and II in-
structions published abbreviated lists of what was contraband, saying that articles 
and materials exempted by treaty provisions, e.g., with still-extant bilateral agree-
ments, would not be contraband, and that upon outbreak of or during hostilities 
the United States might publish lists of other items. This was followed by other 
States. There was no free goods list.372 
Current US naval manuals take the position that if a State wishes to seize ships 
and goods for carrying contraband, all that is necessary is a publication of a free 
goods list.373 The San Remo Manual takes the opposite view; a belligerent must 
publish a contraband list before goods may be seized on this account.374 The Lon-
don Declaration had required publication of all items not on its absolute or condi-
tional contraband lists.375 (The Helsinki Principles take no position on the 
issue.376) Now that the Declaration lists are obsolete, is the notice requirement 
also obsolete? 
Given the uncertainty of what mayor may not be contraband, and uncertainty 
of a publication requirement, a more prudent course is for States to publish contra-
band lists; this likely remains a requirement of international law. 377 They must 
publish lists of free goods despite treaty lists,378 must publish notice of war 
zones,379 must let neutrals know about areas of naval operations,380 and must pub-
lish blockade declarations.381 Proper publication of contraband and free goods 
lists would not limit applying a belligerent's other options, e.g., visit and 
search, diversion, capture, attack, destruction, etc., of neutral merchantmen 
that have acquired enemy character, e.g., by serving as intelligence collectors for 
the enemy or sailing in enemy convoy.382 Published contraband and free goods lists 
should begin with a general warning that a belligerent reserves rights to visit and 
search, divert, capture, attack, destroy, etc., neutral merchant ships under the law 
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of naval warfare, if that is the case. Publishing a contraband list, and labeling 
items as absolute contraband, would inform all that these cargoes, and vessels 
that carry them, may be subject to condemnation as prize. Similarly, publish-
ing a free goods list, with warnings that these goods, if used for enemy 
war-figh ting or war-sustaining effort or for other reasons that would subject the 
vessel to visit and search, diversion, capture, attack or destruction, would clar-
ify what is considered free goods. An option to the latter would be a general no-
tice, to the effect that the proclaiming belligerent will observe its 1949 Geneva 
Conventions obligations and other humanitarian law the belligerent recog-
nizes, e.g., Protocol 1.383 Since much of the latter is customary law, a belligerent 
would be bound by it regardless of being a treaty party, but even here pUblication 
would clarify the issue. As in the case of cartel ships and similar vessels, 
belligerents could make special arrangements for the conflict;384 while this might 
be likely for free goods, particularly those of a humanitarian nature, a special agree-
ment on contraband is much less likely. Publishing contraband lists with warn-
ings of alternatives the belligerent might pursue, could have a practical effect, from 
a proclaiming belligerent's point of view, of deterring shipping from accepting 
these cargoes. Such a proclamation could, of course, be a lightning rod for debates 
like those that erupted during World Wars I and II over contraband definitions. 385 
Yet another option is for belligerents to arrange for certificates of noncontra-
band carriage, i.e., navicerts, aircerts and/or clearcerts, a customary practice of two 
World Wars and as late as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Under this procedure a 
belligerent agrees with a neutral State that the belligerent's consular officers may 
issue certificates stating that a ship's or aircraft's cargo has been found free of con-
traband. Issuance of these certificates may minimize visit and search by the issuing 
belligerent, although unneutral service of another kind, e.g., serving as an intelli-
gence collector for the enemy, etc., may result in action by that belligerent. Certifi-
cates issued by one belligerent have no effect on visit and search, etc., rights of other 
belligerents. A neutral vessel's or aircraft's accepting a certificate does not consti-
tute unneutral service.386 
The continuous voyage rule may apply to contraband issues. In 1856 the Paris 
Declaration laid down now-customary rules that neutral flags cover enemy goods, 
except contraband and that neutral goods except contraband are not liable to cap-
ture under an enemy's flag (free ships, free goods).387 
The London Declaration declared absolute contraband liable to capture if des-
tined to enemy or enemy-occupied territory or to enemy armed forces. "It is imma-
terial whether the carriage of goods is direct or entails transshipment or a 
subsequent transport by land." Conditional contraband is liable to capture if des-
tined for enemy armed forces or an enemy government department, unless cir-
cumstances in the latter case show the goods cannot be used for the war in progress, 
currency and bullion excepted. Conditional contraband is not liable to capture 
Law of Armed Conflict 387 
unless found aboard a vessel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the 
enemy, "and when it is not to be discharged in an intervening port." The sole ex-
ception is where the enemy has no seaboard. The continuous voyage rule, as re-
fined by the London Declaration, says that if goods declared absolute contraband, 
however defined, are bound for an enemy port or for a neutral port with provision 
for transshipment to the enemy, or if goods declared conditional contraband, how-
ever defined, are bound for an enemy that has no seaboard, those cargoes may be 
captured.388 
Conditional contraband destined for a neutral's port, with provision for trans-
shipment to the enemy, cannot be captured under the continuous voyage rule. 
This rule cannot apply to cargoes outbound from enemy or neutral ports, since 
contraband principles apply only to inbound traffic. The rule cannot apply if there 
has been no declaration of contraband. Finally, the rule as stated in the London 
Declaration may have become a relic of the past, given longstanding trends toward 
blurring distinctions between absolute and conditional contraband,389 or not de-
claring contraband at all and relying on capture, etc., for neutral merchant ships 
carrying goods supporting or sustaining the enemy war effort, or other bases of 
capture, etc.390 
These principles are subject to UN Security Council decisions on the issue.391 
4. The Tanker War 
Neutral vessels carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining cargoes destined directly 
to Iraq or Iran, or invoiced to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAB or other neutral States 
for later transhipment, perhaps overland, to either of those belligerent States, were 
subject to visit and search.392 Some of these neutral merchantmen acquired enemy 
character and became subject to possible attack and destruction.393 Those sailing 
in coastal convoys organized, directed and physically protected by Iran were a 
clear example.394 To the extent that they were convoyed, directed or protected by 
Iran, neutral tankers carrying oil from Kharg and other Iranian ports, and there-
fore lifting war-sustaining cargoes, also acquired enemy character and were like-
wise subject to attack.395 
On the other hand, Iraq, having lost its coast and ports for most of the war,396 
could not ship oil direct by sea. It could only ship through pipelines to neutrals for 
eventual lifting through Gulf and Mediterranean Sea ports, and then only after oil 
had been sold to these neutrals and had become neutral property. The last points 
seem to be the factual record.397 Under these circumstances, as a technical matter 
oflaw, if these were bonafide sales to neutrals, and the oil thereby became the prop-
erty of neutral States or their nationals, vessels carrying this oil did not acquire en-
emy character. Any attacks on them were not valid under international law, and 
there was nothing invalid for neutrals to convoy, escort or accompany these ships. 
(On the other hand, if the sales were shams, or if Iraq retained title until final 
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destination, the rule would be the opposite. There is no indication that the transac-
tions were anything but arms-length and that title passed on neutral territory, e.g., 
in Kuwait.)398 
Neutrals protested Iran's legitimate right to visit and search neutral flag mer-
chant ships.399 If these protests had led to active resistance to visit and search, Iran 
could have used forceful means, up to and including destruction, to overcome that 
resistance.400 No Iranian attacks appear to have occurred on this basis. 
Reflagging Kuwait-owned tankers to the US ensign, and others to other neu-
trals' flags, comported with the law of the sea. Since the tankers were registered 
with a neutral State, and re-registered with another neutral country, LONW rules 
on transferring flag from belligerent to neutral did not apply. The reflagging was 
valid under the LONW; it was valid under the LOS.401 
The law of contraband had little impact on the Tanker War. First, since its prin-
ciples can only apply to cargo inbound to a belligerent,402 the law of contraband 
was not involved with shipments of oil outbound by the belligerents themselves. 
The contiguous voyage rule403 cannot have applied to shipments through pipeline 
connections to neutrals (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey for Iraq, perhaps the 
USSR for Iran); these too were outbound shipments, for which contraband law 
does not apply. 
Only in January 1988 did Iran appear to publish a contraband list, the Iran Prize 
Law, which inter alia declared as prize merchandise and means of transport belong-
ing to neutral States or their nationals, if the merchandise or means of transport 
could contribute effectively to the enemy's combat power, or if the means of trans-
port, either directly or through a neutral intermediary, was an enemy ofIran.404 
This generalized statement was consonant with recent statements, either of situa-
tions where an opposing belligerent could attack a merchantman that had ac-
quired enemy character because it carried war-fighting or war-sustaining cargo 
while under enemy direction or control,40S or of the definition of contraband it-
self.406 The Prize Law also appeared to recognize the foregoing principles, i.e., 
contraband rules applied only to inbound traffic, and the continuous voyage 
rule.407 To be sure, perhaps from caution, the United States and other countries 
declared their convoy, escort and accompanying operations did not involve con-
traband-carrying neutral merchantmen or goods contributing to belligerents' war 
efforts,408 but there is no indication that these statements applied to more than in-
bound traffic, e.g., tankers in ballast headed for Kuwait. There is nothing in these 
statements by neutrals to indicate there had been prior contraband proclamations 
by Iran or Iraq. They were merely statements of conformity with international law, 
which permits neutral warship convoy of neutral merchantmen not carrying con-
traband.409 
Moreover, ifit is accepted that publication of contraband lists is a requirement of 
internationallaw,410 any Iranian captures on claims of contraband before January 
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1988 were not valid. The same can be said for any Iraqi captures during the conflict, 
since apparently Iraq never published a contraband list. The record on these 
points is not clear as to whether there were any captures on this basis by either 
belligerent. 
There is also no record of issues relating to free goods, and particularly items 
which should pass to a belligerent bysea under humanitarian law. Nor is there any 
indication of employing navicerts or similar procedures.411 Similarly, there were 
no UN Security Council decisions affecting these LONW issues.412 However, as 
analyzed earlier, it seems fairly clear that standards of necessity and proportional-
itywere not observed, particularly by Iraq in its long range, fire and forget attacks. 
Moreover, the method ofIran's attacks on these merchantmen, even if warranted 
under the LONW, indicates that necessity and proportionality principles were not 
observed in all cases.413 
Part E. The Law of Blockade and the Tanker War 
There were statements early in the war about "blockade" ofIraq's small coast-
line and Iraq's Kharg Island "blockade," mostly by commentators.414 The theme 
of this Part is that neither belligerent could have effectively invoked the law of 
blockade during the war. 
1. The UN Charter and the Law of Blockade 
The UN Charter, Article 42 declares that the Security Council may take action, 
including blockade, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Arti-
cle 42 has never been formally invoked.41S The Council authorized interdiction of 
petroleum bound for Rhodesia in 1965, but not a blockade,416 although a commen-
tator says the operation was a form of "pacific blockade," i.e., blockading a coast 
during time of peace, probably not allowed as a measure for States under the UN 
Charter.417 It maybe argued, however, that Article 42 indirectly supported the UN 
forces' North Korea blockade, pursuant to Council decisions418 to aid South Ko-
rea.419 Since Council decisions may supersede at least treaty law, 420 the traditional 
law may not apply in blockade operations when Council decisions authorize or di-
rect action.421 
2. Blockade Under the Law of Naval Warfare 
The traditional law of blockade, recited mostly in custom or commentators' 
views,422 may be stated fairly simply. Unlike issues related to contraband, which is 
concerned with traffic inbound to a belligerent,423 blockade is a belligerent's right 
to prevent vessels or aircraft of all countries, enemy and neutral, from entering or 
leaving specified ports, airfields or coastal areas under the sovereignty, occupation 
or control of the enemy. Belligerent visit and search interdicts the flow of contra-
band goods; belligerent blockade tries to prevent ships and aircraft, regardless of 
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cargo, from crossing an established, publicized line separating an enemy from in-
ternational waters and airspace.424 
A belligerent or a belligerent's blockading force commander acting pursuant to 
the commander's government's order must declare a blockade.425 At a minimum a 
declaration must include the date and time a blockade begins, its geographic lim-
its, and a grace period within which neutral ships and aircraft may leave the area to 
be blockaded. Vessels whose registry has been changed from enemy to a neutral 
flag under the law of naval warfare may be restricted from leaving. If an area 
changes, or a blockade ends, these too should be declared. Under the London Dec-
laration, notice should also be given local authorities, although this provision has 
been superseded by World War I and II and Korean War practice and realities of 
modern warfare.426 If a blockade is interrupted, e.g., by withdrawing blockading 
forces for gunfire support elsewhere, a belligerent retains a right of visit and search 
for contraband and other modalities of economic warfare, e.g., attack and destruc-
tion of merchantmen serving as intelligence collectors for the enemy. However, 
the blockade at this point becomes a "paper blockade," unlawful under the LOAC 
since the 1856 Paris Declaration.427 
If a blockade is interrupted, a blockading belligerent must declare a blockade 
again. If an enemy drives off blockading ships, the blockade ends and must be re-
instituted. If a blockading power captures the blockaded port, the blockade ends; 
however, if a blockading power controls territory near a blockaded port or area, but 
notthe blockaded port or area itsel~ a blockade remains in force. Temporary inter-
ruption, e.g., by a violent storm, does not end a blockade. A blockading force may 
end a blockade by appropriate notice.428 
A blockade may continue during an armistice unless there is an agreement to 
the contrary.429 Although individuals who violate armistice terms, e.g., by contin-
uing blockade activity after an armistice suspends or ends it, may be punished if 
captured, there is no unanimous view on what a State may do in such a case. Some 
say it may reopen hostilities; others say it may denounce the armistice, the posi-
tion of the Hague Regulations.430 
A blockade must also be effective, i.e., forces (air, surface, submarine, or a com-
bination) must maintain it sufficient to render ingress or egress to a blockaded area 
dangerous. Effectiveness does not require covering every possible avenue of in-
gress or egress.431 Although traditional law required a close-in and not a long-
distance blockade, World Wars I and II and Korean War practice; perhaps mili-
tary feasibility before then and developments in weapons systems and platforms, 
including submarines, high-speed aircraft, cruise missiles and missiles from the 
blockaded shore since; have rendered the close, in-shore blockade difficult if not 
impossible and therefore obsolete except perhaps in localized conflicts.432 In a 
backhand way, extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles for most States has also 
helped eliminate the truly close blockade; a blockaded belligerent may 
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temporarily suspend innocent passage in its territorial sea if a strait is not in-
volved,433 and this may force more neutral merchantmen to use high seas passage. 
Thus a naval force may not have to approach enemy coasts as closely as before to 
enforce a blockade.434 
Hague VIII says belligerents cannot lay mines off belligerents' coasts with the 
sole object of intercepting commercial shipping and must notify danger zones 
around anchored mines as soon as military exigencies permit; the 1913 Oxford 
Manual denounced mining to maintain a blockade. These rules were soon found 
impracticable and do not seem to have survived World War I and II practice, al-
though laying anchored mines with a sole object of interrupting commerce by 
blockade with no naval forces to enforce a blockade may still violate international 
law.435 In only that narrow context may the prohibition survive. The San Remo 
Manual says mining operations in a belligerent's internal waters, territorial sea or 
archipelagic waters "should" provide for free egress of neutral shipping when min-
ing is first executed,436 signaling the rule's total demise. 
A blockade must be impartial; it must apply to all States' aircraft and ships. Dis-
criminating against or in favor of some States, including a blockading State's 
ships, invalidates a blockade. However, particular aircraft or vessels or classes of 
them may be permitted to pass through a blockade, provided no distinction is 
made as to flag, either by agreement or unilateral act of a blockading belligerent. 
Examples might include cartel ships repatriating prisoners of war or permitting 
repatriation of merchant mariners of neutral nationality.437 Although neutral 
warships and neutral military aircraft have no positive right of entry to a block-
aded area, they may be allowed to enter or leave this area as a matter of courtesy, 
with length of stay and other conditions in the hands of a blockading force com-
mander or higher authority.438 
Humanitarian law imposes limitations on declaring, establishing or maintain-
ing blockades. They cannot be established with a sole goal of starving the civil pop-
ulation, as distinguished from enemy armed forces. If the civil population is 
inadequately provided with food or materials essential for survival, or if medical 
supplies are needed for this population or wounded and sick enemy armed forces 
members, a blockading State must provide for passage of food, these materials or 
medical supplies. This is subject to a blockading State's right to prescribe techni-
cal arrangements, e.g., visit and search, for blockade passage. A blockading State 
may also provide for distributing these supplies under local supervision of a Pro-
tecting Power or a humanitarian organization, e.g., the ICRC, that can offer guar-
antees of impartiality and that food and other materials, as distinguished from 
medical supplies, do not support enemy armed forces. This might be accom-
plished by belligerents' agreement or a blockading belligerent's unilateral declara-
tion.439 
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Blockades cannot bar ingress to or egress from neutral ports or coasts. Neutrals 
keep rights to engage in neutral commerce ifit does not involve origin or destina-
tion in blockaded areas. Blockades cannot block international straits passage. A 
belligerent may blockade its own coasts if it is enemy-occupied.440 
Breach of blockade, for which a vessel or aircraft may be subject to attack and 
destruction, occurs when a ship or aircraft passes through a blockade without the 
blockading belligerent's entry or exit authorization. Attempted breach, for which 
a vessel or aircraft may also be subject to attack and destruction, occurs from the 
time the platform leaves a port or airfield until the voyage is complete.441 Knowl-
edge of a blockade's existence is an essential element of breach of blockade or at-
tempt to breach blockade. Knowledge can be presumed once a belligerent declares 
a blockade and notice has been provided other governments.442 Under the contin-
uous voyage rule,443 even though the vessel or aircraft is bound for neutral terri-
tory at the time of interception, if its ultimate destination is a blockaded area, that 
platform is subject to principles governing attempted breach of blockade. There is 
a presumption of attempt if a vessel or aircraft is bound for a neutral port or airfield 
that is a transit point to a blockaded area.444 Necessity, i.e., distress, may excuse a 
merchantman's actions that would otherwise be breach ofblockade.445 
Besides being subject to UN Charter decisions,446 blockades are also subject to 
general LOAC necessity and proportionality rules.447 
3. The Tanker War and the Law o/Blockade 
Insofar as the record shows, neither belligerent formally declared a blockade. If 
one was declared, there is no record of beginning times or area parameters, or grace 
periods for departure of neutral vessels and aircraft. Use of the term ''blockade'' ap-
pears only in commentators' and historians' statements.448 An analogy to a war-
time expression, "loose lips sink ships," might apply here. Loose use of blockade 
terminology by commentators, historians, the media or less than knowledgeable 
governments can muddy fairly well-established LONW principles, with a result 
that belligerents and perhaps neutrals later in the conflict, or these sources them-
selves, may be relied on as practice in future wars.449 One great problem in re-
searching the Tanker War has been relative availability of sources. In blockade 
issues, as in other aspects of the conflict, truth may have been the first casualty, and 
in many instances the facts are not available or are sealed in government ar-
chives.450 
If perchance these secondary sources refer to official belligerent declarations, 
records of times, areas and grace periods have not surfaced. Without these, any 
blockade by the belligerents would have violated internationallaw.451 Any block-
ade Iraq declared would not have been effective; Iraq had no naval assets, e.g., 
on-station surface warships, to enforce it.452 Paper blockades have been invalid 
since the 1856 Paris Declaration.453 If speedboats, fixed-wing aircraft and 
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helicopters are thrown into the equation along with its larger warships, Iran proba-
bly had enough platforms to enforce a blockade if it had been properly declared. 
Iranian acceptance of a proposal (which Iraq declined, citing sovereignty over the 
Shatt ai-Arab) to allow neutral-flag merchantmen to leave the Shatt at the begin-
ning of the war under a UN or Red Cross flag454 could be said to be compliance 
with a requirement of allowing these ships egress, except those that had switched 
from an Iraqi to a neutral flag.455 Iraq may have also justifiably refused on grounds 
of temporarily suspending territorial sea innocent passage, if the LOS applied,456 
on grounds of controlling its pons and at least its share of Shatt territorial waters 
during war, or restrictions on merchant ship movement in the immediate area of 
naval operations (albeit in the riverine warfare context),457 if such was the case.458 
Iraq's LOS authority to temporarily suspend territorial sea innocent passage, in 
terms of time, disappeared not long afterward, and was replaced by the LOAC. By 
that time the war's course around Basra pon and damage to the ships themselves 
undoubtedly made them immobile. Whether there was naval warfare in their vi-
cinity throughout the conflict is not clear from the record. However, the law is 
clear that Iraq could not have used this derogation from freedom of navigation, ifit 
applied in the riverine context, to permanently bar access to navigation. That is 
certainly the rule for high seas naval operations. 
If either belligerent tried to blockade neutral coasts, e.g., Kuwait's or Saudi Ara-
bia's by sowing mines, or use of air or naval forces, that violated international law. 
Thus if somehow the law of blockade, as distinguished from LOS rules for entry 
into and exit from ports, applied, Iran was equally culpable under the LOAC. The 
UN Security Council was fully justified in passing Resolution 552 (1984), although 
its text did not mention blockade but LOS rights to enter and leave port.459 To the 
extent that Iranian naval maneuvers occurred in Saudi territorial waters as a naval 
demonstration,460 that operation violated the Chaner's prohibition of threat of 
force against a neutral State as well as LOS territorial sea rules and LOAC princi-
ples governing belligerents' conduct toward neutrals.461 There is no record of a 
belligerent's mounting a quarantine operation.462 
There are no known instances of attempts to use cartel ships to return prisoners 
of war, etc., during the Tanker War, nor are there any repons of neutral warships' 
attempting to pass through blockades (assuming that lawful blockades existed).463 
Although Iran accepted a proposal to allow merchant ships trapped in the Shatt in 
1980 to depart under a UN or Red Cross flag, Iraq as the "blockaded" State de-
clined.464 Assuming a proper blockade ofIraq's coast then existed, which is un-
likely,465 departure of neutral nationality mariners aboard these vessels could have 
been accomplished as a humanitarian law exception to the law of blockade, since 
the purported blockading State (Iraq) approved as a matter of discretion.466 
If it is assumed that either State established a lawful blockade, which is highly 
doubtful, many attacks on neutral merchantmen for alleged breaches of the 
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blockade were disproportionate, under the same general standards of necessity 
and proportionality applicable to attacks on neutrals generally.467 In no instances 
are locations of these attacks relative to whatever blockade areas proclaimed, if 
there were any, available; no precise commentary on legitimacy of attacks on this 
basis can be made. 
The UN Security Council did not address blockade directly; there were no 
UN-mandated interdictions.468 Neither belligerent declared a blockade, as the 
LONW requires.469 However, to the extent that mines belligerents laid470 ham-
pered access to neutrals' ports471 and might somehow be considered related to 
blockade, Council Resolution 552 (1984) condemning lack of access 472 stands as a 
condemnation of the practice. 
Part F. Zones: Excluding Shipping, Aircraft from Area of Belligerents' 
Naval Operations; High Seas Self-Defense Zones; War Zones; 
Air Defense Identification Zones; Ocean Zones Created 
for Humanitarian Law Purposes 
During the Tanker War, Iran and Iraq declared war zones, advising by 
NOTMARs and NOT AMs that any merchantmen in the zones might be attacked. 
Iran justified its zone on the basis of defending its Gulf coast and to assure safety of 
shipping. After first pledging that the Straits ofHormuz would remain open, Iran 
later announced that its Straits areas were a war zone, for which there were neutral 
State protests. Iraq said its zone (Gulf Maritime Exclusion Zone, or GMEZ) was a 
reprisal response to Iran's war zone declaration and that Iraq would attack any 
shipping in its zone, saying the zone would help discriminate among shipping in 
the Gulf, i.e., any shipping in the zone was presumed a legitimate target.473 Iran 
also conducted visit and search operations throughout much of the Gulf.474 Iran 
announced or conducted naval maneuvers in its territorial waters, on the high 
seas, perhaps in the Strait of Hormuz, and in Saudi territorial waters.475 
Neutrals' armed forces were also heavily involved in the waters of the Gulf and 
the Strait ofHormuz and the skies above them. There is some evidence Saudi Ara-
bia may have allowed Iraqi military aircraft access to refueling on its territory. 
Midway through the war Saudi Arabia declared an air defense identification zone 
(ADIZ) over waters adjacent to its Gulf coast. Two weeks before the ADIZ procla-
mation Saudi Arabia had shot down an Iranian fighter over international wa-
ters.476 The United States issued NOTMAR and NOT AM warnings to ships and 
aircraft about coming within certain distances and altitudes from its maritime 
forces on the high seas; these were later amended to omit specific distances, claim-
ing a right to declare what I have characterized (and acronymed) as high seas 
self-defense zones (SDZs).477 The US and other navies conducted naval opera-
tions, including mine clearance;478 formation steaming and other air and surface 
evolutions;479 escorting, accompanying or convoying neutral flag merchantmen 
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that did not carry contraband;480 and defense of these ships and their naval 
forces.481 Saudi Arabia announced a safety corridor throughout its and other Gulf 
States' territorial seas.482 
This Part analyzes these issues in the LOAC context and the law of naval war-
fare in particular; Chapter III discussed self-defense issues,483 and Chapter IV cov-
ered LOS aspects. Parts C, D and E of this Chapter considered issues related to visit 
and search, contraband and blockade with respect to attacks on and destruction of 
enemy and neutral flag merchantmen and aircraft. 
1. Excluding Shipping and Aircraft from Immediate Areas of Belligerents' Naval 
Operations; High Seas Self-Defense Zones (SDZs) 
Although the law allowing exclusion of neutral merchant shipping and civil air-
craft is fairly straightforward, principles regarding excluding neutral warships and 
military aircraft are less than clear. Application of UN Charter norms adds a fur-
ther difficult dimension to these issues. Claims with respect to high seas defense 
zones (SDZs) are relatively new, but they have been implicit in the LOS authority 
to conduct peacetime naval operations. How SDZs interface with the LOAC right 
of a belligerent to exclude shipping and aircraft from the immediate area of naval 
operations presents further difficult questions. One more aspect of the problem 
has been, as for blockades, development oflonger range weaponry that can expand 
threat zones many miles from a naval force.484 
a. Excluding Shipping andAircraft from Immediate Areas of Belligerents' Naval 
Operations. Custom allows belligerents to establish special restrictions, including 
total exclusion from waters near operations or requiring departure from the area, 
on neutral merchantmen and aircraft near an immediate area of high seas naval op-
erations ifhostilities are taking place or will occur in the near future, or where bel-
ligerent forces are operating, e.g., conducting visit and search. These areas can 
include flight and submarine operations. A belligerent may not purport to deny 
territorial sea innocent passage access to neutral States' coasts or to close an inter-
national strait to transit or innocent passage unless another route of similar con-
venience is open to neutral traffic.485 A belligerent may also impose similar 
restrictions on neutral merchantmen and aircraft in its territorial sea, an enemy's 
territorial sea where the belligerent occupies enemy coasts, or occupies an enemy's 
territorial sea but does not occupy the coast, consistent with LOS principles for 
temporary suspending innocent passage through the territorial sea and lack of a 
right of innocent passage in a belligerent's territorial sea.486 A belligerent's right to 
restrict neutral maritime and air traffic on and over the high seas applies to high 
seas fishing zones; neutrals' contiguous zones, continental shelves, EEZs and fish-
ing zones; and in the Area.487 However, belligerents exercising this high seas right 
must pay due regard to neutrals' rights in these areas, including the high seas 
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where no contiguous zone, continental shelf, EEZ or fishing zone, or Area law 
applies.488 
This customary right of restricting neutral activities does not apply to warships, 
naval auxiliaries, ships on governmental or noncommercial service or State or mil-
itary aircraft, which continue to have complete immunity as under the law of the 
sea.489 Consistent with LOS principles applying to the territorial sea and the LOS 
due regard principle,490 a belligerent may ask these neutral platforms to leave the 
area. Consistent with LOS principles, neutral platforms should give due regard491 
to the request and a belligerent's right to restrict other neutral traffic in the imme-
diate area of naval operations. Neutral military commanders may choose to leave a 
belligerent's area of naval operations, or be otherwise guided by rules of engage-
ment, but these are matters of neutral force discretion and not a belligerent's 
right.492 A belligerent's request should not be lightly denied, absent other consid-
erations, e.g., conducting one's own naval operations. 
Policies allowing this "limited and transient" control over neutral merchant 
vessels and civil aircraft, which is a derogation from their navigation, overflight 
and other freedoms, are based on a belligerent's right to attack and destroy its en-
emy, its right to defend itself without suffering from neutral interference, and its 
right to ensure its forces' security.493 On the other hand, when neutral warships, 
military aircraft, etc., are concerned, these policies must be balanced against those 
platforms' navigation, overflight and other freedoms, their immunities, and the 
right of these neutral platforms to defend themselves and vessels or aircraft under 
their charge (e.g., convoyed neutral flag merchantmen not carrying contraband), 
and a right to ensure neutral forces' security, and the security of platforms under 
neutral forces' charge.494 
Consistent with customary blockade principles, a State exercising this high seas 
right must give notice appropriate under the circumstances, e.g. a naval com-
mander's flaghoist or radio message but perhaps a commander's government 
NOTMAR or NOT AM if a major operation such as a Normandy-size amphibious 
landing is underway. The area to be cleared, or the distance to which a neutral plat-
form must depart, should be defined with reasonable precision and should be pro-
portional, i.e., limited to that part of the high seas necessary for the evolution. If an 
operation has not begun, a start time should be given unless this compromises the 
belligerent's security. Similarly, and also consistent with not compromising the 
belligerent's security, notice of ending an operation should be given. Unlike 
blockade areas or war zones, which have definite geographic coordinates, these ex-
clusion areas can be tied to mobile operations, unless the operation involves a rela-
tively long-term location, e.g., an amphibious landing.495 The same principles 
should apply to military operations in a belligerent's territorial sea or in an en-
emy's territorial sea.496 
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In connection with this right of belligerent control, a belligerent naval com-
mander may exercise control over communications of neutral civil aircraft or neu-
tral merchantmen whose presence in the immediate area of naval operations might 
endanger or jeopardize these operations. A neutral civil aircraft or merchantman 
within that area that fails to conform to belligerent directions may thereby assume 
enemy character and risk capture or attack. Legitimate distress communications 
should be allowed to the extent that the operation's success is not prejudiced. Any 
transmission to an opposing belligerent concerning the belligerent's military op-
erations, including the order to depart the area, is inconsistent with neutral duties 
of abstention and impartiality and renders the neutral merchantman or civil air-
craft liable to capture or destruction.497 Since a neutral warship, naval auxiliary, 
government ship on noncommercial service or a military or State aircraft is enti-
tled to immunity,498 a belligerent cannot exercise control over those platforms' 
communications and must give due regard499 for these neutral platforms' rights to 
communicate, including their right to transmit distress messages. Due regard for 
an area of a belligerent's naval operations and common sense dictate that these 
neutral platforms should exercise discretion in what is communicated, on what 
frequencies, etc. Transmission to an opposing belligerent risks a self-defense re-
sponse by the belligerent conducting the naval operation.Soo By the opposite to-
ken, if a belligerent force commits a hostile act against or attacks one of these 
neutral platforms after it rightly refuses to allow control of its communications, 
that belligerent risks a self-defense response. 
A belligerent naval force may also exercise its right of self-defense against neu-
tral forces that display hostile intent against or attack the belligerent force while it 
exercises a legitimate right to control an immediate area of naval operations. Thus 
if a neutral merchant ship legitimately ordered out of an immediate area of naval 
operations by a belligerent signals to a warship of its nationality requesting assis-
tance, and that neutral warship fires on the belligerent force legitimately control-
ling the immediate area of naval operations that has ordered the merchantman to 
depart the area, the belligerent can respond in self-defense. Similarly, if a neutral 
warship or military aircraft observes one of its neutral-flag merchantmen legiti-
mately ordered out of an immediate area ofbelligerent naval operations and fires 
on the belligerent naval force, the neutral platform risks self-defense responses by 
the belligerent. If a neutral military aircraft or warship, being asked to leave an im-
mediate area of belligerent naval operations legitimately declared,SOl displays 
hostile intent or attacks the belligerent force, that neutral platform risks the bellig-
erent's self-defense response. Where a belligerent has not legitimately declared 
such an area, a risk of self-defense response is also present, and lack of a legitimate 
claim of an area of belligerent operations may be a rejoinder to a belligerent's 
self-defense claim. In some cases a belligerent's claim of a legitimate area can be 
evaluated and decided by higher, perhaps executive level, authority. In other cases 
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the on-scene neutral commander may be required to evaluate and decide on the sit-
uation with advice of counsel if available and act, consistent with ROE guidance 
and the right of self-defense. 
b. High Seas Self-Defense Zones (SDZs). The law of the sea provides that after 
due publication of a notice, a State may temporarily suspend, without discrimina-
tion in form or fact among foreign ships, the right of innocent passage for foreign 
ships in specified areas of its territorial sea if suspension is essential for protecting 
its security, including weapons exercises. A State has sovereignty over its territo-
rial sea airspace and may totally exclude foreign aircraft. Transit or innocent pas-
sage through straits cannot be suspended, unless a treaty governing straits passage 
says so.s02 States cannot establish permanent security or military zones, purport-
ing to regulate activities of other countries' warships and military aircraft, seaward 
from their coasts.s03 However, States may conduct high seas military opera-
tions.s04 For States concerned (e.g., a State conducting a military operation, States 
exercising high seas freedoms, e.g., freedom of navigation, fishing or overflight, 
States with EEZ or continental shelf operations), the LOS requires each to have 
due regard for others' oceans uses.sos These LOS rules are subject to the inherent 
right of self-defense,s06 which gives States authority to declare a high seas defense 
zone (SDZ), also known as a "cordon sanitaire,,,s07 on a temporary basis during na-
val forces' transit. 
SDZs may be defined as a geographically limited area beyond the territorial sea 
including the water column, ocean bottom and airspace associated with it that a 
State unilaterally declares as a warning area, around its naval or air assets and 
within which other countries are warned of a heightened risk of self-defense re-
sponse, including response in anticipatory self-defense, to attacks or hostile acts 
from aircraft, ships or submarines. The SDZ travels with a naval force and is not 
tied to geographical coordinates, as with territorial sea innocent passage suspen-
sion areas,s08 blockade areas,s09 war zones,sl0 some but not all areas from which a 
belligerent would exclude shipping and aircraft while conducting naval opera-
tions during armed conflict,sl1 or permanent security zones tied to a country's 
coastline and extending beyond the territorial sea, the latter of which violate inter-
nationallaw.s12 The SDZ mayor may not have time parameters, unlike rules for 
territorial sea innocent passage suspension areas (requiring pUblication of start 
and stop times)s13 or blockade areas (start times must be published, and when a 
blockade ends must also be published).sI4 However, on a time line an SDZ-cov-
ered area usually will not be encumbered for long, due to a naval force's mobility. 
An immediate precedent for mobility aspects of the SDZ was the UK "defensive 
bubble" employed as the UK task force deployed to the Falklands/Malvinas Is-
lands during the 1982 war.sIs A close analogue is the well-established right of all 
States, belligerent or neutral, to conduct naval operations on the high seas, which 
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carries with it the right of se1f-defense.516 The difference between these areas is 
one of notice in all cases for the SDZ and a warning to all States, not just a belliger-
ent, of the right of self-defense in the SDZ notice, which a naval force has under the 
law of the sea in any event. By contrast, some naval operations the LOS permits are 
announced through NOT AMs and NOTMARs, e.g., gunfire exercises in desig-
nated areas, while others are not, e.g., flight or antisubmarine warfare exercises. In 
still other cases a naval force, perhaps steaming in formation, dispersed, or inde-
pendently as separate units, may exercise high seas freedoms like any merchant-
man or civil aircraft;517 these evolutions are almost never published, a major 
exception being flight plans for some aviation. Security concerns may dictate that 
no notice be published for areas where a force will be operating.518 
The primary sources of an SDZ claim are the right of self-defense and the LOS, 
which is subordinate to the right of self-defense.519 A right to establish an SDZ is 
limited to areas beyond the territorial sea and straits passage for the declaring 
State.520 The further problem then arises as to conflicting uses of the high seas and 
straits navigation. Here LOS principles of shared high seas use, restated in the LOS 
due regard principle,521 and the rule that straits passage cannot be impeded,522 come 
into play. A State claiming an SDZ cannot operate so as to deny others' high seas 
rights, e.g., to navigation or overflight freedoms, a coastal State cannot claim an 
SD Z so as to deny others their straits passage rights, and a navalforce in straits pas-
sage cannot use an SDZ claim to deny coastal States their rights or other State,~~ 
platforms their rights to pass the strait. Similarly, others using the high seas or 
straits, or straits coastal States, must have due regard for forces operating under an 
SDZ notice. 
If an SDZ-publishing State exercises its right of self-defense, that exercise is 
governed by necessity and proportionality principles. Under no circumstances 
can an SDZ notice be a basis for free-fire attacks or reprisals involving use of force 
on neutral shipping or aircraft.523 
Unless an SDZ notice says otherwise, publishing an SDZ notice does not limit 
that State's self-defense responses. For example, although an SDZ notice warns of 
a possibility of a self-defense response if an aircraft approaches within a stated dis-
tance, that does not bar self-defense responses at greater distances if the aircraft has 
launched an attack or has displayed hostile intent so as to trigger a self-defense 
right. A platform covered by an SDZ notice may respond to attacks or threats not 
covered by the notice, e.g., responding to a submarine displaying hostile intent or a 
submarine attack when the SDZ notice covers only air or surface ship threats or at-
tacks. A State whose platform is covered by an SDZ notice may respond in 
self-defense to threats to or attacks on other ships or aircraft, e.g., a convoying war-
ship covered by an SDZ notice may respond to threats to or attacks on a convoyed 
merchantman, a nearby unescorted merchantman of the same flag as the warship, 
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or a sister warship not involved in the convoy, even though these vessels are not 
covered by the SDZ notice. 
An SDZ notice, unless it limits it, does not affect rights of collective self-
defense, either by an SDZ notice-covered platform coming to the aid of a platform 
covered by a formal or informal self-defense arrangement, or a platform of a State 
aligned in a formal or informal self-defense arrangement with an SDZ no-
tice-covered platform.524 
Thus although use ofSDZ notices seems to have begun with the Tanker War as 
a gloss on UK practice during the Falklands/Malvinas War, and earlier during 
Nyon Arrangement operations (1937),525 their use, subject to the above-stated 
limiting principles, is consistent with the UN Charter and the law of the sea. A 
State conducting an attack based on unlawful use of an SDZ, e.g., a country using 
an SDZ to establish a free-fire zone, risks self-defense responses, nonforce reprisals 
or retorsions by a State whose platforms are threatened or attacked under a claim 
based on an SDZ, and nonforce reprisals or retorsions for declaring but not using 
illegal SDZs.526 
As the Falklands/Malvinas War suggests, belligerents may declare SDZs to ad-
vise their self-defense rights relative to non-belligerents, i.e., neutrals. In this situ-
ation the LOAC applies to interactions between belligerents, but the law of 
self-defense applies to belligerent-neutral interactions. A belligerent considering 
declaring an SDZ to advise of self-defense intentions must weigh the SDZ notice, 
which may advise belligerents of its forces' whereabouts, against a factor of warn-
ing neutrals (and perhaps belligerents, as a courtesy to allied belligerents and as a 
threat to opposing belligerents who may wish to conserve military assets) of risks 
incident to coming near its forces. As with neutrals' SDZ declarations, interna-
tionallaw does not require belligerents to operate under an SDZ. The inherent 
right of self-defense, subject to limitations, if any, in an SDZ notice applies in this 
situation with respect to neutrals. A belligerent does not gain any LOAC or 
self-defense rights by publishing an SDZ; e.g., an SDZ declaration cannot give a 
belligerent a free-fire area within its geographic parameters. 
Rules of engagement have no bearing on an SDZ declaration; ROE are guid-
ance principles for a military force within its own units and personnel. Forces may 
or may not operate under ROE whether or not an SDZ has been declared. ROE 
should take SDZ standards into account, however. ROE and SDZs are independ-
ent concepts. 
c. Other Self-Defense and UN Charter Issues for SDZs. A final set of issues deals 
with conflicting self-defense claims. Suppose, hypothetically, a naval force of 
country A issues NOT AMs and NOTMARs publishing a legitimate SDZS27 for its 
forces in a high seas area whose waters are a scene of increasing tension. The 
NOTMARs and NOTAMs include defending neutral convoys carrying cargoes 
Law of Armed Conflict 401 
not part of any State's war-fighting or war-sustaining capability, e.g., medical sup-
plies that could be used for civilians or armed forces personne1.528 Country B at-
tacks country C. Country A declares neutrality. Country C, as a self-defense 
measure, begins conducting naval operations and wishes to control a high seas area 
for these operations.529 Country A's neutral forces are operating in the area, and to 
comply with the country C exclusion order will implicate A's announced self-de-
fense measures. What principles guide this hypothetical situation, where there are 
conflicting self-defense claims that may havejus cogens status?530 
Under these circumstances the proper response may lie in a due regard analysis 
of claims. The relative importance of each self-defense claim should be assessed. It; 
e.g., country C's claim of control involves visit and search of merchantmen sus-
pected of carrying materials for mass destruction weapons destined for its enemy, 
that claim should have priority over the country A claim, assuming the convoy is 
on a routine voyage to supply a neutral with replenishment material for its hospi-
tals, and there is no urgent need for them. If country A's medical supply cargo con-
voy is destined for emergency humanitarian relief in country D, at war with 
country E which has authorized the shipment to country D,531 and countryC's na-
val operation is a routine neutral shipping visit and search, the balance tips in favor 
of the country A convoy. Where policies appear equal, the principle of first in time, 
first in right should apply to give the country A convoy primacy. Country A's SDZ 
claim was asserted before country C's self-defense claim based on LOAC princi-
ples for belligerent control of an immediate area of naval operations. 
These are the "easy" cases, and real-world situations will be much more com-
plex. States confronted with this situation should try to avoid escalation and in-
struct military commanders accordingly, perhaps through ROE. ROE might give 
advance guidance, although commanders retain the right to defend their forces.532 
The more difficult dilemma will be respective military commanders confronted 
with these circumstances, particularly where ROE give no guidance. Local com-
munications should help. In the convoy hypothetical, assuming no self-defense 
claim from country C's government, the on-scene country C commander must, 
under principles governing control of the immediate area of naval operations, 
communicate with the convoy commander.533 Similarly, the country A convoy 
commander must communicate the nature of the convoy.534 At this point the re-
spective commanders must use judgment, as they do daily on much more routine 
naval matters. Other situations may not be resolved so easily, e.g., where aircraft 
are involved, because of relatively short decision time. 
Another hypothetical situation might involve interaction between two bellig-
erents in separate wars with different belligerents, and each belligerent wishes to 
control the immediate area of naval operations in separate evolutions that overlap 
in terms of ocean areas.535 Yet another is the situation where two self-defense 
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zones overlap, a rarer circumstance given (thus far) the relatively small ocean areas 
claimed. The same kinds of analysis should be employed here as well. 
If a belligerent proclaims an SDZ, the same rules apply between it and other 
countries not party to its war with opposing belligerents. As between allied 
belligerents, opposing belligerents and neutrals involved in that war, however, the 
LOAC will apply. In the latter situation the SDZ operates as an LOAC zone. 
Under the hypotheticals posed in this sub-Part, as in other situations discussed 
in sub-Part b, ROE and the SDZ are independent considerations. States may oper-
ate under ROE without proclaiming an SDZ, and vice versa. An SDZ - proclaiming 
State should be sure that its ROE and SDZ are congruent, however. 
The foregoing assumes no paramount Security Council decision, perhaps com-
ing after the self-defense claim(s); in the latter case the decision prevails. Practice 
under the decision should follow these principles insofar as the letter of the deci-
sion does not give directives. If the issue is a belligerent's control of the immediate 
area of naval operations under the law of naval warfare, a Council decision also has 
priority. Similarly, practice under the decision should be informed by LOAC prin-
ciples insofar as there is no conflict between them and the decision.S36 
Internationallaw does not require notice of an SDZ. States' naval forces may as-
sume defensive, operational and armed conflict postures without announcement 
to anyone on the high seas, except where other principles, e.g., directions to ships 
and aircraft to stay outside the immediate area of naval operations during armed 
conflict,537 require notice and/or other action. If a State publishes an SDZ notice, a 
disclaimer analogous to the US Tanker War NOTAMs and NOTMARs, which 
warned mariners of the Iranian and Iraqi zones without expressing opinion on 
their legal validity, may be included.538 Unless the contrary is intended, an SDZ 
notice announcing risks or warnings should advise that stated force actions are 
only among the options the naval force may exercise. 
The foregoing legal analysis expresses no opinion on the strategic or tactical de-
sirability of announcing an SDZ. To proclaim an SDZ declares a force's approxi-
mate location, more so than radio communications intercepts; this may be less 
than desirable from an operational perspective. On the other hand, an SDZ an-
nouncement may have advantages, e.g., in psychological operations to warn an ad-
versary of strong naval presence, or comity in advising a co-belligerent of the 
proclaiming State's intentions, but these must be balanced against the disclosure 
problem. Under international law there is no reason why a State cannot declare a 
"selective" SDZ, e.g., announcing movement of some forces but not discussing co-
vert operations, e.g., those with submarines. Nor must an SDZ announcement 
publish a list, inclusive or otherwise, of options a force may employ.539 
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2. WarZones 
During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) Japan declared the first of what have 
come to be known as war zones. 540 Japan declared them before the war; at the war's 
outbreak 12 or more of these areas were designated, the boundaries of which ex-
tended from Japan's coast into the high seas by up to seven miles. The United 
States designated similar areas after entering World Wars I and 11.541 In both cases 
the coastal State claimed a right to exclude merchantmen on the basis of self-de-
fense. Commentators have said establishing these limited zones was legitimate un-
der internationallaw.542 These defense areas were historical antecedents oflater 
war zone claims.543 
During the Spanish Civil War, the 1937 Nyon Arrangement divided much of 
the Mediterranean Sea into areas where danger from unknown submarines, or sur-
face ships or aircraft, existed for neutral merchant ships. The UK Admiralty or-
dered that a submarine detected within five miles of a torpedoed merchantman to 
be hunted and sunk; i.e., a five-mile war zone existed around an attack datum. 
Later ROE allowed attack on a submarine submerged within a specific sea area, 
i.e., a war zone coupled with exercise of an anticipatory right of self-defense was 
created.544 Nyon Arrangement orders were, in effect, a forerunner of the moving 
"defensive bubble" SDZ.545 
In World War I, and again in World War II, both sides proclaimed war zones 
over wide areas, sometimes coupling them with policies of unrestricted submarine 
warfare or starvation blockades, and justifying them as reprisals for prior illegal 
acts of the enemy. This species of war zone was also a result of new and different 
methods and means of warfare, e.g., the submarine and the aircraft. During and af-
ter the wars these zones were condemned as excessive; 546 although this gave zones 
a bad name, like using the word reprisal, the concept of a valid zone remained. 
States have employed a war zone concept in some conflicts after World War II. 
During the Korean War the UN Command proclaimed a Sea Defense Zone (SDZ) 
in 1952, rescinding it a year later during armistice negotiations. The UN Com-
mand established the SDZ to "prevent ... added attacks on the Korean Coast; 
secur[ e] ... the Command sea lanes of communication and prevent ... introduc-
tion of contraband or entry of enemy agents into [the] Republic of [i. e., South] Ko-
rea."S47 A blockade had been proclaimed in 1950 at the beginning of the war 
around North Korea's coast;548 the SDZ affected South Korea's coast. 
During the Algerian civil war France declared a 20 to 50 kilometer (11-28 mile) 
customs zone off Algeria for small craft, seeking to visit and search ships suspected 
of running war materials to rebels in Algeria. High seas interceptions occurred off 
Algeria but also 45 miles off Casablanca in the Atlantic Ocean and in the English 
Channel. France justified her actions on self-defense grounds. Flag States of ves-
sels involved protested vigorously; compensation was paid for some ships wrong-
fully detained.S49 During the 1971 India-Pakistan war the Bengal Chamber of 
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Commerce advised neutral shipping it would not risk attack in the Bay ofBengal if 
it did not approach within 40 miles of the coast between dusk and dawn.550 During 
the 1973 Arab-Israel conflict, shipping was warned about entering the region of 
conflict, at first with respect to Egyptian and Israeli territorial waters, but later 
parts of the Mediterranean Sea and Egyptian, Libyan and Syrian ports were 
listed.55! During the Vietnam War, Operation Market Time patrol areas, origi-
nally part of a 12-mile defensive sea area, eventually extended to over 30 miles off 
the South Vietnamese coast.552 These areas were not tied to a coast, like North Ko-
rea's security zone,553 but were moving zones within which patrol vessels might 
operate. The concept of a "cordon sanitaire," i.e., an area around a peacetime naval 
force analyzed in Parts F.l.b-F.l.c, also developed at this time.554 
In 1982's Falklands/Malvinas war Argentina and the United Kingdom pro-
claimed war zones after Argentina invaded South Atlantic islands, the Falklands/ 
Malvinas group and others over which Britain exercised sovereignty, a claim Ar-
gentina disputed.555 The first UK proclamation declared that Argentine warships 
and naval auxiliaries found in a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ), a 200-mile ra-
dius of the islands, would be subject to UK attack. Argentina followed with a 
200-mile defense zone (DZ) off its coasts and around the islands. The United 
Kingdom also proclaimed a Defensive Sea Area, a defensive bubble around its task 
force, then underway for the South Atlantic, warning that approaches by Argen-
tine warships or naval auxiliaries, or surveillance by Argentine civil or military air-
craft, would result in "appropriate" UK action. When fighting started in the 
islands, the UK changed the MEZ to a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ), purporting to 
exclude all vessels and aircraft supplying the Argentine war effort. The TEZ area 
was the same as the MEZ; the declaration said any ship or aircraft, military or civil, 
found within the zone without UK authority would be regarded as operating to 
support the Argentine occupation and would be regarded as hostile. Like earlier 
UK announcements, the UK TEZ declaration said it was without prejudice to the 
UK's general self-defense rights under the UN Charter.556 
Two days after the TEZ proclamation, the UK submarine Conqueror sank the 
Argentine cruiser General Belgrano with heavy loss of life 30 miles outside the 
TEZ; Belgrano, inter alia armed with Exocet surface to surface missiles, had ap-
peared to turn in the direction of UK forces well over the horizon. The UK govern-
ment justified the sinking on its MEZ warning that any Argentine ship or aircraft 
threatening the UK force would be dealt with.sS7 The UK also boarded and sank 
Narwal, an oceangoing Argentine trawler with communications equipment and 
an Argentine communications officer aboard that had been shadowing the UK 
formation.SS8 Justified on the basis of the threat language in the TEZ proclama-
tion,SS9 the Narwal capture was also lawful under the LOAC.S60 
Argentina then declared all South Atlantic Ocean waters a war zone, threaten-
ing to attack any UK ship therein. Perhaps the only neutral ship Argentina 
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attacked in the zone was S.S. Hercules, a Liberian-flag, US interests-owned tanker 
in ballast and steaming 600 miles off Argentina and SOD miles from the islands.561 
The United Kingdom responded to the Argentine proclamation by announcing 
that because hostile forces could cover distances involved in resupplying Argen-
tine forces on the islands, particularly at night and in bad weather, UK forces find-
ing any Argentine warship or military aircraft more than 12 miles off the Argentine 
coast would consider it hostile.562 Because Argentina faces much of the South At-
Ian tic below Uruguay and Brazil, this meant a substantial overlap of the last Argen-
tine-declared area, which presumably extended from the Equator to Africa and 
Antarctica. 
The war ended two months later, but the United Kingdom continued its TEZ. 
Ten days after hostilities ended, however, the United Kingdom lifted its TEZ but 
warned Argentina to keep military ships and aircraft away from the islands, declar-
ing a ISO-mile Protection Zone (PZ) around the islands. Argentina was required to 
seek UK agreement before Argentine civil aircraft or merchantmen went into the 
PZ.563 The PZ continued for some time thereafter. 
The Argentina-UK war is important for the Tanker War; it occurred in 1982, 
just before belligerent attacks on Persian Gulf shipping intensified. It was also the 
most recent intensive use of war zones since World War II. Commentators have 
analyzed the conflict from the perspective of the zones as proclaimed and em-
ployed; it is therefore appropriate to synthesize principles emerging from this war. 
In some cases the belligerents were correct in their actions, sometimes they were 
correct for the wrong reasons, and in a few cases there were actual or potential in-
ternationallaw violations. 
To the extent the UK MEZ and TEZ and the Argentine DZ declared opposing 
naval forces were subject to attack within the zones,564 the claims were within ac-
tions international law permits. Attack on or capture of opposing naval forces, 
once there is a state of war, can occur anywhere except within neutral waters, and 
then under special circumstances.565 The initial declarations were thus no more 
than declarations of intent to do what the law allowed. Under either theory, i.e., 
limitation because of the MEZ or TEZ or the general law of naval warfare, UK in-
terception ofNarwal was proper.566 Whether 200 miles was a reasonable distance 
is less than clear from facts at hand; later Britain declared the ISO-mile PZ, but this 
was after hostilities ended, and it cannot be said whether 200 miles during the war 
was sufficient, any more than it can be said the ISO-mile PZ was reasonable at the 
end. Argentina also included its territorial sea within its DZ, and the MEZffEZ 
and the DZ necessarily included these waters of the islands. Argentina could val-
idly declare a DZ for its mainland territorial waters under the law of the sea, but 
only for a limited time.567 It could make a similar claim under the LOAC for terri-
torial seas on the mainland and around the Falklands/Malivinas that were imme-
diate areas of military operations. 568 Britain, claiming sovereignty over the islands 
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(a claim Argentina disputed), could likewise assert LOS exclusion rights for the is-
lands' territorial seas; the United Kingdom could also exclude neutrals from parts 
of the territorial seas around the Falklands/Malvinas and Argentina's mainland 
territorial sea while conducting military operations. Any Argentine territorial sea 
exclusion claim under the LOS for the Falklands would have been invalid, if it is 
assumed Britain had sovereignty over the islands.569 The UK reservation of 
self-defense rights was proper but not necessary, except perhaps as a saving clause, 
or as a warning to third States. Argentina could have validly asserted the same 
claim. The right to self-defense is paramount.570 Britain could reserve these rights 
as against others, e.g., in hypothetical situations that Argentina might acquire an 
ally that mounted an attack against Britain, or if a future decision on the war as 
then fought would say that UK attacks on Argentine assets elsewhere were valid 
under this theory. The reality is that these assets would have been subject to attack, 
not on a self-defense basis, but pursuant to the LOAC. 
The UK defensive bubble571 was also proper; it had precedent under the Nyon 
Agreement and other declarations,572 in that it was limited to a certain ocean area. 
Like the N yon Agreement and similar procedures, the bubble was mobile, but that 
was no cause for concern; all high seas mariners have radar today, and they could 
have observed the task force, undoubtedly steaming in formation, on their screens. 
Moreover, the UK task force would have seen neutral ships and aircraft on its sen-
sors and would have warned them if they got too close. A neutral ship blundering 
into the formation and aware of the bubble through a NOTMAR would be at risk, 
but mutual visual identification and signals were available. 
The UK TEZ declaration that any ship or aircraft within the zone would be 
considered hostile could have come close to the line of illegality. 573 Britain could 
declare a presumption of hostility, but even here belligerents must observe neces-
sity and proportionality principles as against vessels or aircraft that are not proper 
targets. Argentine air and naval assets, including ships and aircraft supplying its 
war effort, continued to be proper targets, but the UK blanket declaration meant 
that before attacking in the TEZ, Britain had to determine that the target was 
proper under the LOAC or under self-defense principles in the case of non-Argen-
tine platforms. There is no indication that Britain did not do so. The self-defense 
statement analysis is the same as under the MEZ.574 TheBelgrano sinking 40 miles 
outside the TEZ was a legitimate act under the law of naval warfare, TEZ or no 
TEZ, and whether Belgrano appeared to tum toward the UK task force or not. 
There is no indication that Britain had declared it would not attack Argentine mil-
itary forces elsewhere, and certainly no indication it would not attack ships like 
Belgrano if they appeared to be moving toward the UK force with ship-killing 
Exocet missiles aboard.575 
The Argentine war zone declaration covering the entire South Atlantic576 was 
disproportionate; in theory this stretched from the shores of South America below 
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Brazil and Uruguay to the continent's southern tip and across to Africa. The Ar-
gentine attack on the neutral tanker Hercules was unlawful because it was an attack 
inside a disproportionate war zone; even if the zone had been proportional and 
necessary, it is questionable whether Argentina observed proportionality and ne-
cessity in the attack, given the size of the Argentine navy, threats to it, its capacity 
for enforcement in all these waters, and the relative size of the conflict.577 Neutral 
ships and aircraft did not lose protections just because they passed through a war 
zone.578 The UK declaration came close to saying the same in terms of area, al-
though limited to a presumption of hostility for Argentine flag aircraft and 
ships.579 Under these circumstances, all the UK declaration did was to repeat 
LOAC standards for dealing with these platforms, wherever found on the high 
seas, and the declaration to that extent was lawful. 
Britain could legitimately continue its TEZ after the end ofhostilities;580 the 
posture of the conflict being cooled down at that point was the same as when the 
conflict was heating up, and the UK task force organized and proceeded toward the 
islands. There is no indication the defensive bubble was abandoned; Britain could 
continue this proclamation, and indeed can declare a bubble, reasonable in area 
and the time it will take a UK force of any size to transit an area, to this day, any-
where to assert rights of self-defense. 581 As noted above, whether the ISO-mile PZ 
was reasonable in area under the circumstances can only be determined by opera-
tional considerations, for which the record does not supply information. However, 
the UK PZ could continue after hostilities and until final resolution of the con-
frontation; if visit and search, blockade or a war zone may be maintained during an 
armistice or other cease-fire absent belligerents' contrary agreement,582 a protec-
tion zone after the end of possible hostilities and before restoration of peace can 
likewise be continued. Neither a postwar TEZ nor a PZ can purport to operate like 
a security zone of the high seas, which would exclude all ships and aircraft seeking 
to exercise high seas rights. Security zones so structured are unlawful.583 
The final problem of all these zones is relationship between them and LOS-
permitted zones. It was unfortunate that the TEZ and the DZ coincided with the 
200 miles the law of the sea allows for an EEZ.584 The two concepts are mutually 
exclusive.585 It was not necessary, either as an LOS or LOAC matter, that the two 
areas overlap geographically, and this is illustrated by the later UK PZ, 150 miles 
in breadth. A belligerent's assertion of a war zone cannot bolster an EEZ declara-
tion for the same area, and an EEZ claim cannot bolster a war zone claim for the 
same area. Opposing belligerents must take into account EEZ installations, etc., in 
necessity and proportionality calculations, however. Although no recent war has 
involved contiguous zone, continental shelf, fishing zone, etc., demarcation lines, 
the same considerations apply. As to parts of a war zone in the territorial sea, under 
the LOS any State including a belligerent can limit neutrals' innocent passage 
temporarily.586 The same rule applies during armed conflict, although the time 
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during armed conflict near shore may be different, and belligerents may also to-
tally exclude neutral ships and aircraft from immediate areas of naval opera-
tions.587 An opposing belligerent's military forces, including vessels or aircraft 
supporting the war effort, may be attacked there. 
Argentina could not have closed its Straits of Magellan waters to neutral ship-
ping; the treaties covering the Straits have no provision for it. Under both the LOS 
and the LOAC, these straits had to stay open.588 If UK forces had transited the 
Straits (they did not use them), Argentina could not have attacked them in Chilean 
territorial waters in the Straits, nor could either belligerent have purported to close 
the strait to neutral navigation, either by sinking the other's assets to block pas-
sage, or to have closed the Straits by declaration of a war zone or an immediate area 
of naval operations. A naval engagement, or an exercise of self-defense (which 
might have occurred if a third State attacked either belligerent's forces in the 
Straits) would have invoked necessity and proportionality principles, which 
might have been the same or different for the law of armed conflict or self-
defense,589 depending on the circumstances. In either case necessity and propor-
tionality considerations would have required consideration of neutrals' straits 
transit rights during war or peace. All of this is theoretical, of course, because no 
military actions are reported to have taken place in the Straits during the briefwar. 
In summary, then, it appears that the Falklands/Malvinas war zones were law-
ful, except as to the Argentine declaration for the entire South Atlantic and its at-
tack on Hercules. 590 
A central purpose of these zones has been to avoid committing large forces to a 
task of cutting off enemies' seaborne and air commerce,591 or for a measure of sea 
control where a belligerent has only limited forces to bring to bear on controlling 
enemy commerce. Undoubtedly they will be used more frequently as navies down-
size in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Midway through the Tanker War, 
Fenrick attempted to sum up the developing norm for war zones: 
If belligerents use [war] ... zones, they should publicly declare the existence, 
location, and duration of the zones, what is excluded from the zone, and the sanctions 
likely to be imposed on ships or aircraft entering the zone without permission, and 
also provide enough lead time before the zone comes into effect to allow ships [and 
one would add, aircraft] to clear the area. As with blockades, "paper" zones are 
insufficient. Belligerents declaring zones should deploy sufficient forces to the zone 
to make it "effective," that is, to expose ships or aircraft entering the zone to a 
significant probability of encountering submarines, ships or aircraft engaged in 
enforcing the zone. All militarily practicable efforts should be made to employ 
minimum sanctions, such as seizure instead of attack on sight. Similarly, all 
militaril'ypracticable measures should be taken to ensure proper target identification 
and to ensure that only legitimate military objectives, such as military aircraft, 
warships, and ships incorporated into the [opposing] belligerent['s] war effort, are 
attacked. The emphasis on what is militarily practicable is important. Sometimes the 
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minimum practicable sanction will be attack on sight; sometimes ships or aircraft 
that are not legitimate military objectives will be attacked because of errors in target 
identification. There must be a proportional and demonstrable nexus between the 
zone and the self-defence requirements of the state establishing the zone.592 
Moreover, the same body oflaw, i.e., the LOAC with its limitations (e.g., necessity 
and proportionality, exemption of some ships, e.g., coastal fishing craft, from at-
tack as long as they do not contribute to the enemy war effort), and the overarching 
right of self-defense under the UN Charter, applies inside and outside the zone.593 
A zone's extent, location and duration and measures imposed may not exceed what 
is required by necessity and proportionality,594 and should take into account one 
rationale for the zone, promoting safety of neutral merchant shipping and aircraft 
by keeping them a safe distance from areas of actual or potential hostilities.595 Ifit 
is no longer necessary that a surface ship be on station to enforce a blockade, the 
same rule is true for a war zone. The only requirement is for forces sufficientto en-
force the zone.596 
The zone's location and extent need not coincide with other zones established 
under the LOS or the LOAC. For example, although some Falklands/Malvinas 
war zones extended about 200 miles from the South American mainland and the is-
lands,597 the same permissible distance the LOS allows for an EEZ,598 war zone 
principles may dictate a zonal width broader, narrower or the same as LOS limits. 
The same is true for the law of naval warfare; for example, a blockade area might be 
the same as, greater than, or less than, a war zone laid on top of the area.599 National 
security planning suggests that a war zone declaration should proclaim a zone dif-
ferent from other zone lines in the area, e.g., those for the EEZ, commensurate with 
necessity and proportionality requirements. If a zone line must coincide with an 
LOS zone line, a declarant should state in the war zone proclamation that war zone 
lines are independent of any other zones, and that the war zone declaration should 
not be taken as an assertion of any other, e.g., rights for an EEZ, and that 
declarant's EEZ rights are not affected in any way by the war zone declaration. 
This should help avoid other States' protests that the war zone proclamation is, in 
effect, claiming rights which when combined with other claims amounts to a secu-
rity zone like North Korea's unlawful claim.600 
Due regard601 must be given neutrals' rights to uses of the oceans. 602 Necessary 
safe passage through the zone for neutral vessels and aircraft must be provided 
where the geographic size of the zone significantly impedes free and safe access to a 
neutral's ports and coasts, and in other cases where normal navigation routes are 
affected, except where military requirements do not permit it.603 A war zone can-
not bar straits passage, access to innocent passage through a neutral's territorial 
waters, or access to neutrals' territorial seas.604 A belligerent is not absolved of its 
duties under the LOAC and international humanitarian law by establishing a war 
zone.
605 
"In short, an otherwise protected platform does nodose that protection by 
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crossing an imaginary line drawn in the ocean by a belligerent.,,606 Although 
belligerents must publish restrictive measures so that neutrals will know what is 
expected of them, publication of enforcement measures is not necessary, although 
a belligerent may choose to do so.607 A neutral's complying with a belligerent's or-
ders in the zone cannot be construed as an act harmful to an opposing belliger-
ent.60S These belligerent measures can include only those essential for passing 
through the zone, and do not include complying with a belligerent's order that ef-
fectively converts a neutral into part of a belligerent's war effort.609 
UN Security Council decisions can override these principles, to the extent a 
Council resolution is in point.610 These considerations apart, and despite some 
commentators' and countries' objections,611 State practice before and after World 
War II confirms war zones' lawfulness if properly noticed, properly configured in 
duration and area, and properly employed so as to not violate universally-accepted 
principles of necessity and proportionality during armed conflict.612 
3. Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) 
States may bar foreign aircraft or regulate their entry into national airspace, 
which includes the territorial sea as part of national sovereignty. Analogous to the 
law of the sea, the ICAO Convention allows countries to establish prohibited areas 
in their territories, over which foreign flag aircraft may not fly. Unlike the LOS, 
these prohibitions can be permanent. Aircraft flight through straits cannot be sus-
pended temporariiy or permanendy.613 Since this aspect of the territorial sea is 
also subject to the LOAC through LOS other rules provisions,614 a belligerent may 
apply the LOAC to its territorial sea airspace. Any State, belligerent or neutral, has 
a right of self-defense of this airspace as well as its land territory, territorial waters 
and inland waters below the airspace.615 
Belligerents and neutrals have a customary right to establish air defense identi-
fication zones (ADIZs) in international airspace, anchored to their territorial sea 
airspace, to establish reasonable rules of entry into their territory. The legal basis 
for an ADIZ is a nation's right to establish reasonable conditions for entry into its 
territory.616 An ADIZ is not analogous to a sort of contiguous zone for the air, giv-
ing a coastal State a right to police airspace above that part of the high seas outside a 
contiguous zone. (Coastal States may, of course, police airspace above a contiguous 
zone for activities, e.g., drug smuggling or customs violations, if the LOS permits 
such action and that State has laws claiming jurisdiction over such activities.)617 
An ADIZ cannot be a sovereignty claim over high seas airspace; freedom of navi-
gation and overflight are high seas freedoms.61S An ADIZ does not stand in the 
way of high seas freedoms.619 An ADIZ is a reference area for initiating identifica-
tion procedures for aircraft on a course that will penetrate an ADIZ State's national 
airspace.620 States cannot combine an ADIZ proclamation with other LOS rights, 
e.g., contiguous zone, EEZ, fishing zone, continental shelf, etc., claims, to assert 
Law of Armed Conflict 411 
greater rights over an ocean area, e.g., combining an EEZ claim with an ADIZ 
claim to assert sovereignty over a high seas area. Each claim is separate in rights 
that can be asserted and cannot be thus lumped together. A proclamation for these 
rights may assert some or all of them in the same document, but claims for an 
ADIZ and LOS rights must be separately stated. 
The ADIZ also differs from aircraft warning zones, which are legitimate and 
may be declared incident to military exercises on, under and over the high seas, 
which purport to warn but not to exclude,621 or warnings concerning belligerents' 
immediate area of naval operations,622 blockade areas,623 SDZs624 or war zones.625 
An ADIZ can be an incident of self-defense, including anticipatory self-
defense, in that entry presupposes communication with an aircraft that proposes 
to enter, by its identifying itself as it proceeds toward the ADIZ State or by a chal-
lenge and response system between an ADIZ State and an approaching aircraft. If 
an incoming aircraft displays a threat, i.e., hostile intent, or begins hostile action 
amounting to an attack, an ADIZ State may initiate self-defense responses, includ-
ing interception and anticipatory self-defense, subject to principles of necessity 
and proportionality and rules against attacking certain aircraft.626 A belligerent 
may use its ADIZ during wartime to identify and intercept incoming enemy mili-
tary aircraft and attack them, observing principles of necessity and proportional-
ity, such that neutral States' aircraft, ships, persons or property that are not proper 
objects of attack; or enemy aircraft, ships, persons or property that are not proper 
objects of attack; are not endangered.627 An ADIZ cannot be a justification for 
self-defense or belligerent attacks, however, any more than proclaiming, e.g., a war 
zone can justify indiscriminate attacks.628 The ICAO Convention has recently 
been amended to prohibit States from using weapons against civil aircraft, and in 
the case of civil aircraft interception, action so that lives of those on board and the 
safety of the aircraft cannot be endangered.629 This does not detract from a State's 
inherent right of self-defense, but it does establish conditions of necessity and pro-
portionality if a civil aircraft is involved.630 Similarly, the amendment establishes 
conditions of necessity and proportionality in LOAC situations.631 
Thus far the only requirements for a valid ADIZ are notice, claim of an area of 
international airspace for this purpose, and that the zone has been established for 
aircraft identification. ADIZs thus far have been relatively permanent in nature, 
but if a State modifies or ends an ADIZ, that should be notified as well. In that re-
gard, ADIZ minimum requirements are similar to those for other zones.632 
Analogous to the law of the sea, air law recognizes an exception for aircraft en try 
in distress. During peacetime, States must allow entry of any aircraft in distress.633 
During war neutrals must allow belligerent aircraft in distress entry, but their 
crews and the aircraft must be interned for the duration of the war; civilians must 
be allowed to return home.634 Belligerents' aircraft entering an opponent's terri-
tory in distress may be captured or destroyed, and the crews made prisoners of war, 
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except neutral passengers who do not contribute to the war effort, who must be re-
patriated.635 
4. Ocean Zones Created for Humanitarian Law Purposes 
Humanitarian law allows establishing special hospital zones and neutralized 
z~nes by the parties' agreement. These zones may be on belligerents' territory and, 
"if the need arises," in occupied areas. A belligerent may propose establishing a 
neutralized zone to the enemy through a neutral country or a humanitarian orga-
nization,e.g., the ICRC, in combat areas for sheltering wounded and sick and civil-
ians playing no part in hostilities. A zone must be stated in a written agreement, 
which must reflect geographic area, zone administration, food supply and zone su-
pervision.636 Since belligerent territory and occupied areas can include the territo-
rial sea as part of a belligerent's territory or a belligerent's occupied territory, these 
zones can include sea approaches to them, e.g., landing facilities for a shoreside 
hospital. 637 (Hospital ships and similar craft, unless they contribute to the war ef-
fort, carry their exemptions with them whether they are on the high seas or else-
where, e.g., at a dock in territorial waters.)638 Humanitarian law treaties do not 
provide for similar zones on the high seas. However, during the Falklands/Malvinas 
War, at Britain's suggestion the belligerents agreed on a high seas zone in addition 
to a neutralized zone in the center of the city of Stanley in the islands. The high 
seas zone, called a "Red Cross Box," was 20 nautical miles in diameter and north of 
the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. Argentine and UK hospital ships were stationed 
in the Box. Its primary purpose was exchange of sick and wounded. The Box agree-
ment was not in writing.639 Since 1982 no other high seas areas have been so 
designated. 
The San Remo Manual suggests the possibility of establishing a high seas area 
for humanitarian purposes: "[P]arties to the conflict may agree, for humanitarian 
purposes, to create a zone in a defined area of the sea in which only activities con-
sistent with those humanitarian purposes are permitted." Perhaps recognizing the 
informality of communications at sea, the Manual would not insist on a written 
agreement. Once established, the zone does not have to exist indefinitely but for 
the time agreed upon. No activity forbidden by the agreement, or inconsistent 
with the zone's purpose, should be conducted, e.g., using the zone as a refuge for 
combatant vessels like submarines. Military craft, e.g., helicopters, can traverse the 
zone to ferry sick and wounded.640 
The Manual proposal is progressive development, not a customary norm. How-
ever, the idea has merit and should be followed in future wars. Like agreements on 
hospital and neutralized zones ashore, the agreement should be in writing if at all 
possible and should spell out terms analogous to those for shoreside zones.641 To-
day, despite the fog of war inevitably accompanying armed conflict, worldwide 
communications (e.g., facsimile for signed agreements) are such that belligerents 
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should be able to agree in writing, preferably government to government, rather 
than relying on naval commanders at sea who will have more pressing matters at 
hand. 642N aval commanders should be consulted, of course. Location of the Box or 
any similar zone, its duration including whether it will continue during an armi-
stice or other cease-fire, and the agreement's terms including its relationship with 
other zones (e.g., war zones or ADIZs, discussed in Parts F.2-F.3), should be pub-
lished, particularly by NOT AM and NOTMAR, also another omission of the 
Manual formula. Belligerents might consider language similar to that used in ex-
cluding neutrals from the immediate area of military operations, permitted as dis-
cussed in Part F.I.a, to encourage other countries' shipping to stay out of the Box 
and its vicinity, to avoid complicating situations. The agreement should consider 
the due regard principle, discussed in Part A, to assure other high seas users' rights 
are not unduly compromised. 
Further, there seems no reason why neutrals cannot establish a Box, with 
belligerents' agreement, to succor sick, wounded and civilians who do not take 
part in the conflict. Given the likelihood of relatively small sea wars like the 
Falklands/Malvinas conflict and downsizing among the Earth's navies in the fu-
ture, it is quite possible that many belligerents may not have resources (e.g., hospi-
tal ships) for a Box although they would wish to establish one, and that other 
countries may have these assets and a willingness to deploy them to alleviate suf-
fering and dislocations during the war. Military commands might prepare Box 
agreements in advance of any conflict, to be sure they are complete and ready for 
rapid use if armed conflict and the need for a Box or similar zone arise. 
5. The Tanker War 
There are no recorded belligerent claims to exclusion of neutral shipping from 
the immediate area of belligerent naval operations. 
The United States proclaimed what amounted to SDZs in its NOTAM and 
NOTMAR warnings and its reversion to "zone defense" after the 1988 cease-
fire.643 US NOT AM and NOTMAR warnings referred to a specific area in the Gulf 
but did not mention any specific naval units; they warned of dangers incident to 
approaching US naval forces.644 These warnings were lawful, in that they notified 
others of special dangers incident to approaching too close to US forces, e.g., 
self-defense responses,645 much as NOT AMs and NOTMARs notifying high seas 
users of naval maneuvers, like those Iran announced during the Tanker War, 
which were lawful high seas uses but not lawful in neutrals' territorial seas or in 
straits if straits passage would be impeded.646 
The US SDZ claims for particular areas in the Gulf, at first limited to relatively 
small areas around its forces, and later redefined with no specific areas, appear rea-
sonable in the context of the war. To be sure, there were mistaken firings on, e.g., 
dhows and fishermen coming close to US forces and the Airbus, but there is no 
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evidence the United States violated necessity and proportionality principles, 
given information available at the time, or knowingly attacked ships or aircraft 
that were not lawful targets under the LOAC. These were situations of tragic col-
lateral and other damage incident to self-defense responses, for which the United 
States paid compensation (without admitting fault, a common practice in tort set-
tlements and releases in the common law) for some and probably all damage 
claims.647 Although there appear to be no published SDZs as such for the war's 
neutral convoy, escort or accompanying operations, permitted under interna-
tionallaw,648 use of a published SDZ, whether communicated by diplomatic chan-
nels or perhaps as the need arose for the convoy commander, that was reasonable in 
terms and moving area covered, would have been compatible with international 
law. International law does not require establishment or notice of SDZs, how-
ever.649 
Other neutrals and the belligerents did not proclaim SDZs. Iran could have 
published them for its convoy operations and projected naval operations and ma-
neuvers, but apparently chose not to do so.650 The convoys were subject to Iraqi at-
tack.651 An SDZ declaration could not have changed that. Iran had a right to 
conduct naval maneuvers in its territorial sea, as well as high seas naval maneuvers, 
the latter subject to due regard for others' oceans uses, but had no right to conduct 
maneuvers in Saudi territorial waters.652 Publishing SDZs could not alter the le-
gality, or lack thereof, of these operations. Both belligerents' military aircraft 
could overfly the Gulfs high seas, subject to due regard for others' high seas rights, 
but not neutrals' territorial seas, and an SDZ pUblication could not change these 
rules.653 Nor could publishing an SDZ justify belligerents' mine or other attacks 
on neutrals. 
Iran and Iraq published war zones.654 They roughly corresponded with the gen-
eral geographic area of some but not all military operations. The zones were not 
"paper" zones and were legitimate in terms of geographic scope, since Iran and 
Iraq had capability for operations over them,655 except to the extent that Iran 
sought to control or restrict Strait ofHormuz transit passage. Iran could publish a 
Strait war zone to warn of risks ofhostilities, but it could not use the zone procla-
mation to close the Strait or restrict straits passage by neutrals,656 any more than 
North Korea could establish its security zone, purporting to limit high seas free-
doms.657 
The principal problem with the belligerent zones was with their misuse. Iran 
and Iraq made neutral ships their principal targets with a view to inhibiting oil ex-
ports that financed their opponent's war effort. Iran also attacked neutral shipping 
proceeding between neutral ports. These attacks occurred outside the zones as 
well. Both belligerents fired on neutrals' military aircraft and warships, both in-
side and outside the zones. There was an obvious disregard of target discrimina-
tion, failure to observe general principles of necessity and proportionality, and a 
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failure to avoid attacks on shipping that was exempt from capture or destruction. 
To that extent both States violated international law in use of otherwise valid 
zones.658 To the extent mining was part of war zone operations, the zones were un-
lawful in use because they did not provide safe sea lanes for neutral shipping.659 
UN Security Council resolutions condemning indiscriminate Tanker War attacks 
on neutral shipping support this view.660 
Saudi Arabia established an ADIZ during the war.661 Establishing the zone was 
consistent with international law; it was noticed.662 The record does not disclose 
the high seas area it covered, but presumably it was that part of the high seas off the 
Saudi Gulf coast, nor does the record say what the ADIZ notice recited in terms of 
identification. However, there were no recorded protests, and it must be presumed 
that Saudi Arabia acted in accordance with international law on these points. 
Two weeks before establishing the zone, Saudi Arabia shot down an Iranian air-
craft over the high seas of the Gulf.663 The ADIZ would not have given a right to 
shoot it down, even though initial information for Iranian flights may have come 
through AWACS information procedures. The shootdowns were governed by the 
right of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, as well as principles of ne-
cessity, proportionality and admitting of no other alternative in the case of anticipa-
tory self-defense.664 There is nothing in the record to say the law was not observed. 
There are reports Saudi Arabia allowed Iraqi military aircraft to use refueling 
facilities on its territory.665 There is no evidence that these aircraft entered under 
distress conditions,666 and it must be presumed that Saudi Arabia permitted entry, 
which it was allowed to do under the LOS and the law of the air.667 Whether this 
could be claimed as a violation of Saudi obligations as a neutral was a separate is-
sue. Depending on resolving the issue of whether a neutral may aid a country that 
is victim of an aggressor, and who was the aggressor in the war, the response could 
go either way. Commentators may differ on whether a neutral may aid a country 
believed to be a target of aggression, but the view seems to be that it is proper to as-
sist the target with aid, including military aid.668 If neutral Saudi Arabia could aid 
Iraq as a victim ofIranian aggression, then the assistance was proper. IfIraq was 
the aggressor, then the aid was improper. The difficulty, of course, is which coun-
try committed aggression. The reported facts may point toward Iran or Iraq; the is-
sue is far from c1ear.669 
Perhaps owing to the nature of the conflict, i.e., isolated attacks on shipping or 
defense of shipping, or lack of seaborne assets dedicated to humanitarian use, e.g., 
hospital ships,670 no equivalent of a Red Cross Box was established during the con-
flict.671 
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Part G. Weapons and Weapons Use; Mine Warfare 
Unlike the land war, where Iraq used poison gas against Iranian forces in viola-
tion of the law of armed conflict,672 no nuclear, biological or chemical weapons 
were employed in the Tanker War at sea. 
Conventional weaponry in the sea war included all sizes of projectiles, from bul-
lets sprayed on merchantmen's bridges to medium-size naval guns, surface to sur-
face rockets, belligerent helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft fire and bombing, 
intermediate range land-based Silkworm missiles Iran fired against merchantmen 
in Kuwaiti port berths, and surface to air missiles and projectiles. Iran fired con-
ventional weapons at Iraqi port facilities, neutrals' port facilities and neutral ship-
ping; these attacks came from Iranian naval units and land-based aircraft. Iraq 
conducted aerial attacks on Iranian oil facilities and neutral shipping; the flights 
originated on land, because Iraq had no shipboard naval aviation capability. Nei-
ther belligerent bombarded its opponents' shores incident to a seaborne invasion. 
After giving occupants ofIranian offshore oil platforms, used for surveillance and 
harboring small, offensively armed boats, notice and an opportunity to leave them, 
US naval forces shelled these platforms in response to speedboat attacks on neutral 
merchantmen. US naval forces also used weapons fired from helicopters and sur-
face ship weapons in self-defense responses against belligerent surface vessels. The 
U.S.S. Vincennes mistakenly shot down the Airbus with surface to air missiles. 
Other US warships mistakenly fired on dhows and fishing boats. At least one bel-
ligerent's attack jet was downed by a Saudi interceptor.673 
Both belligerents laid sea mines during the Tanker War. All apparently were of 
the contact variety, i.e., actuated by contact of a vessel with the mine. Iran laid 
them, probably tethered to the bottom, in approaches to Kuwaiti and other neutral 
ports. Iraq laid them in Iranian Gulf port approaches. Both States laid them in in-
ternational shipping lanes, i.e., in high seas areas where traffic generally sailed. 
Sometimes these were laid just before a ship was due to pass. Some were drifting 
mines, the result of anchored mines' having broken their moorings; others re-
mained tethered. Neutral navies began to report, sweep and destroy or remove 
mines, sometimes individually, and in other cases cooperatively among several 
States' naval forces. The US Navy captured and later scuttled the Iranian mine-
layer IranAjr, and returned surviving crew to Iran. After hostilities ended neutral 
navies organized to sweep thousands of mines in the upper Gulf.674 
Apart from mine warfare discussed in sub-Part 2, this Part concentrates on 
methods and means of belligerents' attacks on opposing enemy forces, shipping or 
facilities in the Tanker War. Analysis of belligerents' attacks on neutral military 
forces, neutral shipping or neutral facilities has been discussed in Chapter III and 
in Parts A.-F., and that analysis will not be repeated here. 
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No Tanker War participant, belligerent or neutral, employed weapons consid-
ered inherently unlawful under the LOAC or in self-defense. The central issue for 
the war is whether belligerents, or neutrals acting in self-defense,675 used conven-
tional weapons consistently with principles of necessity and proportionality and, 
for anticipatory self-defense, necessity, proportionality and admitting of no other 
alternative. What might be proportional and necessary under the LOAC between 
belligerents might or might not be necessary and proportional in a self-defense 
context, and vice versa.676 Besides these general principles, there were few guide-
posts in treaty or customary law. 
1. Conventional Weapons Use, Apart from Mine Warfare 
Iran bombarded Iraqi shore facilities during the Tanker War, using land-based 
air and perhaps naval assets. Iraq bombarded Iranian shuttle convoys carrying oil 
that Iran sold to finance its war effort, Iranian vessels on the high seas, and Iranian 
port facilities and offshore oil installations. No international agreement specifi-
cally covers the circumstance of attacks on offshore oil platforms, which I would 
also characterize as "shore bombardment." Hague IX declares that military instal-
lations and warships in a harbor may be destroyed by bombardment, with consid-
eration for historical, scientific and artistic monuments and hospitals, after 
summons to surrender and a reasonable time of waiting. No summons need be 
given if necessity (i.e., surprise) dictates othenvise.677 The Hague Air Rules have 
similar provisions for attacks from the air but omit requirements for a sum-
mons.
678 
Whether or which of these principles are customary law or are in desuetude is a 
debate among commentators. However, at the least these provisions today reflect 
customary rules of necessity and proportionality applying to attacks on military 
objectives under the LOAC or in self-defense responses. These principles of neces-
sity and proportionality apply to military objectives within otherwise civilian 
areas, e.g., oil platforms within an EEZ (a "civilian area") used for military surveil-
lance or as launching pads for attacks on shipping (a proper military objective). 
Bombardment may not be used to terrorize the civil population or to wantonly de-
stroyareas of concentration of civil populations. Today the rule seems to be notice 
should be given of an attack if the military situation permits it.679 Besides histori-
cal and artistic monuments, medical facilities are off limits for attack unless used 
for military purposes.680 
The record of belligerents' bombarding opponents' shore facilities as incidents 
of the Tanker War is sparse.681 Whether notice if appropriate was given; whether 
Hague IX and Hague Air Rules standards were followed; whether civilian objects 
or historical, artistic, scientific or hospital sites were involved; whether bel-
ligerents attacked areas where the civil population was concentrated; whether at-
tacks were designed to and did terrorize the civil population; or whether attacks 
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followed LOAC principles of necessity and proportionality, is less than clear.682 If 
the War of the Cities and other aspects of the 1980-88 conflict on the land are any 
indicator, there is a high likelihood that there were LOAC violations, perhaps of 
the general principles of necessity and proportionality and perhaps of specific 
rules in Hague IX and the Hague Air Rules. We do not know from the available 
historical record of this aspect of attacks on land targets. 
2. Mine Warfare 
Mine warfare law is a mixture of one treaty dating from 1907, Hague VIII,683 
and custom developed from it684 and elsewhere since introduction of sea mines, 
once known as torpedoes, over two centuries ago.685 Although modern mine de-
vices, e.g., CAPTOR, which rises from the seabed to attack submarines by a modi-
fied homing torpedo, have been developed and were used in many wars in this 
century,686 belligerents laid only bottom-moored contact mines during the Tanker 
War, although some of these may have broken loose from their moorings. 687 Anal-
ysis therefore concentrates on legal aspects of this weapon as used in the war. 
A State laying mines must notify other States of the location of mines as soon as 
military exigencies permit.688 Belligerents may not lay mines in neutral waters, 
i.e., neutrals' territorial seas.689 Anchored mines, i.e., moored or tethered mines, 
must become harmless when they break their moorings or control over them is 
10st.690 Unanchored mines, i.e., those not fixed to orimbedded in the bottom, must 
become harmless after a mine layer loses control of them, e.g., after a vessel drops 
them over the side or an aircraft deploys them.691 As the foregoing indicates, these 
principles apply to mines and not to a delivery system; aircraft and submarines are 
bound by them like surface ships.692 
Minefield locations must be carefully recorded to ensure accurate notification 
(and therefore appropriate action by other States, e.g., to avoid them), and to facili-
tate removal and/or deactivation, perhaps after hostilities end. At the end ofhostil-
ities States must remove mines they have laid, except that States must remove 
mines in their waters, regardless of who laid them. Parties to a conflict may make 
other arrangements for removal, including arrangements with other countries for 
mine removaI.693 Neutral States do not commit an unneutral act if they clear 
mines laid in violation ofinternationallaw,694 unless to do so would violate other 
international law principles.695 
Mines may be used to channel neutral shipping but not to deny straits or 
archipelagic sea lanes passage.696 Mines cannot be laid off an enemy's ports and 
coasts with a sole objective of intercepting commercial shipping; however, they 
may be otherwise used in strategic blockade of enemy coasts, ports and water-
ways.697 States cannot mine areas of indefinite extent in international waters, i.e., 
the high seas. Reasonably limited war zones may be established if neutral shipping 
has an alternate route around or through the zone. Indiscriminate high seas 
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mining is unlawful. Minelaying States must have due regard for others' high seas 
rights and freedoms.698 
Belligerents or neutrals may not lay mines in other neutrals' internal waters or 
territorial seas; this would violate that State's territorial integrity under the UN 
Charter as well as the LOAC.699 Mines cannot be laid in international straits so as 
to impair or impede neutral passage unless alternate routes of equal safety and con-
venience are provided?OO 
Neutrals may lay mines in their territorial sea as a self-defense measure, but 
they are bound by rules for belligerents, e.g., notice, leaving lanes open for ship-
ping, not impeding shipping, etc.701 When a threat ends, the LOS 702 and Hague 
VIII require that such mines be removed or rendered harmless?03 Unless it is a 
case of self-defense by a neutral or a belligerent expecting or experiencing attack by 
a country with which that belligerent is not presently at war, and usually in cir-
cumstances of anticipatory self-defense, armed mines may not be laid on the high 
seas,7°4 absent an armed conflict situation. If mines are placed on the high seas un-
der these circumstances, a minelaying State must give prior warning by analogy to 
Hague VIII; 705 other Hague rules must be applied analogously, e.g., mines must be 
removed expeditiously or rendered harmless once an imminent danger passes.706 
Controlled mines, i.e., those that cannot be actuated except by signal from a 
minelaying State's forces,7°7 may be laid on the high seas as long as they do not in-
terfere with other high seas uses, or uses involved with parts of the seas covered by 
EEZ, etc., regimes?08 Due regard principles apply here too?09 Even if controlled 
mines are laid that would interfere with high seas freedoms, this may be permissi-
ble if there are published alternate safe and convenient routes for other high seas 
users.710 Since most countries laying controlled mines would want controlled 
mine locations secret until there is a need to actuate them, it is not likely a 
minelaying State would notify other countries of their location by notice of an al-
ternate route or risk entanglement with another high seas user, followed by diplo-
matic protest based on the due regard principle?l1 
3. Mine Warfare Principles and the Tanker War 
Chapter III analyzed the necessity and proportionality of self-defense re-
sponses, and that discussion will not be repeated here,712 nor will the necessity and 
proportionality questions incident to LOAC issues, discussed in Parts A-F, be re-
hearsed anew here. In some cases, assuming that an objective was a proper military 
target, e.g., neutral merchantmen under belligerent convoy with cargoes support-
ing an enemy war effort,713 it is questionable whether the method of attack was 
necessary or proportional under the circumstances. Iranian forces in particular 
seemed to target merchant ship crews by aiming at personnel areas of ships. 714 The 
same can be said for belligerents' indiscriminate mining, resulting in casualties to 
merchantmen and warships alike.71S Failure to publish location of minefields was 
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a factor in lack of discrimination, as was belligerents' failure to lay mines that be-
came inoperative after losing their tethers.716 
Besides failing to satisfy general principles of necessity and proportionality, in-
cluding target discrimination and minimization of civilian and neutral military 
casualties, the belligerents, and Libya if involved in the 1984 Red Sea mining, vio-
lated many specific rules of mine warfare. Although belligerent ships probably laid 
most mines, the rules applied to mines laid by aircraft as well.717 Minefield loca-
tions were not published.718 Belligerents laid mines in neutral waters, a Charter vi-
olation and a violation of the LOAC.719 Mines, particularly those Iran laid, failed 
to become harmless after breaking moorings.720 Whether the belligerents re-
c~rded minefields carefully is unknown. What is clear is that an international post-
war effort was required to clear northern Gulf mines, which could infer that 
/ 
neither belligerent, having laid mines, had the necessary means to retrieve them 
after hostilities, a Hague VIII requirement.721 Iran's mines in the Strait ofHormuz 
also violated a principle of mine warfare, that international straits passage must 
not be impeded.722 Iraq may have violated the rule against laying mines off a bel-
ligerent's coast, i.e., the Iranian coast, for the sole purpose ofintercepting commer-
cial shipping.723 Iran deliberately laid mines in international waters, with no 
minefield announced and no provision for alternate routing around or through the 
mined area, another LOAC violation. The belligerents showed little, if any, due re-
gard for high seas users' rights.724 There was no record of damage to EEZ facilities 
as a result of mines, however, other than the almost certain pollution from holed 
ships. 
Throughout the Tanker War neutral navies were engaged in mine countermea-
sures, including sweeping, retrieving and destroying mines.725 International law 
permitted this on the high seas and in neutral territorial waters where the neutral 
coastal State allowed entry for this purpose. Even if a neutral had not granted 
permission, and there was a mine threat (e.g., a CAPTOR mine) to a third State's 
shipping, the third State could enter neutral waters to remove the threat if the 
neutral could not or would not do so.726 For example, Saudi Arabia requested US 
assistance (and thereby gave permission) for mine sweeping and clearance of its 
waters during the 1984 Red Sea mining episode.727 lfit is assumed that minelaying 
in neutral territorial waters violates the UN Charter in addition to the law of naval 
warfare, it could be argued that the Saudi-US mine clearance agreement was an in-
formal self-defense arrangement to respond to the mine invasion.728 Another 
self-defense claim related to the US destruction of Iran Ajr, 729 an element of which 
was neutrals' customary right to remove mines, and devices involved with them 
(i.e., the minelayer), from ocean areas, i.e., the high seas, where mines have been 
unlawfully laid?30 
Although the belligerents committed numerous LOAC violations, including 
failure to observe necessity and proportionality principles in surface and air 
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attacks on neutral shipping (warships and merchantmen alike),731 their mine war-
fare programs take the prize for wholesale violations of international law. And al-
though neither State is party to Hague VIII'732 the rules of that treaty are grounded 
in custom, whose norms both belligerents violated. 
Part H. Other Humanitarian Law Issues 
Chapter III and Parts A-G have discussed Tanker War humanitarian law issues 
in other contexts, e.g., general principles of necessity and proportionality in 
self-defense or LOAC situations, including limitations on reprisals and when ne-
cessity and proportionality should be measured and the prohibition against per-
fidy;733 visit and search or diversion, attack on and destruction of enemy vessels 
and vessels with enemy character, vessels exempt from attack unless they aid the 
enemy war effort, and goods exempt from designation as contraband because of 
their humanitarian nature;734 blockade and exemptions from blockade because a 
vessel is carrying cargo for a humanitarian purpose; 735 creating various zones dur-
ing war, including a Red Cross Box as a sea area where belligerents' sick and 
wounded may be transported for hospital ship treatment on the high seas; 736 bom-
bardment and mine warfare?37 Those analyses will not be repeated here. How-
ever, other humanitarian law issues arose during the war and are discussed in more 
detail in this Part. 
1. Merchant Ship Crews Trapped in the Shatt ai-Arab attheBeginning o/the War 
The fate of crews trapped aboard neutral flag merchantmen in the Shatt aI-Arab 
at the beginning of the war is not clear?38 Those of the Iraqi merchant marine who 
fell into the hands oflran, and Iranian merchant marine personnel who fell into 
the hands oflraq, were entitled to at least prisoner of war status under the Third 
1949 Geneva Convention. The same would be true of ships' crew if a neutral vessel 
acquired enemy character.739 Crew of neutral flag ships that had not acquired en-
emy character, which probably accounted for personnel on most stranded vessels, 
were protected persons under the Fourth Convention: "Persons ... who, at a given 
moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or oc-
cupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they 
are not nationals." They should not have been detained and should have been al-
lowed to return home promptly.74O 
Crew entitled to prisoner of war status were entitled to treatment as prisoners of 
war,741 including repatriation before the end of hostilities for those seriously ill or 
wounded?42 In any event these crews should have been repatriated "without delay 
after the cessation ofhostilities.,,743 There is no record of when or if these prison-
ers of war were repatriated. However, if part of those were still in captivity 10 years 
after the war,744 the Detaining Powe?45 (Iran or Iraq) may have been guilty of a 
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grave breach of humanitarian law.746 The same can be said for the seriously ill or 
wounded who were not returned in accordance with the Third Convention.147 
Fourth Convention-covered crew also had considerable protections even if in-
ternees.148 Unless interned, these crews were entitled to leave unless their depar-
ture was contrary to Detaining Power interests.149 Internees should have been 
released from internment as soon as conditions for internment no longer ex-
isted,750 and then as protected persons they were entitled to rapid repatriation.151 
In no event could internment last longer than the end of hostilities, at which time 
any crew internees should have been repatriated as soon as possible unless there 
were outstanding penal proceedings against them.152 There is no record of when 
Fourth Convention-protected crew were returned. However, if crew considered 
protected persons were not interned, they should have been repatriated. Interned 
crew should not have been held longer than the end of hostilities before repatria-
tion, unless there were criminal charges against them. If any of these crew mem-
bers were held longer, the Detaining Power was guilty of a grave breach,753 
particularly if they were among those held over 10 years after the end ofhostilities. 
2. Rescue o/Those in Peril on the Sea 
On at least three occasions neutral armed forces took custody of members of 
belligerents' armed forces after attacks on or over the high seas. A US Navy ship 
rescued an Iraqi pilot shot down by an Iranian air-to-air missile; the pilot was repa-
triated to Iraq during the war through Saudi Arabian Red Crescent Society aus-
pices. US forces rescued 22 Iranian Iran Ajr crewmen after their minelayer was 
captured during a US self-defense response. The 22, and remains of 3 crewmen 
that died in the attack, were handed over to Omani Red Crescent officials, who sent 
them to Iran. US naval forces also rescued six Iranian Revolutionary Guards boat 
crewmen from the water during a US self-defense response; two died aboard a US 
Navy ship. The survivors and remains of the dead were turned over to Omani Red 
Crescent officials, who sent them to Iran. It is not known whether Iraq consented 
to repatriation of the Iranian service members, but it does not appear that Iraq ob-
jected to th~ procedure. Similarly, it is not known whether Iran consented to the 
Iraqi pilot's l'~turn or whether Iran objected to this procedure.154 After the US at-
tack on the RQ~tum platforms in response to attacks on neutral shipping, and a 
subsequent naval battle with Iranian surface combatants, there were heavy casual-
ties. US forces permitted Iranian tugboats to engage in rescue operations without 
impediment.755 
Undoubtedly there were survivors in the high seas after belligerents' numerous 
attacks on shipping by mines, aircraft or surface combatants.156 Undoubtedlyneu-
tral naval forces or other merchant ships rescued many of them. There is no record 
ofIranian naval forces' succoring survivors; Iranian tugs picked up platform crew 
when US forces attacked them.757 Since Iraqi fighter aircraft prosecuted high seas 
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attacks, these platforms could have not actively participated in rescue operations, 
although commensurate with security Iraq could have signaled to other platforms 
concerning survivors in the water. IfIraq had helicopters or surface ships in the 
area, they could and should have participated. There were apparently no belliger-
ent minelaying units nearby that could have particip~ted in rescue efforts when 
mines detonated against shipping. 
There is a general obligation, under the law of the sea and the law of armed con-
flict, to rescue persons in peril on the sea.758 Thus whether belligerent forces, neu-
tral warships or aircraft, enemy flag merchantmen or neutral merchantmen, all 
had the obligation to rescue shipwrecked mariners. Apart from Iranian tugs' as-
sisting Iranian nationals,159 there is no record of belligerent ships or aircraft's 
helping to rescue persons in peril on the sea. Consistent with their security needs, 
these ships and aircraft should have done their utmost to assure safety of these per-
sons, perhaps communicating their observations after reaching a place of safety. 
There is no indication as to whether this was done, or ifit could have been done un-
der the circumstances. 
Some rescues, e.g., that of the Iran Ajr crew, came after self-defense responses. It 
could be argued that since these did not occur during armed conflict as between 
rescuer forces and rescued persons, the LOS supplied the standard after self-de-
fense measures ended.160 Alternatively, it could be argued that these rescues were 
incidental to the right of self-defense; 761 i.e., the LOS did not apply, and these res-
cues became part of the developing law of self-defense. Under this theory, a right of 
self-defense carries with it the responsibility of attempting to save life at sea under 
LOS and LOAC standards. Since the United States was a neutral, unless the 
LOAC in this particular instance applied to it,762 the LOAC could not have gov-
erned these rescues.163 These are distinctions without a difference, as they should 
be. Given the obligation's universality, it could be argued that a duty to rescue 
those in peril on the sea has achievedjus cogens status,164 required in peace and war, 
subject to a rescuer's responsibility of protecting its own crew, passengers and 
platform. 
3. Neutrals'Repatriation of Belligerent Armed Forces Members 
Sub-Part 2 discussed neutrals' rescue and repatriation of Iranian and Iraqi 
armed forces members during the war. Humanitarian law requires that neutrals 
into whose territory, including territorial waters, belligerent military personnel 
fall must intern them for the war's duration, so that they do not take further part in 
the conflict, according to the Second Convention, which is particularly in pointfor 
this issue.165 With respect to the Iraqi pilot shot down, rescued by US forces, 
turned over to the Saudi Red Crescent and returned to Iraq, this may have techni-
cally violated humanitarian law standards unless Iran consented to the arrange-
ment. The same could be said oftheIranAjr crew rescued by US forces, turned over 
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to the Omani Red Crescent and returned to Iran, ifhumanitarian law applicable to 
the LOAC applied unless Iraq consented to premature repatriation. If it is as-
sumed that the United States turned these persons over to Red Crescent represen-
tatives in good faith, the blame for premature repatriation arguably lies elsewhere 
than on the United States. 
Since these attacks occurred in the context of US self-defense responses, it could 
be argued that the humanitarian law applicable during armed conflict did not ap-
ply of its own force, but only in the context of necessary and proportionate self-de-
fense?66 Under this theory, new standards of humanitarian law, not necessarily 
the same rules applicable during armed conflict, could apply during and after 
self-defense responses. If this is the case, returning Iranian crew and remains be-
fore the end of hostilities was not unlawful; there were no treaty rules to govern re-
patriation, since the Charter and its right of self-defense trumped the treaty law?67 
However, it could be argued that the same rules of humanitarian law applicable 
during armed conflict should be applied by analogy in the self-defense context.768 
A third argument would be that the law of self-defense ceased with the armed re-
sponse, and that other norms, e.g., the LOS and LOAC rescue at sea requirements 
and LOAC nonrepatriation principles then arose to supply the rules?69 Under the 
first or third theories, and arguably what should be the law in the self-defense con-
text, it was not proper to repatriate the rescued crew prior to termination of 
hostilies without opposing belligerent consent. However, since there was no pro-
test from opposing belligerents, these States' acquiescence in these actions may be 
presumed. 
Part I. Deception During Armed Conflict at Sea: Ruses and Perfidy 
Stratagems and ruses are allowed in sea warfare within the same general limits 
as land warfare; customary and treaty law denounce perfidy ("breaking of faith") 
or treachery in land, sea, air or space warfare. Ruses of war involve misrepresenta-
tion, deceit or other acts to mislead an enemy under circumstances where there is 
no obligation to speak the truth. Perfidy or treachery involves acts inviting an ad-
versary's confidence that the actor is entitled to protection or must accord protec-
tion under internationallaw.770 
1. Legitimate Ruses of War and Actions Constituting Perfidy 
Although the LONW follows general rules for ruses of war in other arenas, 
there are principles peculiarly applicable to sea warfare and others that have more 
frequent application to sea warfare situations. 
For example, most commentators say it is lawful for a warship to use a neutral or 
enemy flag when chasing an enemy vessel, when trying to escape, or to draw an en-
emy vessel into action. The warship must fly its national ensign immediately be-
fore it attacks, however. It is perfectly proper for warships to assume disguise, i.e., 
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adding funnels or masts to simulate a merchantman. Aircraft, including naval avi-
ation, may not use false markings, however. Use by a belligerent of neutral flags, 
insignia or uniforms during actual armed engagement is forbidden?71 
Besides the false flag rule for warships, legitimate ruses of war for warships and 
naval au.;:iliaries, and vessels convoyed by a belligerent and other ships with en-
emy character, include camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation, 
which might include false or misleading communications signals, acoustic or 
other emissions, paint except for the markings or pendent number the LOAC re-
quires, and the like. These (but not the false markings rule) also apply to aviation 
operating over the oceans. Other lawful ruses include surprises; ambushes; feign-
ing attack, retreat or flight from battle; simulation of quiet or inactivity; deception 
by bogus orders or plans; use of enemy signals or passwords; communications or 
orders to nonexistent units; deceptive supply or military unit movements; decoy-
ing through use of obsolescent or poorly armed military aircraft or warships to lure 
hostile forces into combat; dummy ships or aircraft; altering vessel or other equip-
ment appearance by e.g., adding fake funnels or masts; mock combat among 
friendly forces to lure an opponent into combat to aid its forces; flares or fires to 
mimic battle damage; smoke to conceal opposing forces' size and power; taking ad-
vantage of weather (e.g., fog); removing or changing navigational aids; psychologi-
cal methods to incite enemy personnel to rebel, mutiny, desert or surrender; and 
inciting an enemy population to revolt.772 
Ruses can be unlawful or unlawful, depending on the situation. Although de-
ceiving the adversary is generally lawful, deception that involves misleading or 
luring an adversary into what would otherwise be a treacherous or perfidious act is 
an unlawful ruse. For example, luring or misleading an adversary into attacking ci-
vilian objects or the civil population in that adversary's ruse-induced mistaken be-
lief the target is a legitimate military objective is an unlawful ruse that the LOAC 
condemns.773 While some unlawful ruses are common to all warfare modes, others 
have particular emphasis in naval warfare.774 
Warships and naval auxiliaries may not simulate hospital ships, small coastal 
craft or medical transports; vessels on humanitarian missions; passenger ships 
carrying civilian passengers; vessels guaranteed safe conduct by parties' prior 
agreement, including cartel ships; vessels entitled to be identified by the red cross 
or red crescent emblem; or vessels carrying cultural property under special protec-
tion.775 Although the San Remo Manual says this list is exhaustive,176 it does not 
reflect the state of the law; e.g., a warship may not simulate a vessel that has surren-
dered and is therefore exempt from attack, a perfidious act, as the Manual later rec-
ognizes?77 In terms of aviation operating over the high seas, a similar list might 
be: medical aircraft; aircraft on humanitarian missions; civil airliners carrying 
only civilian passengers; aircraft granted safe conduct by parties' prior agreement; 
and aircraft entitled to be identified by the red cross or red crescent emblem; 
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aircraft carrying cultural property under special protection.778 And as in the case 
of prohibitions on warships and naval auxiliaries, the list is not exhaustive; 779 e.g., 
aircraft cannot display any false markings.780 
The Manual would also bar belligerents from actively simulating status of a ves-
sel flying the UN flag as part of its "exhaustive' list, noting that "It has not yet been 
determined precisely in which circumstances flying [UN] colours would indicate 
protected status .... [I]fUN forces are not taking part in the conflict ... , they are 
entitled to a form of protected status.,,781 
The Manual standard, while perhaps appropriate as a general principle, may be 
deficient in several respects. First, in practice, when the UN ensign has been flown 
during peacekeeping operations, ithas been subjectto prior agreement.182 Second, 
any such agreement is subject to Security Council decisions, which could super-
sede it.783 Third, the rule does not take into account situations where a belligerent 
or neutral State is faced with a UN-flagged force of warships arrayed against it. 
While that country may be entirely in the wrong in opposing the force, perhaps op-
erating under a UN - supported blockade,784 that State may oppose, attack and de-
stroy these UN flagged forces as it can under the present LOAC or law of 
self-defense. On the other hand, if the UN flagged force is used for humanitarian 
purposes, e.g., to transport cargo through a blockade for humanitarian pur-
poses,785 the Manual principle would apply. The third point, where a UN force is 
used for combat purposes, invokes the false flag rule, a legitimate ruse of war at sea 
for warships as long'as the false flag is hauled down before hostilities begin and true 
colors are flown, which the Manual also recognizes.186 Under the false flag rule, a 
country opposing a UN combatant force could fly the UN flag as a ruse under cir-
cumstances described, and under LONW customary standards the UN flagged 
warships would not be entitled to protected status as the Manual suggests if the 
State's naval forces hauled down a false flag, hoisted true colors and attacked. If the 
UN operation is proceeding under a Council decision, as a technical matter the 
LONW rules might not apply of their own force, but in all likelihood the result, as 
a matter of international law under the Charter, would and should be the same. 
The foregoing analysis suggests, as the Manual also does, that the law of UN 
flagging is less than complete. The best procedure in every case would be for States 
whose vessels would fly the UN flag to seek agreements with belligerents or be 
girded with a Council decision, particularly if a State would oppose the UN -
flagged naval force with armed force.187 
Perfidy includes feigning distress, particularly through misusing an interna-
tionally recognized protective sign, e.g., the Red Cross or Red Crescent; feigning 
cease-fire, humanitarian negotiation (e.g., a parley to negotiate removal of dead 
and wounded) or other truce; feigning incapacitation by wounds or sickness; or 
combatants' feigning civilian noncombatant status. 
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Like lawful ruses, perfidy involves simulation, but it aims at falsely creating a 
situation in which the adversary, under international law, feels obliged to take action 
or abstain from taking action, or because of protection under international law 
neglects to take precautions which are otherwise necessary. Perfidy or treachery to 
kill, injure or capture has been prohibited in armed conflict under internationaIlaw ... 
to strengthen the trust which combatants should have in the international law of 
armed conflict .... [P]erfidy tends to destroy the basis for restor[ing] ... peace and 
causes the conflict to degenerate into savagery.788 
In naval warfare these include launching attack while feigning exempt platform 
status; feigning surrender or distress.789 Air warfare rules allow an aircraft to feign 
disablement or other distress to induce an enemy to end its attack. There is no obli-
gation to stop attacking a belligerent military aircraft that appears disabled. How-
ever, if it is known an aircraft is disabled so that it is permanently removed from 
conflict, attack should end to allow possible crew or passenger evacuation?90 Sub-
marines have feigned success of depth charge or torpedo attacks by releasing oil or 
debris; this practice has never been questioned as perfidious conduct?91 
2. Ruses and Perfidy During the Tanker War 
There are no reported ruses of war, lawful or unlawful, adopted by belligerents 
during the Tanker War. There are no reports of perfidious conduct. 
US naval vessels began painting their combatants' pendent numbers in shades 
of black and grey, instead of the traditional white-on-black familiar to the world, to 
minimize reflective surfaces that might attract a missile?92 Although there is no 
report ofit, undoubtedly US and other aircraft may have used nonreflective paint 
and nonreflective markings, instead of the usually brilliant aluminum or other 
surfaces commonly seen during recent conflicts in which the United States has 
been involved?93 Perhaps US and other countries' warships also began to use 
nonreflective paint. Undoubtedly US platforms, and those of other countries, em-
ployed emission controls and other devices to minimize detection and therefore to 
minimize attacks by belligerents. Toward war's end warships like Vincennes ap-
peared in Gulfwaters; these vessels had been designed from the keel up to mini-
mize detection by their configuration and equipment. Neutral navies did not 
actively simulate hospital ships and other platforms the LOAC forbids?94 
LOAC rules allowing ruses and forbidding perfidy did not apply to US and 
other neutrals' warships and military aircraft operating in the Gulf during the 
Tanker War. These countries were not belligerents. If these actions are seen as in-
cidents of self-defense,795 and if the LOAC rules are analogized to self-defense sit-
uations, these neutral naval forces' actions were legitimate. Apart from displaying 
a pendent number on ships or proper markings on aircraft,796 international law 
does not require a ship or aircraft to be painted a particular color or with a particu-
lar kind of paint, and the law says nothing about the color of these markings. 
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Similarly, if emission control and other actions to minimize detection are legiti-
mate ruses for belligerents, neutrals may employ them in self-defense. Warships 
like Vincennes or aircraft like Stealth bombers can be designed and built to mini-
mize detection under the LOAC and the law of self-defense. 
There were two potential uses of the UN flag during the war. Early in the war 
the Organization sought the belligerents' approval for allowing vessels trapped in 
the Shatt aI-Arab to leave under the UN or ICRC flag. Although Iran approved, 
Iraq refused permission, and the vessels remained there for the duration of the 
conflict?97 No subsequent Security Council decision addressed the issue. If the 
belligerents had agreed on terms of departure, that agreement would have gov-
erned. If the Council had issued a decision, that decision would have governed the 
situation?98 Use of the ICRC flag, without UN action on its use,e.g., by Council de-
cision or suggestion of an agreement in absence of Council action, would have been 
subject to the parties' agreement. In the latter case the LOAC would have governed 
as to the ICRC, i.e., Red Cross or Red Crescent, ensign?99 None of these events oc-
curred, and the scenarios posed are hypothetical, offering considerations for future 
wars. 
Late in the war the USSR proposed a UN flotilla, perhaps flying the UN colors. 
The proposal came to naught, although the United States correctly insisted on a 
careful statement of terms. 800 However, this raises the issues of relative sanctity of 
the UN flag. If the flotilla had been created by Council decision, that decision 
would have determined the flag status. On the other hand, if the decision did not, 
and the flotilla engaged in operations against the belligerents, it should have been 
subject to the same rules, e.g., false flags principles, that the LONW has devel-
oped.801 As in the case of the UN or ICRC flag proposals for merchantmen,802 
these scenarios are hypothetical but offer thoughts for future wars. 
During the Tanker War merchant ships began tailing neutral naval convoys or 
simulating convoys during night steaming.803 Some merchant ships appeared in 
the Gulf painted grey, like warships.804 
If these ships were neutral flagged and did not carry goods for belligerents' war 
efforts, no perfidy issues arose. Commensurate with safety on the high seas in the 
case of the convoys, there is no objection under the LOAC for merchantmen to sail 
close to neutral convoys, even if accompaniment suggests association with the con-
voy. If such a vessel was not formally part of the convoy, it could not claim convoy 
protection and was subject to visit and search as if it steamed alone on the high 
seas. 80S It could be defended like any other merchantmen by neutral warships.806 
The same principles apply to painting vessels grey, perhaps to simulate a warship. 
If ships tried to look like neutral warships in color, as long as they did not carry a 
pendent number required of all warships under the LOS and the LOAC,807 they 
were not subject to attack as a belligerent target if the simulation approximated 
such. If the vessel contributed to the opposing belligerent's war effort, and thereby 
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acquired enemy character,808 it was subject to capture and possible destruction on 
that account, and not because of its paint. On the other hand, if the simulation ap-
peared to resemble a neutral warship, the belligerents had no justifiable reason to 
attack on account of the color simulation. Grey-painted merchantmen invited 
risks of mistaken attacks by a belligerent if a belligerent thought the ship was an 
opposing belligerent's warship,809 or perhaps neutrals' self-defense responses if 
the neutral warship thought the grey-painted vessel was a warship approaching 
with hostile intent, however.810 
Part J. General Conclusions and Appraisal; Projections for the Future 
Cessation of hostilities in 1988 did not end the war.811 The belligerents' status 
when fighting stops is usually determined at the time of cessation and by terms of 
the cessation of hostilities, in this case a cease-fire. It does not dispose of parties' 
claims. 812 This was true for the Tanker War, the 1980-88 conflict's Persian Gulf as-
pects. The belligerents apparently did not settle matters for two more years; Iraq 
became involved with the crisis over Kuwait and Coalition war against it in 
1990-91.813 Tardy prisoner of war exchanges a decade after the cease-fire814 may 
indicate that matters are not settled yet. There is litigation in the International 
Court ofJustice over the US platforms attack,815 for example; private claims may 
be in lawsuits or the espousal process816 for years. New facts and records may 
change conclusions in this volume. 
This Part advances general conclusions from the available record for develop-
ments in and projections of the law of armed conflict as it applied to the Tanker 
War. I do not propose to repeat full, separate analyses for each topic appearing in 
this chapter, however.817 
1. BasicPrinciples: Necessity andProportionality; ROE; the SpatialDimension818 
The war illustrates the distinction that must be made between necessity and 
proportionality in self-defense situations and necessity and proportionality in 
LOAC situations. What is or is not proportional in a self-defense response mayor 
may not be proportional in the same circumstances when the LOAC applies.819 
The same analysis must apply to the due regard principle, adapted from the law of 
the sea and promoted for LOAC situations where no LOAC rule applies, i.e., 
belligerents should have due regard for neutrals' LOS rights.820 Necessity and 
proportionality or due regard, like many terms in US and other legal systems, are 
"terms of art" for lawyers that may have different meaning and content depending 
on circumstances in which they are used. To cite an example from US law practice, 
"jurisdiction" can mean subject-matter jurisdiction, or competency; venue, or the 
particular court(s) within a judicial system that can hear a case; authority of a court 
over persons or things, i.e., in personam, in rem, quasi in rem or status jurisdiction, or 
more generally "judicial jurisdiction;" standing, or the authorization the 
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Constitution or statutes give a particular claimant to bring a suit; etc. The word 
"trespass" is another example; it has one set of meanings for lawyers, another to 
those who are not lawyers, and yet another in the Lord's Prayer.821 
The LOAC recognizes two ocean areas and the air above them, the high seas and 
the territorial sea as defined in the 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions; special 
LOAC rules apply to neutrals' territorial waters. In general, belligerents may wage 
war in their territorial seas and on the high seas, subject to limitations, e.g., the law 
ofblockade,822 principles of treaty interpretation and application and UN law un-
der the Charter,823 and a general principle of due regard for others' oceans rights. 
LOS rules for other ocean areas, e.g., EEZs, do not apply of their own force, but 
belligerents must pay due regard to neutrals' rights in these areas.824 In general 
belligerents may not wage war in neutrals' territorial seas, but here too there are ex-
ceptions, e.g., the rule of necessity permitting a belligerent to attack, using neces-
sity and proportionality qualifying factors, an enemy warship threatening it from 
neutral territorial waters when the neutral cannot or will not obtain movement of 
the ship from its territorial sea as the law of neutrality requires. As a general rule, 
belligerents may not impair or impede neutrals' straits passage.825 As in self-de-
fense situations, ROE may qualify LOAC responses.826 A due regard principle, 
analogous to the same principle in the LOS, has been advocated for LOAC situa-
tions if there is no positive law governing oceans use between belligerents and neu-
trals.827 In any case, the LOS other rules clauses, a customary norm, declare that 
this body oflaw must be read in the LOAC context in appropriate situations.828 
The Tanker War record is slim on belligerents' recognizing or observing these 
principles. As Parts B-G suggest, Iran and Iraq failed to observe necessity and pro-
portionality principles throughout the war, particularly in attacks resulting in 
damage to neutral shipping from mines, fire from aircraft and surface vessels, and 
missiles. Iran violated, or came close to violating, rules for neutrals' territorial seas 
and the straits transit regime. 
2. Visit and Search; Capture, Destruction or Diversion 
The Tanker War revisited traditional principles of visit and search, as distin-
guished from LOS approach and visit, and rules applicable to neutral warship-
convoyed vessels and belligerents' convoys. As in prior wars, aircraft, particularly 
helicopters, played a role in visit and search, and this confirms use of other than 
surface combatants for this purpose. Belligerents have a right of visit and search of 
merchant shipping to determine if they are carrying goods for an opponent's war 
effort. If such goods are found, the merchant ship may be captured. Alternatively, 
belligerents may divert merchant ships for search in a more convenient and safe 
place. The traditional rule of prima facie validity of a neutral flag flown by a mer-
chantman, and the conclusive presumption rule for merchantmen flying the en-
emy flag, still apply. Warships are never subject to visit and search. While 
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belligerents may convoy shipping with military aircraft and warships, those con-
voys are subjectto attack. On the other hand, it is legitimate for neutral warships to 
convoy neutral-flag merchant shipping; those convoys are not subject to visit and 
search, and neutral convoying warship(s) or aircraft may respond in self-defense if 
a belligerent attacks the convoy.829 
Iran was within its rights to conduct visit and search of neutral shipping to de-
termine if it carried cargoes helping Iraq's war effort. Iran did not have the right to 
attack and destroy these vessels without warning or proof they carried such goods. 
While Iraq might have exercised visit and search by helicopters, it did not do so, 
and its indiscriminate attacks on neutral shipping also violated the LOAC. Iraq 
was within its rights to attack Iranian convoys shuttling oil down the Iranian coast 
for sale to finance Iran's war efforts. On the other hand, Iraq violated international 
law when it attacked neutral flag convoys carrying goods that did not contribute to 
Iran's war effort that were escorted by neutral flag warships. Neutral flag warships 
could legitimately respond in self-defense. 
3. Belligerents' Seaborne Commerce; Belligerents' Convoys830 
Sub-PartJ.2 discussed rules for belligerent convoying; these rules apply to mer-
chantmen flying belligerent flags. Flying a belligerent's flag is a conclusive pre-
sumption of enemy character. 
In determining whether or not an enemy merchant vessel is a lawful military 
objective, and therefore targetable, the US Navy manuals' "war-fighting or war-
sustaining" approach appears to make sense. Protocol I's land warfare approach, 
copied for sea warfare in the San Remo Manual "effective contribution to military 
action" phrase, is similar but more restrictive. The US Navy and Manual ap-
proaches may be distinctions without differences; although the Manual analysis is 
said to be more restrictive, its application in practice may have the same result as 
the US Navy standard. 
The London Protocol declares that belligerents should not destroy a merchant 
ship unless passengers, crew, ship's papers and, if feasible, passenger and crew ef-
fects are first placed in safety. State practice since 1909 appears to confirm that an 
absolute rule is impracticable, particularly in air and submarine attacks. The rule 
today should be that general LOAC principles of proportionality and necessity 
should be observed, and that the safety of passengers, crew, ship's papers and ef-
fects should be observed when at all possible, which should include advising by 
communications of the location of the sinking and of lifeboats. Separate rules, e.g., 
those published in current military manuals, for air, surface and submarine plat-
forms, should be consolidated in view of the reality that merchant ship inter-
dictions may be coordinated among all three kinds of platforms. It makes no sense 
to have one set of rules for each kind of platform. The same principles, perhaps 
with different necessity and proportionality factors, should be observed in 
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self-defense situations.831 I have proposed a nine-point analysis to attempt to clar-
ify the rules. It is clear that belligerents failed to observe even these principles, but 
that neutrals, e.g., the United States, attempted to do so in self-defense responses 
like the Airbus incident. 
Certain enemy vessels and aircraft are exempt from attack unless they contrib-
ute to an opponent's war effort. There were no published instances of belligerent 
attacks on these platforms during the Tanker War. Neutrals fired at these vessels, 
i.e., fishing craft, during mistaken self-defense responses. 
4. Neutral Flag Merchantmen; Enemy Character; Reflagging; Contraband832 
Neutral merchant ships can acquire enemy character if they aid the enemy, e.g., 
by carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining cargo pursuant to enemy diretion or 
control or when under enemy convoy, or by supporting the enemy, e.g., by signal-
ing the location of an opponent's sea forces. Absent these considerations, a neutral 
flagged ship carries a prima facie presumption of neutral status. Reflagging during 
the Tanker War complied with LOAC standards as well as LOS standards. 
Late in the war Iran published a contraband list covering goods inbound to 
Iraq. Its effect during the war is less than clear, but it did not apply to Iranian sei-
zures, etc., of neutral shipping before its publication. Contraband lists must be 
published before they are effective. Although the list was general, it was a valid list 
after its publication. The record of post-1945 wars, and indeed since the 1909 Dec-
laration of London, demonstrates the impossibility of compiling and publishing 
lists of absolute and conditional contraband. Weapons development and commod-
ities supporting a war effort, often locked in intelligence and defense agencies' na-
tional security classifications, are in constant change today as before. Any attempt 
to publish up-to-date contraband lists is doomed to failure before the ink is dry. 
Naval manuals continue to pay lip service to these concepts; a better approach is 
listing items that are not contraband, e.g., humanitarian supplies, and treating the 
rest as goods for the war effort. 
5. The Law of Blockade and the Tanker War833 
Although there was loose talk, in the media and among some commentators, 
about Iran's blockading the Iraqi coast or Iraq's blockading Iran's Kharg Island, 
no blockade that the LOAC would recognize occurred during the Tanker War. 
Neither belligerent published any notification of a blockade and their sea mine 
campaigns could not have counted as a blockade with or without notification. In 
any event, it is doubtful ifIraq could have mounted an effective blockade of the en-
tire Iranian coast with her air force alone. Iran's naval and air forces could have 
blockaded the small Iraqi coast effectively, but there is no evidence they did. Al-
though the UN Security Council might have imposed a blockade under its Charter 
authority in Article 41, it did not do so.834 The significance of blockade for the 
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Tanker War are two: (a) using the term, however loosely, is evidence the LOAC 
concept is still alive; (b) States wishing to impose a blockade must comply with the 
traditional law, even if it means that aircraft will mainly be used. 
6. Zones835 
Although the Manual and current military manuals confirm the customary rule 
that belligerents may exclude neutrals from properly notified high seas areas that 
are an immediate area of naval operations which must be proportional in size, this 
procedure was not used in the Tanker War. 
The United States proclaimed a high seas defense zone (SDZ), also known as a 
defensive bubble or cordon sanitaire, around its forces, thereby adding to customary 
law for this LOAC-related sea zone receiving modem emphasis in the 1982 
Falklands/Malvinas War. The SDZ must be proportional in area. The SDZ need 
not be noticed like warnings of belligerents' immediate areas of naval operations. 
The SDZ is only an announcement of a State's intention to apply its inherent right 
of self-defense. Although they did not do so, Tanker War belligerents or other neu-
trals could have published these zones; if they had done so, they would have been 
subject to the same principles. An SDZ cannot justify conduct unlawful under the 
LOAC or the law of self-defense. Whether an SDZ is a tactically useful device is 
questionable; it advertises a naval force's approximate location. On the other hand, 
it may serve a useful political purpose in warning about naval presence. Interna-
tional law does not require notice of SDZs; they are grounded in the law of 
self-defense, which requires no publication. 
Iran and Iraq proclaimed war zones. Modem military manuals and the Manual 
recognize high seas war zones as a customary norm, if they are properly notified, 
are proportional in area, give time of implementation and duration and allow a 
grace period for shipping to leave the zone. Like blockades, they must be effective; 
"paper" zones are inadmissible. Declarants must observe LOAC principles, e.g., 
necessity and proportionality, exemption of certain vessels (e.g., hospital ships) 
from attack, and enemy character rules for merchantmen. War zone declarations 
cannot create a high seas free fire area entitling belligerents to shoot on sight. Al-
though the Tanker War belligerents' war zones were notified, proportional and ef-
fective, use of the zones as free-fire areas, including Iraq's notice to that effect, 
meant the zones were unlawful as applied. Belligerents' war zone misuse was 
among the most egregious LOAC violations during the Tanker War. 
Saudi Arabia proclaimed an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over Per-
sian Gulfhigh seas midway through the war. If an ADIZ is properly notified and is 
proportional to its purpose, e.g., as an identification device for incoming aircraft, 
an ADIZ is permissible under international law. ADIZs are lawful under the LOS 
and the LOAC. There is no indication the Saudi ADIZ failed this test. 
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During the Falklands/Malvinas War the United Kingdom proposed, and Ar-
gentina accepted, creation of a high seas Red Cross Box north of the Falklands/ 
Malvinas, where hospital ships could operate and receive sick and wounded. The 
Box precedent was the First and Fourth 1949 Geneva Conventions, which allow 
belligerents to agree on hospital or neutralized zones for sick and wounded and ci-
vilians. There is no equivalent in the Second Convention on humanitarian law 
principles at sea. Despite subsequent lack of practice (none was established during 
the Tanker War), the concept is useful, if the Box is reasonable in size, other high 
seas users' rights are not prejudiced under the due regard principle, and bellig-
erents notice the Box's duration and location. A Box agreement should follow the 
1949 Conventions Annex form and be in writing if practicable. 
7. Weapons and Weapons Use; Mine Waifare836 
Whether Iran and Iraq followed necessity and proportionality principles in at-
tacks on convoys, oil platforms and the like is less than clear. If the War of the 
Cities record is an indicator, it is highly likely that they did not adhere to these 
standards in Tanker War bombardments. As noted in Part J.5, they did not follow 
these rules in high seas attacks on merchantmen; it follows that they also probably 
did not do so for shore installations. 
The belligerents' automatic submarine contact mine campaigns were among 
the most egregious Tanker War LOAC violations. Neither observed necessity and 
proportionality principles in mining. Iraq mined high seas areas; many Iraqi 
mines became unmoored and did not deactivate. The same appears true for Iranian 
mining. Iraq may have laid mines off the enemy coast for the sole purpose of inter-
cepting commercial shipping. Iran laid mines in the high seas without publishing 
location of minefields. Iran may have laid mines in neutral waters, and mines ap-
peared in the Strait of Hormuz, thereby threatening to impede or stop neutral 
shipping. Iran and Iraq also failed to show due regard for neutrals' rights to use the 
high seas or other ocean areas. 
8. Other Humanitarian Law Issues 
Besides humanitarian law issues related to attacks on shipping and shore facili-
ties,837 the Tanker War raised issues of evacuation of merchant ships and crews 
trapped in the Shatt aI-Arab dividing Iran and Iraq, under a UN or ICRC flag; neu-
trals' repatriation of belligerent crew they rescued on the high seas; and repatriat-
ing prisoners of war at war's end.838 
When Iraq refused, as humanitarian law allowed it to do, egress of trapped mer-
chantmen under a UN or ICRC ensign, the issue was mooted. These issues may 
arise in future wars. 
When the United States turned over an Iraqi pilot to a national Red Crescent So-
ciety, and when the United States turned over surviving Iranian IranAjr crewmen to 
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another Red Crescent Society, the United States acted in accordance with humani-
tarian law, which says that belligerents' armed forces members must not be returned 
to their countries during the war if a neutral rescues them on the high seas. Whether 
the Red Crescent Societies acted properly is another matter. Since opposing 
belligerents did not protest, it is presumed they acquiesced in the transactions. On 
the other hand, Iran's failure to repatriate prisoners of war until 1 0 years after the 
war's end violated humanitarian law, which says they must be repatriated 
promptly after hostilities end. 
9. Deception During Anned Conflict at Sea: Ruses and Perfidy 
Although there were no reported belligerent actions amounting to ruses of war, 
lawful or unlawful, or perfidy, there were actions related to these issues during the 
Tanker War.839 
Late in the war the USSR proposed a UN flotilla of Gulf naval forces; when all 
Gulfnavalinterests did not agree with the proposal, the idea mooted. The issue re-
mains for future wars, particularly in the peacekeeping context. The flag issue is 
the tip of the iceberg; underneath lie command and control structure issues for 
multinational naval operations. During the Tanker War navies cooperated to 
greater or lesser degrees, particularly in clearing mines, analogous to a more formal 
coalition opposing Iraq, ultimately with Security Council authorization, in the 
1990-91 war. The USSR proposal may prove to have been a seed of future opera-
tions concepts. 
Neutral warships and military aircraft probably began to adopt protective mea-
sures like non-reflective paint schemes. Warships like U.S.S Vincennes and some 
neutral military aircraft were built from the frames up to be less conspicuous on ac-
quisition radars. Neutral shipping tagged along with neutral convoys; some ships 
were painted grey like warships, probably to simulate them and thereby deter bel-
ligerent attacks. None of these actions were perfidy or unlawful ruses; they were 
actions by neutrals. 
10. Summing Up: Projections for Future Conflicts 
Although on a worldscale basis the Iran-Iraq war was a small affair, it was a big 
war, a total war, for two medium-sized belligerents. It was fought far away from 
major neutral naval powers' home ports. It has not been and will not be the last of 
its kind. The 1990-91 Gulf War pitted a US -led coalition against one Tanker War 
belligerent, Iraq, and there was the potential and reality for a reprise of many 
Tanker War LOAC issues. Yugoslavia's disintegration, continuing to this day, be-
gan just after the Tanker War cease-fire. The same kind ofissues, e.g., interdicting 
high seas merchant traffic, arose in these conflicts. 
A critical difference between the Tanker War and these later conflicts was the 
Cold War's end and perhaps a beginning of a new UN era, in which Charter law 
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issues besides the inherent right of self-defense, a major legal issue during the 
Tanker War,840 will figure. To the extent the later conflicts were governed by 
Charter-based law, as a technical matter the LOAC did not apply; in all cases the 
LOAC informed the content of Charter-based law. The result thus far has been 
close approximation ofLOAC standards under Charter law, but the law need not 
always be identica1.841 The difference between necessity and proportionality un-
der the LOAC and necessity and proportionality in self-defense situations, the 
Charter recognizing the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, 
can be great.842 This was a major but disputed Tanker War issue. To take another 
issue related to the War, law governing a Security Council decision directing a 
blockade might include a "paper blockade," unlawful under the LOAC since the 
1856 Paris Declaration.843 For national decisionmakers, the question will be 
whether the LOAC should be part of the law governing UN operations; if not, 
what should be different? In many cases the old law has worked well; it is a matter 
of understanding and applying it. Tanker War examples of objections to legitimate 
visit and search or use of the term "reprisal" when self-defense should have been 
recited are not helpful in developing the law, traditional or otherwise. 
The second problem will be interfacing the LOS with the LOAC. Universal ac-
ceptance of the 1982 LOS Convention will cure ambiguities in earlier law, e.g., 
straits passage rules, and will strengthen customary norms already restated in the 
1982 and 1958 Conventions. A narrow issue will be whether the customary and 
treaty-based rule, that the customary other rules clauses of the 1982 and 1958 Con-
ventions, which mean the LOS is subject to the LOAC in appropriate situations, 
will be followed in the future. Properly read and applied, Article 88 of the 1982 
LOS Convention, declaring the high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes, will 
not impede Charter-governed operations, LOAC-governed operations, or peace-
time naval operations, for that matter.844 A reverse-twist issue is whether the due 
regard principle, found in the LOS conventions as a rule for mutual use of, e.g., the 
high seas, will apply as an LOAC concept in belligerent-neutral relations for 
oceans use if there is no LOAC rule.845 This is not a firm LOAC principle but only 
commentators' proposals; should it become a rule oflaw? 
The third issue is applying traditional rules, or perhaps variants of them under a 
Charter law regime, to new technologies. The Tanker War was the first where heli-
copters, as distinguished from fixed-wing aircraft, worked with warships in visit 
and search or diversion operations. The technique was employed again in the 
1990-91 Gulf War and the Yugoslavia crisis. Missiles have been a feature of every 
war since the early Arab-Israel conflicts. New sea mines may be deployed; the tech-
nology of Tanker War mines dated back to the early Twentieth Century. New elec-
tronic or other devices may conjure up new ruses of war, with a possibility of claims 
of unlawful ruse or perfidy. How will Internet communications affect traditional 
LOAC rules? Will space technology and platforms be a factor? In many ways the 
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Iran-Iraq conflict was an old-fashioned war, replete with unrestricted (and unlaw-
ful) attacks on neutral merchantmen and grisly trench warfare on land, complete 
with gas attacks reminiscent ofW orld War I. The next wars may not be simple in 
terms of weapons technologies and techniques. How will traditional LOAC rules, 
and necessity, proportionality and due regard principles, respond to these issues? 
The interdependent world economy is another issue, largely outside the law, 
but it may promote problems, whether the law is Charter-based, the LOAC or the 
LOS. Besides seafaring nations, some of whom have substantial naval assets and 
others that do not, other countries' and their citizens' and businesses' interests will 
figure in decision making, particularly in UN action, but maybe in individual sov-
ereign State attitudes. The sketch of possible interests in maritime carriage of 
goods and passengers is a case in point.846 Consider how political decisions might 
be different, depending on whose and which national interests are involved. These 
decisions have translated, and will translate, into the content of UN and individual 
States' actions. The history of support for the Tanker War belligerents in the ab-
sence of UN action illustrates the latter point.847 
One final, new issue is the maritime environment during armed conflict. 
Tankers and other oceangoing vessels are larger today than ever before; they are 
matched by larger warships, all of which carry more bunkers, or can lift more oil, in 
the case of the tankers. There was one major reported spill during the Tanker War, 
in 1983, at Iran's Nowruz offshore facility, resulting from Iraqi attacks.848 Un-
doubtedly high seas self-defense responses or belligerent attacks caused others. 
The maritime environment issue is the subject of Chapter VI, to which we now 
turn. 
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470-83A; 1 HYDE § 227; McDOUGAL & BURKE 887-93; NWP I-14M Annotated 1111 3.4-3.8; NWP 9A Annotated 1111 
3.4-3.8; 2 O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 802-03, 814-19; 1 OPPENHEIM §§ 292-93, 299-305, 429-30; REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) § 34; REsTATE.IIENT(THIRD) § 522; HUGHTHO.llAS, THESLAVETRADE(1997); Eric Ellen, ContempororyPiracy, 
21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 123 (1990); Samuel Pyatt Menefee, "Yo Heave Hal"; Updating America's Piracy Laws, id.151 
(1990); John N. Petrie, Pirates and Naval Officers, NWC REv. 15 (May-June 1982); Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The 
Suppression of Pirate Broadcasting; A Test Case for Control of Activities Outside National Territory, 45(1) L. & CoNTEIotp. 
PROBS. 73 (1982); Louis Sohn,Peacetime Use afForce on the High Seas, in Robertson 38, 39-59; Anna van Zwanenberg, 
Interference with Ships on the High Seas, 10 ICLQ 785 (1961). 
77. See nn. IV.710-12 and accompanyingte.xt; COLOMBOS §§ 151-56. Because the United States abolished National 
Prohibition over 60 years ago, US ConsL, amend. XXI, these treaties may be headed toward desuetude in terms of 
their specific function, if that is not already trUe. See nn. III.930, IV.28 and accompanying te.XL They may have 
lingering vitality for LOS territorial sea issues as discussed nn. IV.710-12 and accompanying texL 
78. Sec Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs & Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, art. 
17,-UST-, in 28 ILM 493-518 (1989). The United States and other countries have concluded bilateral agreements 
on narcotics interdiction too. See, e.g., Agreement to Facilitate Interdiction by the United States of Vessels of the 
United Kingdom Suspected of Trafficking in Drugs, Nov. 13, 1981,33 UST 4224,1285 UNTS 197. Table of United 
States Bilateral Treaties Praviding for the Prevention of Smuggling, Doc. 17-7, 6E BENEDICT lists these and other US 
antismuggling bilateral agreements. See also BROWN 310-11; NWP I-14M Annotated 1111 3.11.4.1-3.11.6 & Table A3-1: 
Maritime Counterdrug/AlienMigrantInterdictionAgreemenzs (SepL 1,1997), in id. 3-33; REsTATEIoIENT(THIRD) § 522, cmt. 
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d & r.n.4; Phillip A.Johnson,ShootingDownDrng Traffickers, LIBERAAIlCORUMch.4; Sohn,Peacelime Use, n. 76,59-79. 
Smuggling people has been an issue too. See, e.g., Gary W. Palmer, Guarding the Coast: Alien Migrant Operations at Sea, 
LIBER AAIlCORUM ch. 8. 
79. Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 
1988,-UST-, in 271LM 668 (1988); Protocol for Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Fixed Platforms 
Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988,-UST-, in id. 685 (1988); see also BROWN 304-09; NWP I-14M 
Annotated 113.5.2.3 n.30; Malvina Halberstam, TheAchilleLauro,Piracyandthe IMO Convention on MaritimeSa/ety, 82 
AJIL 269, 270-71 (1988); Christopher C. Joyner, Offshore Maritime Terrorism: International Implications and the Legal 
Response, NWC REv. 16 Guly-Aug. 1983). 
80. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also BROWN 313 (force used to interdict arms shipments); COLOMBOS § 337; NWP 
I-14M Annotated, 11 3.11.5.1 (distinguishing force used in drug interdiction and measures taken in inherent 
self-defense right); nn.II1.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying texL See Parts F.2-F.5 for analysis of 
war zones, often claimed in connection with visit and search. 
81. LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; Vienna Convention, arts. 60-62; see also nn. 
111.952-67, IV.I0-33 and accompanying texL 
82. The claim by BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 that the approach and visit regime has been destabilized 
because of self-defense and other claims related to approach and visit may indicate lack of appreciation of the law 
flowing from UN Charter, art. 51, 103, and that the LOS Convention confirms what had been developing trends in the 
law; compare 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF TIlE SEA 801. 
83. LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; Vienna Convention, arts. 60-62; see also nn. 
111.928-67, IV.I0-33 and accompanying texL 
84. See nn. 76-79 and accompanying texL 
85. LOS Convention, arts. 95-96, 110(1),236; High Seas Convention, arts. 8(1),9; see also Helsinki Principle 
5.2.7; NWP I-14M Annotated 117.6; NWP 9A Annotated '117.6; 2 OPPENHEtM § 416; OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, arL 32; 
STONE 591-92; 11 WHITEMAN 3; n. IV.794 and accompanying text; but see TUCKER 335-36. 
86. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn.II1.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying texL 
87. Bring, Commentary, n. 111.848, 843; Schindler, Commentary, n. 62,221. 
88. Hague XlII, arts. 1-2,25; Stockholm Declaration, arts. 9;NWP I-14M Annotated 11 7.6; NWP 9AAnnotated 'II 
7.6; SAN REAIO MANUAL 111114-15, 16(d), 118; Bring, Commentary, n. III.848, 843; Schindler, Commentary, n. 62, 215, 
218. 
89. LOS Convention, arts. 1(1), 33, 58, 76(1), 78, 135, 137; Continental Shelf Convention, arL 3; Fishery 
Convention, arts. 1, 6;Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24; see also Parts IV.B.l and B.2. 
90. LOS Convention, arts. 1(1), 136-37; see also BROWN 18,20, ch. 17; BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 252-57; 2 
Nordquist 11'111.1-1.19; 1 O'CoNNELL, LAW OFTHE SEA 463-66; 1 OPPENHEIM § 350; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 523. 
91. See nn. IV.75, V.58, 62 and accompanying texL 
92. LOS Convention, arts. 2, 8; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1, 5; see also nn.IV.267-508 and accompanying 
text. 
93. See nn.IV.75, V.58, 62 and accompanying texL 
94. LOS Convention, arL 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, arL 16(3); see also nn. IV.337, 349 and accompanying 
text. 
95. Helsinki Principle 3.3, cmt.; NWlP 10-2 '11'II430b &n.23; NWP I-14M Annotated '117.8; NWP 9A Annotated 11 
7.8; SAN REAIOMANUAL 11108; TUCKER 300-01; c[. Helsinki Principle 3.2. This right of belligerents to close an area of 
the sea incident to visit and search should be distinguished from an exclusion zone claim, discussed in Part F, which 
may involve larger high seas areas. 
96. NWP I-14M Annotated'll 7.8; NWP9AAnnotated '117.8;c[. London Declaration,arL 1; Paris Declaration 114; 
SAN REAIO MANUAL 111185,106. 
97. See generally PartIV.B.5 and nn. V.58, 62 and accompanying texL Some treaties have specific provisions, e.g., 
Montreux Convention, n.IV.557, arL 19,173 LNTS 225 (no visit and search or hostile actin Turkish Straits if Turkey 
nota belligerent); see also NWP I-14M Annotated '117.3.5,7-14; NWP 9AAnnotated 117.3.5,7-20; 1 OPPENHEL~I § 213; 
Vignes, n. IV.555, 474. 
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98. Hague XIII, art. 1 requires belligerents to respect neutrals' sovereign rights. Belligerents must abstain from 
acts in neutral waters which ifknowingly permitted by any State would bean act of belligerency; Maritime Neutrality 
Convention, art. 3 obliges belligerents "to refrain from performing acts of war in neutral waters or other acts which 
may constitute on the part of that State that tolerates them, a violation of neutrality." NWP I-14M Annotated'll 7.6; 
NWP 9A Annotated '117.6 say the prohibition extends to "international straits overlapped byneutrai territorial seas ... "; 
SAN REMO MANUAt. 11 15 uses similarianguage. See also Stockholm Declaration, art. 9(1); Helsinki Principles 1.4,3.1; 
Bruce Harlow, UNCLOS III and Conflict Manogementin Straits, 15 ODIL 197,205-06 (1985); Schindler, Commentary, 
n. 62, 220-21. This would be the situation of e.g., the Strait ofHormuzifIran, Oman and the UAE were neutral during a 
war involving other States; all are littoral States for the Strait. However, this was not the Tanker War case; Iran was a 
belligerent, and Oman and the UAE were officially neutral. Under these circumstances Iran should have been 
permitted to conduct visit and search in its territorial waters in the strait" so long as it did not interfere with neutral 
shipping transit passage rights. As a matter of theory, this may be the legally correct response, but a practical result of 
almost any kind of visit and search in this strait's confines will result in neutral shipping transit passage interference. 
On the other hand, in other straits,e.g., those with a considerable high seas belt in the middle, as Hormuz might have 
been seen early in the war, cf. nn. IV.533-45, 562-65 and accompanying text, Iran could have conducted visit and 
search in the high seas area subject to the LOACand the due regard principle, nn. 58, 62 and accompanying text" or in 
its territorial sea. 
99. LOS Convention, arts. 38(1), 44-45; see also no. IV.567, 582-600 and accompanying text. 
100. /.e., as a temporary security measure pursuant to LOS Convention, art. 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, art. 
16(3); sec also nn. IV.308-09, 337, 349 and accompanying text. 
101. NWP I-14M Annotated 1111 7.6, 7.8; NWP 9A Annotated '11'11 7.6, 7.8; cf. Helsinki Principle 5.2.9; London 
Declaration, art. 1; Paris Declaration'll 4; SAN RaIO MANUAt. '11'11 15,85,106. See Part F for analysis of e.xclusion and 
similar zones, which implicate wider high seas areas than theimmediate area of naval operations for visit and search. 
102. Although this is the US procedure, it is common practice among navies today. NWP I-14M Annotated'll 7.6 
(notes omitted); NWP 9A Annotated'll 7.6.1 (notes omitted), citingTucKER338-44. See also Helsinki Principles 5.2.1, 
5.2.6; McDOUGAL & FELICIAN0509-13; 1 W.N.MEDLICOTT, THEEcoNOMlcBLOCKADE70-85 (1952); NWIP 10-2 'II 631d 
n. 22; NWP I-14M Annotated'll 7.4.2; NWP 9AAnnotated '!I7.4.2; 2 OPPENHl!IM §§ 418-21; OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, 
art. 32; 2 O'CoNNELL, LAW OF TIlE SEA 1147-48; SAN RaIO MANUAL '11'11 122-24; TUCKER 280-82, 312-15, 322-23; W. 
Thomas Mallison,Limited, n. 111.316, 389-90; US State DepanmentPress Release, U.S. Acts toAvoidDelaysforShips 
Transiting IPatm in V'rcinityofCuba, 47 Bulletin 747 (1962), on certificates of noncontraband carriage,i.e., World War 1 
and II navicerts and aircerts; clearcerts, used during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. No aircerts, clearcerts or navicerts 
were reported during the Tanker War. 
103. SAN RaIO MANUAL'll 121 & cmL 121.1. The merchantman may consent to diversion. Id. 'II 119 & cmts. 
119.1-119.2, citing inter alia COLOMBOS §§ 888-92; TUCKER 340; see also 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 421a-21b; 1 von Heinegg 
301-04. 
104. NWP I-14M Annotated 11 7.6.2; NWP 9A Annotated'll 7.6.2; accord, 2 OPPENHEIAI § 415. 
105. See nn. 76-79 and accompanying texL 
106. Cf. NWP I-14M Annotated'll 7.6.2; NWP 9A Annotated'll 7.6.2. 
107. See generally NWP I-14M Annotated 1111 7.6.1, 8.2.2.2-8.2.3, 8.3.1, 8.4; NWP 9A Annotated 11'11 7.6.1, 
8.2.2.2-8.2.3,8.3.1,8.4; SAN REAlO MANUAL 1i'll 47, 136-37, 139-40, 146, 151. 
108. See Parts C.4 and D.3. 
109. Lieber Code, arts. 135-37, 141-42; OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, art. 92; see also Howard S. Levie, The NalUre and 
Scope of the Annistice Agreement, 50 AJIL 880, 903-06 (1956); Verri, n. IV.n, 337. 
110. Cultural Property Convention, art. 14(2), to which the United States is not a party; see also CoLOMBOS §§ 
662-63; TOMAN 151-72; SAN RatO MANUAL '11'11 47(d), 136(d), 137, & cmts. 47.30, 136.1, 137.1; STONB 586; 
Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n.II.468, 253; 1 von Heinegg 312; Lyndel V. Prott" Commentary, in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 
582, 585; n. V.262 and accompanying text. 
Ill. Second Convention, arts. 22, 24-25, 29-33, 47; Protocol I, art. 22; BOTIlE et al.. 142-45; COLOMBOS §§ 638-55; 
MALt.tSON 124-25; NWP I-14M Annotated '11'11 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated '11'11 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; 2 
O'CoNNELL, LAW OF TIll! SIlA 1119-22; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 190,206; OXFORD NAVAL MANuAL, arts. 41-42, 49; 2 PICTET 
154-62,164-69,177-89,252-56; PILLOUD, CoMMENTARY 254-60; SAN RaIO MANuAL '11'11 13(e), 47(a), 48(b), 136(a) & 
cmts. 13.16, 47.1-47.8, 48.10, 136.1; STONl! 587; TUCKER 97, 117-34; Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. II.468, 214-29; P. 
Eberlin, Identification of Hospital Ships andShips Protected by the Geneva Conventions of12August 1949,1982 INT'LREv. 
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RED CROSS 315; Steven L. Oreck,Hospital Ships: The Right o/Limited Self-Defense, PROCEEDINGS 62 (Nov. 1988); L.R. 
Penna, Commentary, in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 534, 537; Arthur M. Smith, Safeguardzng the Hospital Ships, 
PROCEEDINGS 56 (Nov. 1988); Verri, Commentary, n. IV.7l, 334-35; 1 von Heinegg 313. These vessels may lose their 
exemption if they contribute to the war effon. See nn. 175,243, 257-58,273-76 and accompanying te.XL 
112. " ••. [P]ostal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, whatever its official or private character may be, 
found on the high seas on board a neutral or enemy ship, is inviolable. If the ship is detained, the correspondence is 
forwarded by the captor with the least possible delay. The[se] provisions .•• do not apply, in case of violation of 
blockade, to correspondence destined for or proceeding from a blockaded port ••.• [IJnviolability of postal 
correspondence does not exempt a neutral mail ship from the laws and customs of maritime war as to neutralmerchant 
ships in general. The ship, however, may not be searched except when absolutely necessary, and then only with as 
much consideration and expedition as possible." Hague XI, arts. 1-2. Commentators divide on whether mailships arc 
among exempt vessels Compare COLOMBOS §§ 665-72 (mail ships not exempt); SAN RaIO MANUAL ~ 136, cmL 136.2 
(same), citing 2 OPPENHEIM § 191 (same); STONE 589-90 (restrictive interpretation, at best, in practice) with 2 
O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1123-24 (mail ships exempted); OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, aIL 53 (same); I.A. Shearer, 
Commentary, in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 183, 189 (same); 1 von Heinegg313 (same); Verri, n. IV.7l, 335 (same). Even 
the Hague XI correspondence exemption is subject to question and limitation through the practice of two world wars, 
although neutral diplomatic and consular correspondence and other mails may be exempt under other principles of 
international law. See, e.g., Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, arL 27, 23 UST 3227, 3239, 500 UNTS 
95,108; Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 23, 1963, arL 35,21 id. 77,99,596 UNTS 261,290; COLOMBOS § 673; 2 
OPPENHEIM § 191; OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, art. 53; STONE 589-90; C.D. Allin, Belligerent Interference with the Mails, 1 
MINN. 1.. REV. 293 (1917); A.P. Higgins, Treatment 0/ Mails in Time o/War, 9 BYBIL 31 (1928); Shearer, 183-85; Verri, 
Commentary, n. IV.7l, 335. The Hague Air Rules adopt the naval warfare rules, whatever they are, for air mail. Hague 
Air Rules, an. 56. The Hague Air Rules are considered customary norms and are generally regarded as declaring 
customary law, at least for naval warfare. NWIP 1-14 ~ 7.3.7 n.82. The US Navy applied them during World War II. 
AFP 110-31 ~ 4-3c, citing 1941 Tentative InstrUctions. (AFP 110-31 ~ 5-2c says the Air Rules, arts. 22,24-26 relating to 
air bombardment are not customary law as a total code, however; see also Part G.l.) The foregoing does not answer the 
question of what the naval warfare rule is; the Air Rules may incorporate nothing by reference when it comes to 
neutral mail. If a neutral mail ship exemption exists today, such a ship is subject to enemy character rules and 
consequences those entail. Hague XI and the general law of naval warfare make that very clear. See Part D.l. The 
"consideration and expedition" language of Hague XI, arL 2, iflaw today, might be considered an early statement of 
necessity and proportionality principles. See Pan A. See also nn. 257,271 and accompanying text. 
113. This exemption is grounded in treaty and customary law. Hague XI, arL 3; The Pacquete Habana, 175 US 677 
(1900); COLOMBOS §§ 656-59; 1 LEVIE, CODE 186; MALLISON 15-16, 126-28; NWP I-14M Annotated ml 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 
8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated ~~ 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OFTHE SEA 1122-23; 2 OPPENHEIM § 187; OXFORD 
NAVAL MANUAL, arts. 47, 49; SAN REMO MANUAL ~'1147(g), 136(f), 137 & cmts. 47.45-47.51; 136.1, 137.1; STONE 586; 
TUCKER 95-96; Doswald-Beck, n. II.468, 253-56; L.C. Green, Comments, in Grunawalt 223, 225-26; Shearer, 
Commentary, n.112, 185; 1 von Heinegg312; Walker, State Pracrice 129-30,140,146,155,187. As Hague XI, art. 3 and 
commentators emphasize, these vessels lose their exemption if they participate in hostilities. For further analysis of 
exempt vessels, see Part C. 
114. COLOMBOS § 870; NWP I-14M Annotated ~7.6; NWP 9A Annotated ~7.6; 2 OPPENHEIM § 416; OXFORD NAVAL 
MANUAL, arL 32; STONE 591-92; 11 WHITEMAN 3. Under the law of the sea these ships are also exempt from approach 
and visiL See n. 76 and accompanying texL 2 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA unfortunately uses the same terms, visitand 
search, for LOS approach and visit and LOAC visit and search. 
115. COLOMBOS § 871-77; Helsinki Principles 5.2.8,6.1; London Declaration, arts. 61-62; NWP I-14M Annotatcd 
~ 7.6; NWP 9A Annotated ~ 7.6; 2 OPPENHEIM § 417; OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, arL 32; SAN REMO MANUAL \I 120; 
TUCKER 334-35; Frits Kalshoven, Commentary, in LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 257, 268; Walker,Anticipatory, n. III.289, 
379,31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 347 (US World War II convoy of UK-bound cargoes while US neutral); Walker, State 
Practice 128-29; 170; nn. IV.811-19, 826 and accompanying texL UK practice was once to the contrary. 2 OPPENHI!LI\ § 
425. Sweden's warships convoyed iron ore shipments in Sweden-flagged bulk carriers at least pan way to Germany in 
1915. PAUL G. HALPERN, A NAVAL HtSTORY OF WORLD WARI 204 (1994). Germany was dependent on iron ore, but the 
questionable nature of what was then absolute contraband clouded the issue of whether Swedish practice violatcd 
London Declaration convoying rules. See also Part D.3. 
116. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn.III.lO, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
117. See nn.115-16 and accompanying texL 
118. See nn. 115-17 and accompanying texL 
119. See Part C.l. 
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120. Compare Helsinki Principle 1.1; NWIP 10-211 501; SAN RaIO MANUAL II 113; 1 von Heinegg 292; cf. NWP 
I-14M Annotated 1111 7.4, 7.5; NWP 9A Annotated II 7.4,7.5 (LONW rule), with LOS Convention, art. 91(1) (LOS 
rule); High Seas Convention, art. 5(1) (same); see also nn. IV.736-62 and accompanying text. 
121. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III.952-67, IV.I0-25 and 
accompanying text. 
122. See generally CoLOMBOS §§ 609-10; 3 HYDE § 786; London Declaration, arts. 55-56; NWP I-14M Annotated II 
7.5; N\'1P 9A Annotated II 7.5; OXFORD NAVAL MANuAL, art. 52; SAN RaIO MANUAL II 112; TUCKER 80-81; 1 von 
Heinegg 293; Kalshoven, Commenllny, n. 115,267; Verri, Commentary, n. !V.n, 335. 
123. See nn. IV.736-62, 824-25 and accompanying text, concluding that reflagging from a Kuwaiti to a US ensign 
was valid under LOS principles. 
124. See n. 120 and accompanying text. 
125. 3 Nordquist II 93.7(e), referring to LOS Convention, art. 97; see also LOS Convention, art. 93; High Seas 
Convention, art. 7; Protocol I, art. 38; nn. IV.807-10 and accompanying text. 
126. See COLOMBOS §§ 605b·08; Declaration of London, art. 30; Helsinki Principle 5.2.3 & cmt.; NWIP 10-21111 
631(c)(I),633(a); NWP I-14M Annotated 1111 7.4-7.4.1.1; NWP 9AAnnotated II 7.4.1.1; 2 O'CONNELL,LAWOFTIIESEA 
114647; 2 OPPENHEIM § 92; SAN Ra\O l\1ANuAL II 148 & cmt. 148.4; STONE 486; TUCKER 267-68; Kalshoven, 
Commentary, n. 115, 263. 
127. See nn. 76-81 and accompanying text; see also nn. II.305, 347 (terrorist attack potential considered in US 
NOTAl\1s, NOTMARs). 
128. This included asserting visit and search righlS after the ceasefire.See nn. II.I77, 274-78, 288, 296-99, 306, 366, 
420,447,491-92 and accompanying text. 
129. Sec nn. II.I04-06, 220, 277, 290, 325, 357, 375, 379-80,463 and accompanying text. 
130. Sec generally nn. II. 177, 274-78, 288, 296-99, 306, 366, 420, 447, 491-92 and accompanying text. 
131. LOS Convention, arts. 37-38, 87; High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. IV.68-79 and accompanying text 
and Part VI.B.6. 
132. UN CharIer, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.lO, 47-630,916-18,968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
133. See, e.g., nn. II.179, 233, 250, 260, 334, 33840 (attack on U.S.S. Stark, perhaps thought by Iraq to be a 
merchantman), 354, 357 (mine attacks on merchantmen), 359, 362, 368, 373, 393-94, 412, 420-21, 430-33 (mining 
U.S.S. Samuel B. Roberts in shipping lanes), 446, 469, 519 and accompanying text. 
134. See nn. III.568-69 and accompanying text. 
135. See nn. II.295, 304, 34345, 349, 351-53, 359, 361-62, 438, 44748, 454, 472 and accompanying text. 
136. Sec nn. II.153-56 and accompanying text. 
137. See nn. II.425-28 and accompanying text. 
138. 3 Nordquist II 93.7(e). 
139. If a ship flies a UN ensign, perhaps in addition to its registry flag, the view is that only the registry State has 
jurisdiction over the ship. 3 Nordquist II 93.7(e); cf. LOS Convention, art. 93; High Seas Convention, art. 7; see also nn. 
IV.835-37 and accompanying text. LOAC analysis is less clear; it is not certain which ensign prevails, the UN's or the 
flag State's. See nn. 120-25 and accompanying text. 
140. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations, 1949 IC] 174; BROWNUE, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 680-95; GOODRICH et al.. 619-20; 1 OPPENHEIM § 7, 18-19; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 223; SU.IMA 1126. 
141. UN Charter, arts. 25, 48; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text. 
142. LOS Convention, art. 93; High Seas Convention, art. 7; see also 3 Nordquist II 93.7(e), at 133, quoting Flag 
Etiquette Code to Be Followed on Naval Vessels PrO'1Jided by Troop-Contributing Country to the United Nations Observer Group 
III CentralAmerica - --Practice Concerning the Use of the UnitedNatwns Flagon Vessels, 1990 UN lURID. YB 252 (citation 
of use onCRC ensign). 
143. Flag Etiquette Code, n.142, 3 Nordquist II 93.7(e), at 133, contemplates a possibility that warships could fly the 
UN flag, alone or with the national ensign. 
144. UN Charter, arts. 25,48; see also no. IV.57 and accompanying text. 
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145. See nn. III.308-48 and accompanyng text. 
146. See nn. II.363, 412 and accompanying text. 
147. See Part I. 
148. See, e.g., n. II.420 and accompanying text. 
149. See nn. II.368-72 and accompanying text. 
150. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; He1sinkiPrinciple6.2; SA1'1RE1.IOAuNUAt.1192; ; see also nn.III.10,47-630,916-18, 
968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. See Parts G.2-G.3 for further LOAC mine warfare analysis. 
151. Thisruleis subject toqualification,e.g., warships that have surrendered cannot be attacked. COLOMBOS §§ 512, 
516; NWIP 1O-21111430a,441, 503a; NWP I-14M Annotated 118.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated '!l8.2.1; 2 OPPENHEIM § 181; 
OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, artS. 1, 31; SAN REMOMANUAt. 68 & '!l1O, 34-35; Vern, Commentary, n. IV.71, 330-31; n. 267 
and accompanying text. Attacks on enemy targets invokes the military objective principle, restated for land warfare in 
Protocol I, artS. 48, 52(2) and for naval warfare in NWP 1.14M Annotated 118.1.1; NWP 9A Annotated 118.1.1; SAN 
RE1.IOMANUAL II 39; See also AFP 110-32 1111 6-3c; BOTHEetal •• 274-80,282-86,320-26; GREEN 161; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 213, 
214e, at 522-23; PaLouD,COMMENTARY 585-96, 598-600, 630-37; Horace B. Robertson,]r., ThePrincipleofthe Military 
Objective in the Law of Anned Conflict, LIBER ru,IICORUAl ch. 10. 
152. See nn. 58, 62 and accompanying text. 
153. Prize law does not apply to these captures; title vests immediately in the captor, under US law. COLOMBOS § 
930,801; NWP I-14M Annotated 118.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated II 8.2.1, reflecting Oakes v. United States, 74 US (32 
How.) 778 (1863); but see COLO.UBOS § 930 and A. Pearce Higgins, Ships of War as Prize, 6 BYBIL 103 (1925), reporting 
UK prize court cases on warships. Each country may establish its prize courtS' jurisdiction, subject to international 
law rules; that explains the difference. COLOMBOS § 926; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 192, at484-85; 434; 656. Itis legally proper for 
the United States to claim immediate title and for the United Kingdom to send warships to prize court adjudication. 
There is no international law rule on the subject. 
154. If military exigencies permit, all possible measures should be taken without delay to search for, collect and 
identify the shipwrecked, wounded or sick and the dead. Warships may appeal to the charity of commanders of neutral 
merchant vessels, yachts or other craft, to take on board and care for the wounded, sick or shipwreeked, and to collect 
the dead. Second Convention, arts. 16, 18-21; Protocol I, art. 33; BOTHEet al •• 171-75; COLO.I\BOS § 510; NWIP 10-2 '!l 
511b; NWP I-14M Annotated '!l8.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated 118.2.1; 2 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHESEA 1121; 2 OPPENHELU 
§§ 204-205a; 2 PICTET 112-16, 129-53; PILLOUD, COMMENTARY 350-54; SAN REMO MANUAL 1111 159, 161, 163-68; 
Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. II.468, 225-26; Matheson, Remarks 424. 
155. Second Convention, art. 15; see also 2 PICTET 107-12; n. 154 and accompanying text. 
156. See Part B. 
157. AULLISON 101; NWIP 10-2 '!l502a; NWP I-14M Annotated '!l8.2.2.1; NWP9AAnnotated 118.2.2.1; SANRE1.IO 
MANUAL 11135; TUCKER 103·04. 
158. Hague VI, arts. 1-2,4. 
159. See n. 16 and accompanying text. 
160. 2 OPPENHElM§ 102b,at334; De Guttry,Commentary, nn.16, 108; InlToductoryNote, in SCHINDLER & TOMAN 791. 
161. Third Convention, art. 4(A)(5) (if they "do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other 
provisions ofinternationallaw," referring to Hague XI, art. 6); 3 PICTET45-51, 65-66; SAN REAlo !\1ANUAL '!l165(d) & 
cmts.165.5-165.9;TUCKER112-15;cf. NWP I-14M Annotated '!l8.2.2.1 & NWP 9A Annotated '!l8.2.2.1 ("maybe made 
prisoners of war"). 
162. COLO.IIBOS §§ 909-10; NWIP 10-2 '!l502b(2); NWP I-14M Annotated '118.2.2.1; NWP9AAnnotated '!l8.2.2.1; 2 
O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1115-16; 2 OPPENHEIM § 194; SAN RE1.IO !\1ANUAL '!l139; TUCKER 106-08. 
163. SAN RE1.IO !\1ANUAL 11'!l59, 61; see also nn. 35-40 and accompanying text. 
164. These categories have been derived from Protocol I, art. 52(2); London Protocol, Rule 2; id., Rule 1, declaring 
that submarines mustobeyrules for other warships; NWIP 10-2 '!l503b(3); NWP I-14M Annotated 118.2.2.2; NWP 9A 
Annotated 118.2.2.2; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 181a, 356(1), 389; SAN RE1.IO MANUAL '!l60 & cmts; see also nn. 45,166-256 and 
accompanying text. 
165. Compare NWP 9A Annotated'll 8.2.2.2 and NWP I-14M Annotated '!l 8.2.2.2 (identical with NWP 9A 
Annotated, '!l8.2.2.2 except citations) with SAN REMO MANUAL 1160; see also NWIP 10-2 '!l503b(3). SAN RE.uo AUNUAL, 
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cmt. 60.1 recites the NWP categories in the conjunctive ("and"). The NWP lists are neither disjunctive ("or") as my 
list has them nor conjunctive, but it is clear from NWP 9A Annotated 118.2.2.2; NWP I-14M Annotated 118.2.2.2 that 
the disjunctive is meant. If read in the conjunctive, it means that all criteria,from persistendyrefusing to stop through 
integration into an enemy's warfighting/war-sustaining effort, must be meant. This is not the law; meeting any 
Category criterion is enough to subject an enemy merchantman to attack and destruction. NWIP 10-2 II 503b(3) 
pr~sents its criteria in a format similar to the NWPs. 
166. London Protocol, Rule 2; NWIP 10-2 II 503b(3); NWP I-14M Annotated II 8.2.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated II 
8.2.2.2; ShN REAlo l\U.NUAt. 111160(b)-60(e); see also l\U.LUSON 122-23; Jon L. Jacobson, The Law of Submarine Wmfare, 
in Robertson 205, 231. 
167. NWP I-14M Annotated II 8.2.2.2 n.54; NWP 9A Annotated II 8.2.2.2 n.49, citing NAVAt. WAR CoLLEGE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATIONS 1930, at 9-19, 21-25 (1931); NWIP 10-2 II 503b(3)(4); SAN REAIO l\ihNUAL 1160(1) & 
cmL 60.14; Levie, Submarine Wmfare, n. III.439, 56; W.J. Fenrick, Comments on SaUy V. and W. 17wmas Mallison's 
Paper, in id. 110, 117-1S. 
16S. Compare NWP 9A Annotated 118.2.2.2 n.49; NWP I-14M Annotated 118.2.2.2 n.54 with ShN REAIO l\ihNUAL, 
cmt. 60.14; NWlP 10-2 II 503b(3)4 used the formula, "offensive ••• use ••• against an enemy." 
169. NWP I-14M Annotated 118.2.2.2 n.54; SAN REAIO MhNUAL, emt. 60.14. 
170. NWP 9A Annotated 118.2.2.2; see also NWP I-14M Annotated 118.2.2.2. 
171. SAN REMO l\U.NUAL II 60(1). 
172. Compare NWP I-14M Annotated '118.2.2.2, n.54; NWP 9A Annotated '118,2.2.2, n.49, with SAN RilMo l\ihNUAL 
cmt.60.14. 
173. Cf. NWP 1-14M Annotated 119.2; NWP 9AAnnotated '119.2 (mine technology); O'Connell,InternationaILaw, 
n. III.252, 52; HoraceB. Robertson,Jr.,Modem Technology and theLaw of Armed Conflict at Sea, in Grunawalt 362, 370; 
Robertson,New Technologies and Armed Conflicts at Sea, 14 SYRACUSEJ. INT"L L. & COM. 699 (1988); Service, n. III.439, 
238-40. 
174. In this regard NWP 9A Annotated II 8.2.2.2; NWP I-14M Annotated 118.2.2.2 follow the pattern ofNWIP 
10-2, 'II 503b(3), which says, "Enemy merchant vessels may be attacked and destroyed, either with or without prior 
warning, in any of the following circumstances: ••. If armed, and there is reason to believe that such armament has 
been used, or is intended for use, offensively against an enemy." • 
175. On the other hand, "passive" electronic and similar defense equipment, e.g. electronic countermeasures gear, 
infrared decoy dispensers, and chaff, would be allowed. Cf. NWP 1-14M Annotated II S.2.3 n.66; Oreck, n. Ill, 
approving similar devices for hospital ships, exempt from attack unless they lose protected status. See nn. 111, 240, 
243,257-58,273-76 and accompanying text. 
176. See, e.g., nn. II.463-64 and accompanying text. 
177. The author had experience with this while on naval service. 
178. SAN REMO MANUAL '1160(a). 
179. Hague VII, arts. 1-6, restating custom; see also nn. IV.789-90 and accompanying text. 
ISO. Paris Declaration, Ill; see also n. IV.624 and accompanying text. 
lSI. LOS Convention, arts. 100·07, 110; High Seas Convention, arts. 14-22;seealso n. 76andaccompanyingtext. 
IS2. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III.952-66, IV.I0-25 and 
accompanying text. 
183. E.g., LOS Convention, arts. 109-10 (illicit radiobroadcastiog); see also n. 76 and accompanying text. 
184. See n. 164 and accompanying text. 
185. Cf. SAN REMO l\U.NUAL '1160, cmt. 60.11. 
186. NWP 9A Annotated '118.2.2.2; see also NWP 1-14M Annotated IIS.2.2.2 (same); for analysis of the London 
Protocol requirements of providing for safety of passengers, crew and papers, see nn.195-256 and accompanying text. 
IS7. SAN RilMo l\U.NUAL '1160(g). 
IS8. Id., cmt. 60.10; see also id., cmts. 60.1-60.9, 60.11, referring to Protocol I, art. 52(2); n. 45. 
IS9. Helsinki Principle 5.2.3; compare NWP 1-14MAnnotated '117.4; NWP9A Annotated 117.4, which distinguish 
between "commerce between a neutral ••• and a belligerent that does not involve the carriage of contraband or 
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otherwise contribute to the belligerent's war-fightinglwar-sustaining capability." Helsinki Principle 5.2.3, cmt., says 
certain goods, e.g., religious objects, may never be considered contraband; see also Part D.3. 
190. Helsinki Principles 5.2.4-5.2.5; NWP I-14M Annotated 117.4.1.1; NWP 9A Annotated 117.4.1.1; SAN REMo 
MANUAL'll 148; see also Part D.3. 
191. See, e.g., Doyle, International Law, n. 6,21-23; Schmitt, n. 6, ix; Thomas, n. 6, xv, xvii; see also BROWNUE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5; REISMAN & LEITZAU, n. 6, 1; n. 6 and accompanying texL 
192. Helsinki Principle 5.2.3; NWP I-14M Annotated 1111 7.4, n.88; 8.2.2.2, n.57; NWP 9A Annotated '11117.4, n.90; 
8.2.2.2, n.52; see also SAN REMO MANUAL '1160, cmt. 60.10; n.45 and accompanying text. 
193. See Parts. A.I-A.2. 
194. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also n. IV.75 and accompanying text. A 
similar, but not the same, due regard principle should govern LOAC issues where there is no positive rule oflaw and 
there is interface between the LOAC and neutrals' oceans use rights. See nn. 58, 62 and accompanying te.xt. 
195. The London Protocol declared that 1930 London Naval Treaty, art. 22, which would expire because not all 
signatories had ratified it, would remain in force "indefinitely and without limit of time." Id., art. 22, had provided: 
... The following are accepted as established rules of international law: 
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules ofinternational 
law to which surface ships are subject. 
(2) ... [Ejxcept in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to 
visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation 
a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety •••• [T]he 
ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of passengers and crew is assured, in the 
existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity ofland, or the presence of another vessel which is in a 
position to take them on board. 
The 1922 Washington Naval Treaty had provided: 
... [Ajmong the rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and 
noncombatants atseain time of war, thefollowingare deemed to bean established partofinternationallaw: 
(1) Amerchantvesselmust be ordered to submit to visit and search to detertnineits character before it can 
be seized. 
A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuses to submit to visit and search after warning, or to 
proceed as directed after seizure. 
A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have been first placed in safety. 
(2) Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the universal rules above stated; 
and if a submarine cannot capture a merchant vessel in confortnity with these rules the existing law ofnations 
requires itto desist from attack and from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested. 
Anyone in a belligerent's service who violated the Treaty and Protocol rules would be liable to trial for piracy under 
any State's jurisdiction where that person might be found. Prohibiting submarines as commerce destroyers, as 
practiced during World War I, was recognized, as was the practical impossibility of using them as commerce 
destroyers without violating these rules. The goal was universal acceptance of prohibiting submarines as commerce 
destroyers. Washington Naval Treaty, arts. 14. The treaty failed of ratification. Introductory Note, SCHINDLER & 
TOMAN 877. 1917 Instructions, arts. 96-97, had provided: "In no case after a vessel has been brought to may it be 
destroyed until after visit and search ... and all ..• on board have been placed in safety, and also, if practicable, their 
personal effects." Ship'S papers were to be preserved. The 1909 London Declaration, arts. 49-50 had been to the same 
effect. See also Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 115, 272; Nwogngn, n. III.439, 353-54. 
196. NWP I-14M Annotated 11 8.2.2.2,n.47; Robertson, U.S. Policy, n. III.439, 351; Service,n. III.439, 241 n.9; see 
also W. Hays Parks, Conventional Area Bombing and the Law of War, PROCEEDINGS 186, 106 (May 1982). 
197. Hagne Air Rules, art. 24(1); see also 2 OPPENHEIAI § 214c; Introductory Note, SCHINDLER & TOMAN 207; 
Remigiusz Bierzanek, Commentary, in LAw OF NAVAL WARFARE 396, 401, 406. The Hague Air Rules are ~onsidered 
customary law. See n. 112. 
198. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 98; High Seas Convention, art. 12;seealso nn. IV.816and accompanying text. 
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199. Second Convention, art. 12; Protocol I, art. 33; see also n. IV.816 and accompanying text. 
200. Sec n. IV.816 and accompanying text. 
201. COt.OMBOS § 923; Levie, Submarine Waifare, n. III.439, 32-40. 
202. Cot.OMBOS §§ 857,923; Levie, Submarine Waif are, n. III.439, 48-54. 
203. See nn. 263, 274-75 and accompanying text. 
204. " ... [T]he number of neutral seamen and vessels lost at sea by enemy action during the Second Great War 
e.,cceded by far those ... in the First Great War." CoLO.I\BOS § 923,794. 
205. Cot.OMBOS §§ 857-58; NWP I-14M Annotated, 'il8.2.2.2 n.47; 2 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 1135-37, 1153; 
TUCKER 312-15; Mallison & Mallison, The N(l"IJal, n. III.439, 90-91. 
206. 1 TWC 311-12 (Doenitz), 317 (Raeder); for widely differing interpretations of the judgments,see COLOMBOS § 
259; NWIP 10-2 'iI 503b(3) n.21; 1 O'CONNELl., LAW OF THE SEA 1137; Fenrick, Comments, n. 167, 113-16 (only 
successfultu quoque defense); L.F.E. Goldie, Targeting, n. 11.262, 10-11; Mark W.Janis, Comments on Sally V. and W. 
Thomas Mallison's Paper, in id. 104, 106-08; Levie, Submarine Waifare, n. 111.439, 91-97; Robertson, U.S. Policy, n. 
III.439,342-43. 
207. E.g., TUCKER 63-70; Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 115,272-74; Alex Kerr, International Law and the Future of 
Submarine Il7aifare, 81 PROCEEDINGS 1110 (Oct. 1955); Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of 
War, 29 BYBIL 360, 374 (1952); O'Connell, International Law, n. 111.252; Parks, Conventional, n. 196, 106. 
"[R]eferences of naval historians to the law of naval warfare and to the ... Protocol ... are less than flattering." Fenrick, 
Comments, n. 167, Ill, citing THEODORE RoscoE, UNITED STATES SUBMARINE OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR 1119 (1949); 
J.E. Talbott, Weapons Development, War Planning and Policy: The US Navy and the Submarine, NWC REv. 53, 68 
(May-June 1984). 
208. Service, n. 111.439, 238-40; cf. O'Connell, International Law, n. 111.252, 52. 
209. Fenrick, Comments, n. 167, 117; Goldie, n. 11.262, 6, 9. 
210. COLOMBOS § 535; I Levie, Code 162-63; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 194a-94b; L.C. Green, Comments on George K. Walker 
Paper, in Grunawalt 223, 226; Janis, Comments, n. 206,106-08 (London Protocol is "hard" law, the Nuremberg trials 
are opposing "soft" law); Levie,Submarine Waifare, n. 111.439, 59; A.V. Lowe, Comments on Howard S. Levie's Paper, in 
Grunawalt 72, 77; Nwogugu, n. 111.439, 353; Robertson, U.S. Policy, n. 111.439, 352-53; Robertson,Submarine Waifare, 
JAG J. 3,3 (Nov. 1956). "Soft law" refers to norms of persuasive impact, perhaps in international organizations' 
nonbinding resolutions, but below primary authority, e.g., treaties, custom and general principles and secondary or 
subsidiary sources, e.g., court decisions or commentators. See generally ICJ Statute, arts. 38(1), 59; BROWNLIE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 698-99; I OPPENHEIM § 16; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102, 103 & cmt. c (international 
organizations' resolutions "some evidence" of custom), r.n. 2; OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICECH. 6(1991); Prosper Weil, Towards RelatrveNormativity in InternationalLaw?, 77 AJIL413,414-15 (1983); see 
also nn. 111.10, IV.57 and accompanying te.,t. 
211. FIeck, Comments, n. 111.439, 83. 
212. Robertson, U.S. Policy, n. 111.439, 351; conlTa, CoLO.llBOS §§ 535, 843,914. 
213. 1900 Naval War Code, art. 50 (adding "The imminent danger of recapture would justify destruction if there 
should be no doubt that the vessel was a proper prize"); 1917 Instructions 'il94. 
214. 1917 Instructions 'iI'iI94-97. 
215. 1943 Tentative Instructions 'iI'iI 50, 98-102; 1941 id. 'iI'iI 50, 98-102. 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 194a-94b (1952), says 
Germany violated London Protocol standards, which were customary law. 
216. NWIP 10-2, iii. 
217. Id. 'il110, whose n.1 indicates this statement tried to repeat, for id., war crimes trials' opinions that declared 
that since military manuals were not legislative enactments, they could not bind a publishing State. NWP I-14M 
Annotated,Preface, at I, and NWP 9A Annotated,Preface, at I, similarly declare: "This pUblication sets forth general 
guidance. It is not a comprehensive treatment of the law nor is ita substitute for the definitive legal guidance provided 
by judge advocates and others responsible for advising commanders on the law." Footnotes in id., citing the war 
crimes trials, follow NWIP 10-2 to say neither the Handbooks (versions for commanders' use) nor NWP I-14M 
Annotated or NWP 9A Annotated (annotated versions cited in this book) can be considered as legislative enactments 
binding upon courts and tribunals applying the rules of war, adding that their contents may possess evidentiary value 
on US custom and practice. See also BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5. 
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218. TUCKER i, 357-422. 
219. To be sure, the USSR navy was beginning to challenge it in size, particularly in submarine strength; other 
countries had considerable navies,e.g., France, the United Kingdom and other US allies. Ten years before, at World 
War II's end, the US Navy had over 600 combatant ships, but by 1981 the number had shrunk to about 360 while the 
USSR navy had risen to 800 combatants, many of them submarines. WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n. II.59, 
135; id., U.S. SHIPBUILDING,n. II.60, 27. Today the Russian navy may number more combatants on paper, but since the 
USSR's demise the US Navy undoubtedly is the most powerful on Earth. See generally WILLL\M E. ODOM, THE 
COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY 28-35, 80-81, 300·01(1998). 
220. NWIP 10-2 'II 503b(2), in TUCKER 397; compare 1943 Tentative Instructions '11'11 50,98-103; 1941 id. 11'11 50, 
98-103; see also n. 215 and accompanying text. 
221. NWIP 10-2 '11503b(2) & n.20, referring to id., 'II 503b(3) n. 22, in TUCKER 397, 404-05. 
222. Compare NWIP 10-2 '11503b(2) & n.16, 21 (1974 version), with NWIP 10-2 '11503b(2) & n.20, 22,in TUCKER 397, 
404-05. 
223. Robert W. Tucker,Foreword, in TUCKER iii, v. 
224. He was on The Johns Hopkins University faculty when the volume appeared. Id. i. 
225. Compare TUCKER 63-70with NWIP 10-2 1I503b(2) & n.20, 22, in TUCKER 397, 404-05. lfso, the difference is a 
tribute to the intellectual independence accorded the College fa,ulty, who speak for themselves and not necessarily for 
the Navy or the government. Thomas H. Robbins, Jr., Preface, in id. vii underscores the point for TUCKER'S volume in 
the International Law Studies series. I have been accorded the same academic freedom. 
226. Vienna Convention, preamble, arts. 38, 61-62; see also nn. III. 10, 928-30, IV.26-28 and accompanying texL 
227. NWIP 10-2, 11 503b(3) n.22, reprinted in TUCKER 404-05 ("These rules, deemed declaratory of customary 
intemationallaw, have been interpreted ..•. "). 
228. Compare NWIP 10-2 '11503b(3) & n.20, 22, reprinted in TUCKER 397, 404-05, with NWIP 10-2 1I503b(3) & n.16, 
21; see also n. 216 and accompanying texL 
229. Cf. Janis, Comments, n. 206, 106-08, writing nearly 40 years after NWIP 10-2's first publication. 
230. See n. 210. 
231. AFP 110-31 114-4c. 
232. Compare NWP I-14M Annotated '118.2.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated 1I8.2.2.2,with NWIP 10-2 '!I503b(3); see also 
Second Convention, art. 16; Protocol I, arL 33; n. IV.816 and accompanying texL 
233. There is no stated requirement for collecting the dead as required of surface warships. Compare NWP I-14M 
Annotated '11'118.3, 8.3.1; NWP 9AAnnotated 11118.3, 8.3.1,with NWP I-14M Annotated 118.2.2.2; NWP 9AAnnotatcd 
118.2.2.2; see also Second Convention, art. 16; Protocol I, art. 33; n. IV.816 and accompanying text. 
234. There is no stated requirement for collecting the dead as required of surface warships. Compare NWP I-14M 
Annotated 'II 8.4 with id. 11118.2.2.2,8.3,8.3.1; NWP 9A Annotated '11118.2.2.2, 8.3, 8.3.1, 8.4; NWIP 10-2 '11503b(3) & 
n.21; See also Second Convention, art. 12; Protocol I, arL 33; n. IV.816 and accompanying texL 
235. SAN REAIO MANUAL 1160, cmL 60.9 (one group of commentators' views). 
236. Compare London Protocol with SAN REMo MANUAL 11'11139-40; See also id. 1I1I13(b) (definition of attack), 13(i) 
(merchant vessel definition). 
237. Cf. SAN REAlO MANUAL, Part V, at 31, 187 ("Measures Short of Attack"). 
238. Id. 11139, cmL 139.1. 
239. See nn. 163-65 and accompanying texL 
240. Second Convention, arts. 22, 29-30,32-33,47; Protocol I, art. 22; see also n. III and accompanying texL 
241. /d., 11139, cmt. 139.2. AFP 110-31 114-4, at 4-5, in effect says as much, unfortunately injecting "political ••• 
factors" into the matrix. See also Parts A.I-A.2. 
242. See nn. 163-65 and accompanying texL It does not seem appropriate to have some categories for some kinds of 
attack platforms, e.g., differentiation between surface warships and aircraft, where there is a possibility that different 
platforms could participate in attacks for all reasons. Compare, e.g., NWP 9A Annotated '118.2.2.2, at 8-11- 8.12; NWP 
I-14M Annotated, 118.2.2.2, at 8-11- 8-12 with NWP 9A Annotated '118.4; NWP I-14M Annotated '118.4, at 8-22. And 
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while it might be said that ftxed-wing aircraft have different characteristics, the helicopter, often carried on a warship 
like ftxed-wing craft were through World War II, is a projection of the ship's armament, like ship-based guns or 
missiles. 
243. See nn. 111,240,257-58,273-76 and accompanying texL 
244. In some cases diversion may be mandated, e.g., for passenger liners. See nn. 103-05,236 and accompanying 
texL 
245. See Parts A.I-A.2. 
246. See n. 195 and accompanying texL 
247. Service, n. III.439, 238-40. 
248. London Protocol, Rule 2; Second Convention, arts. 12-21; Protocol I, arL 33; see also nn. IV.816, V.195 and 
accompanying te.XL 
249. Service, n. 111.439, 238-40. 
250. E.g., Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, arts. 4, 6(1). For analysis of human rights law in the context of the 
maritime environment, see Part VI.C.2. 
251. Sec n. 26 and accompanying te.XL 
252. See n. 242 and accompanying texL Although e.g., Principle 5, n. 244 and accompanying text, only recites 
"warship," Principle 6 declares that all attacking platforms are included within the analysis. 
253. UN Chaner, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.1O, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, lV.6-25 and accompanying text; Parts 
A.I-A.2. 
254. Second Convention, arts. 12-21; Protocol I, arL 33; London Protocol, Rule 2 ; see also Service, n. 111.439, 
238-40; nn. IV.816, V.195-256 and accompanying te.XL 
255. UN Charter, arts. 25,48, 103; see also nn. I1I.l0, lV.57 and accompanying texL 
256. Cf. n. 173 and accompanying te."L 
257. NWP I-14M Annotated '11'118.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated '11118.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; SAN REAlo MANuAL'll 
137. 
258. Second Convention, arts. 22, 29-30, 32-33, 47; Protocol I, aIL 22; see also nn. 240 and accompanying texL 
259. Sec generally Second Convention, arts. 21, 24, 26-27, 38,43,47; Protocoll, aIL 23; BOTHllCt aL. 147-49; NWP 
I-14M Annotated 1111 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 1111 8.2.3. 8.3.2,8.4.1; 2 PICTEl' 150-53, 164-67, 169-74, 
212-15,252-56; PILLOUD, COMMENTARY 262-78; SAN REAIO MANUAL '1111 13(e),47(b), 136(b) & 13.17,47.11-47.17,136.1 
(noting exceptions, conditions for exemption); TUCKER 97; Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. 11.468, 229-31; Philippe Eberlin, 
The Protection of Rescue Craft in Periods of Anned Conflict, 1985lN'rL REv. RED CROSS 140; 1 von Heinegg 313. 
260. See generally Third Convention, aIL 118 (requiring returning prisoners of war at end of hostilities); CoLOMBOS 
§ 660-61; MALUSON 126; NWP I-14M Annotated 11118.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 11118.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; 2 
O'CoNNELl., LAW OI'THE SEA 1123; 2 OPPENHEIM § 225; OXFORD NAVAL MANUAl., arts. 45, 49; 3 PiCTEl' 541-53; SAN 
REAloMANUAL 'Il1l47(c)(i), 136(c)(i) & cmts. 47.18-47.23,136.1; STONE 586; TUCKER 97-98; Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. 
11.468,239-41; 1 von Heinegg 312; Verri, Commentary, n.lV_7l, 334-35; Part H.!. 
261. See generally Third Convention, arts. 70-77; Fourth Convention, arts. 107-13; Protocoll, arts. 54, 70; 
CoLOMBOS § 660; 2 O'CoNNELL, LAW OI'THE SEA 1123; OXFORD NAVAL MANUAl., arts. 45, 49; 3 PiCTET 340-80; 4 id. 
448-73; SAN REAlo MANUAL 'Il'll47(c)(ii), 136(c)(ii) & cmts. 47.24-47.29,136.1; STONE 586; TUCKER 98; Doswald-Beck, 
Vessels, n. 11.468, 242-48; 1 von Heinegg 312-13; Verri, Commentary, n. v.n, 334-35. 
262. Sec generally Cultural Property Convention, arts. 12-14, to which the United States is not a party; see also nn. 
110, VI. - - - and accompanying te."L 
263. Secgcnerally NWP I-14M Annotated 'Il'!l8.2.3,at8-18 &n.75, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; NWP9AAnnotated 1l8.2.3,at8-20 & 
n.61, 8.3.2, 8.4.1 (although passenger ships normally an object of attack, loss of civilians would be clearly 
disproportionate to military advantage gained); SAN REAlo MANUAL 1111 47(e), 140 & cmts. 47.33-47.36, 140; 
Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. II.468, 248-50. 
264. First stated in treaties, the exemptions are generally considered customary law applying to public or private 
vessels. Ships gathering scientiftc data of potential military application are not exempL See generally Hague XI, arts. 
3-4; MALUSON 128; NWP I-14M Annotated '!III 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 1111 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; 2 
O'CoNNELl., LAW OI'THE SEA 1123; 2 OPPENHEUI § 186; OXFORD NAVAL MANuAl., arts. 46,49; SAN REAlo MANUAL 1111 
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47(f), 136(e) &cmts. 47.37-47.44, 136.1; STONE586, 589; TUCKER96-97; Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. 11.468,251-53; 1 von 
Heinegg 312; Shearer, Commentary, n. 112, 185-86; Verri, Commentary, n. IV.71, 334-35. 
265. This exemption is grounded in customary and treaty law. See generally Hague XI, art. 3; n. 113 and 
accompanying text. As commentators, n. 113, make clear, these vessels lose exemption if they participate in hostilities. 
See also nn. 174-76 and accompanying texL 
266. SAN REMo MANUAL ~~ 47(h), 136(g) & cmts.47.52-47.55, 136.1 (these ships could not be deemed to contribute 
to war effort); Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. 11.468, 257-59. 
267. Hague IV, arL 23(c); Protocol I, arL 41; AFP 110-31 ~ 4-2d; BOTHEet al .• 219-24; NWP I-14M Annotated 11 
8.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated II 8.2.1; 2 OPPENHEL~I § 183; PILLOUD. COMMENTARY 480-91; SAN REAlO MANUAL II 47(i) & 
cmts. 47.56-47.57; Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. 11.468, 259-60. Generally vessels offer to surrender as a unit as 
distinguished from land warfare, where people often surrender individually. Land units' commands also may offer to 
surrender for an entire organization. Air warfare offers to surrender necessarily come from platforms or units and not 
individuals aboard aircraft; aircraft offers to surrender are generally not given, although it has occurred. See generally 
AFP 110-31 II 4-2d; NWP I-14M Annotated II 8.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated II 8.2.1; Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The 
Obligation to Accept Surrender, 46 NWC REv. 103 (Spring 1993). 
268. Second Convention, arts. 12, 18; Protocol I, arL 8(b); BOTHE et al •• 95-97; 2 PICTET 84-92, 129-36; PILLOUD. 
COMMENTARY 115-16, 118-24; SAN REMo MANUAL II 47(j) & cmL 47.58 (citing war crimes tribunal judgments); 
Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. II.468, 260. 
269. NWIP 10-2 II 503c; 2 OPPENHEIM § 218; OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, arts. 48-49; TUCKER 98 n.l0; see also 
Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. II.468, 241-42; 1 von Heinegg 312; Verri, Commentary, n. IV.71, 334-35. 
270. COLOMBOS § 664; 2 OPPENHEIM § 189; OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, art. 34; 1 von Heinegg 313; see also nn. 
IV.494-506, V.20 and accompanying text. 
271. A customary exemption for mail ships, i.e., mail packets and the like, seems not to have developed, although 
there are contrary arguments. Neutral mail, especially diplomatic and consular correspondence, may be exempt from 
search. Hague XI, arts. 1-2; Convention on Diplomatic Relations, n. 112, art. 27, 23 UST 3239, 500 UNTS 108; 
Convention on Consular Relations, n. 112, art. 35, 21 id. 99,596 UNTS 290; see also n. 112 and accompanying texL 
272. See n. 263 and accompanying te.xt. 
273. See generally 2 OPPENHEIM § 188; SAN REMo MANUAL, 11136, cmL 136.2. Although Hague VI would afford some 
protection for enemy merchant ships in port and on the high seas, the convention is in desuetude. See n. 16 and 
accompanying texL 
274. E.g., coastal fishing or trading vessels, e.xempted from capture by customary law and Hague XI, art. 3, unless 
they contribute to the war effort; see nn. 113, 265 and accompanying text. This was the situation of Narwal, an 
Argentine fishing vessel the Royal Navy intercepted and destroyed on the high seas during the Falklands/Malvinas 
war. Narwal had military communications equipment and an Argentine communications officer aboard and was 
intercepted far at sea; attack and destruction was appropriate. NWP I-14M Annotated 118.2.3 & NWP 9A Annotated'll 
8.2.3, citing MAx HASTINGS & SIMON JENKINS, THE BATTLE FOR THE FALKLANDS 158 (1983); MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK, 
OPERATION CoRPORATE: THE FALKLANDS WAR 186 (1985); see also COLOMBOS§ 6 59; 2 O'CONNELL,LAWOFTHESEA 1122; 
OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, arL 49; Howard S. Levie, The Falklands Crisis and the Laws o/War, in CoLL & AREND 64, 67; 
Verri, Commentary, n. IV_ 71, 334-35; Walker, State Practice 153. 
275. E.g, coastal fishing or trading vessels, exempted from capture bycustomary law and HagueXI,art. 3, lose their 
status as coastal craft iffound on the high seas, far from the coast; see nn.I13, 265 and accompanying texL This was the 
situation of Narwal, an Argentine fishing vessel the Royal Navy intercepted and destroyed on the high seas during the 
Falklands/Malvinas war. It was also probably too large to be considered a coastal trawler. COLOMBOS §§ 658-59; 2 
O'CoNNELL,LAWOFTHESEA 1122-23; TUCKER 95-96; Walker, State Practice 153,155. Destruction was also appropriate 
becauseNarwal carried Argentine military communications equipment and an Argentine communications officer; it 
was contributing to the Argentine war efforL See n. 274 and accompanying texL 
276. See nn. 151-254 and accompanying text. 
277. NWIP 10-2 '11503c; TUCKER 98 n.10; see also n. III.258 and accompanying text. 
278. See generally First Convention, arts. 36-37; Second Convention, art. 39; Fourth Convention, arL 22; Protocol 
I, arts. 8(j), 24-31; BOTHEet al .. 95-96, 101, 150-67; Hague Air Rules, arL 17; NWP I-14M Annotated '11'118.2.3, 8.3.2, 
8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated '11'11 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; 1 PICTh"T 285-96; 2 id. 215-22; 4 id. 173-77; PILLOUD. COMMENTARY 
115-16,131-32,279-337; SAN R!;AIO MANUAL 'II 53(a) & cmL 53.1; TUCKER97; Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n. 11.468,262-68; 1 
von Heinegg 313; see also n. 258 and accompanying texL 
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279. NWP I-14M Annotated '11'118.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 'Il'll8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; SAN REAIO MANUAL 'Il 
53(b) & cmt. 53.2; Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n.II.468, 268-69; 1 von Heinegg 313; see also n. 260 and accompanying text. 
280. NWP I-14M Annotated 'Il'l18.2.3,8.3.2, 8.4.1; NWP9AAnnotated 8.2.3,8.3.2,8.4.1; SANREAIOMANUAL 'I153(c) 
& cmt. 53.3; cf. ICAO Convention, 1984 Protocol, art. 3 bis; see also TUCKER 110-11; Doswald-Beck, Vessels, n.II.468, 
269-75; n. 263 and accompanying text; bur see Hague Air Rules, arts. 33-34; 2 OPPENHEIM § 214f. 
281. 2 OPPENHEIM § 214h; SAN REAIO MANUAL 'Il'll54-57 & cmts. 54.1-57.5. 
282. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also SAN REAIO .MANUAL '11 53(c) & cm! 53.3, citing ICAO Convention, 1984 
Prolocol, art 3 bis, declaring that although every Stale must refrain from using weapons against civil aircraft in flight 
and that persons' lives on board and aircraft safety must not be endangered, this does not modify rights and 
obligations under the Charter; nn.III.lO, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
283. UN Charter, arts. 25,48,103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text. 
284. Cf. NWIP 10-2 '!J 503c; TUCKER 98 n. 10; see also nn. III.258 and accompanying text. 
285. Sec Part B.2. 
286. Sec Part C.l. 
287. Mallison 122; NWP I-14M Annotated 'Il 8.2.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated '!J 8.2.2.2; Jacobson, n. 166,231. 
288. Hague XI, art. 3. Thus in a scenario of a belligerent warship escorting coastal fishing vessels employed as such 
and not contributing to the war effort, the warship is subject to capture or attack but the fishermen are not. If, on the 
other hand, the fishing vessels are contributing to the war effort, they are subject to attack too. See nn. 265-66, 274-75 
and accompanying text. 
289. CoLOMBOS § 760; Helsinki Principle 5.2.3; NWP I-14M Annotated '!J 7.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated '!J 7.4.1; 2 
O'CoNNELL, LAW OF TIlE SEA 1144; SAN REAIO MANUAL '!J 148 & cmt. 148.1; TUCKER 263. 
290. Helsinki Principle 5.2.5. 
291. Part D considers issues related to neutral-flag merchantmen that may have assumed enemy character. 
292. Sec nn. II.l77, 274-78, 288, 296-99, 306, 366,420,491-92 and accompanying text; Part B. 
293. Part D considers these issues. 
294. See nn. 257-84 and accompanying text. 
295. See n. II.240 and accompanying text. 
296. Sec nn. 21-47 and accompanying text. 
297. See nn. 24-40 and accompanying text. 
298. See nn. 196·97,252 and accompanying text. 
299. Second Convention, art. 21; sec also nn. IV.816, V.154-55, 206, 234, 254 and accompanying text. 
300. See nn. 30-47 and accompanying text. 
301. Second Convention, arts. 12-21; Protocol I, art. 33; see also nn. IV.816, V.154-55, 206, 234, 254 and 
accompanying text. 
302. See nn. II.103, 280, 306 and accompanying text. 
303. See nn. 286-87 and accompanying text. 
304. See nn. 286-87 and accompanying text; Part D.1. 
305. See Part B.2, n. 286 and accompanying te.xt. 
306. Second Convention, arts. 12-21; Protocol I, art. 33; LOS Convention, art. 98; High Seas Convention, art. 12; 
see also nn. lII.948, IV.30, 816, V.154-55 and accompanying text; London Protocol, nn. V.195-257 and accompanying 
text. 
307. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
308. See nn. II.295, 304, 342-44, 348, 350-52, 359, 361-62, 382, 437, 446-47, 453, 471 and accompanying text. 
309. Second Convention, arts. 12-21; Protocol I, art. 33; LOS Convention, art. 98; High Seas Convention, art. 12; 
see also nn. IV.816, V.154-55 and accompanying text. 
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310. LOS Convention, art. 98; High Seas Convention, art. 12; see also n. IV.816, and accompanying text. 
311. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.I0, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-2S and accompanying text. 
312. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III.lO, 952·67, IV.I0-25 and 
accompanying text. 
313. LOS Convention, art. 98; High Seas Convention, art. 12; see also n. IV.816 and accompanying text. 
314. In some cases,e.g., the response was in error, for which therespondingship's country gave compensation. Sec, 
e.g., nn. II.368-72, 391, 398, 410-11, 430-33, 459-68 and accompanying text. 
315. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III. 10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
316. Second Convention, arts. 12-21; Protocol I, art. 33; see also nn. IV.816, V.154-55 and accompanying text. 
317. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.1O, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
318. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III.lO, 952-67, IV.1O-25 and 
accompanying text. 
319. LOS Convention, art. 98; High Seas Convention, art. 12; see also n. IV.816 and accompanying text. 
320. See nn. II.367, 410-11, 459-68 and accompanying text; see also LOS Convention, art. 98; High Seas 
Convention, art. 12; n. IV.816 and accompanying text. 
321. See nn. 151-55 and accompanying text. 
322. Second Convention, arts. 12-21; Protocol I, art. 33; see also nn. IV.816, V.154-55 and accompanying text. 
323. See nn. II.55-61, 71 and accompanying text. 
324. See nn. II.112-14, 182,473-74 and accompanying text. 
325. See n. II.183 and accompanying text. 
326. See nn. II.473-74 and accompanying text. 
327. See nn. II.l77, 274-78, 288, 296-99, 306, 366,420,447,491-92 and accompanying text. 
328. See, e.g., nn. II.179 (mines), 233 (mines), 250 (mines), 260, 334 (mines), 354 (mines), 357 (mines), 359 (mines), 
361,368 (mines), 373, 393-94, 412, 420 (mines), 421, 446, 469, 519 and accompanying text. 
329. See nn. II.l44, 422-23 and accompanying text. 
330. See LOS Convention, art. 110; High Seas Convention, art. 22; nn. 76-81 and accompanying text. 
331. See Part B.!. 
332. See Parts C.I-C.4. 
333. NWIP 10-211 501; NWP I-14M Annotated 11 7.5; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.5; 2 OPPENHEIM § 89 (flying enemy 
flag prima facie evidence of enemy character); SAN REt.IO MANUAL 1111 112 & cmts. (conclusive evidence of enemy 
character), 117 & cmt.; TUCKER 76-86. The LOAC cOrPorate-owned vessels control test may differ from cOrPorate 
claims espousal rules. Compare, e.g., Barcelona Traction (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 IC] 3; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 213, 
cmt. d & r.n. 2,3, 711-13, with SAN REt.IO MANUAL 11 117, cmt. 117.1. Compare the nationality approach in LOS 
Convention, arts. 90-94; High Seas Convention, arts. 4-7, considered customarY law. See Part IV.B.3. Duringwar LOS 
principles do not apply because of the LOS conventions' other rules clauses. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); 
High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III.952-67, IV. 10-25 and accompanying text. 
334. NWP I-14M Annotated 11 7.5; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.5. 
335. SAN REMO MANUAL '11113 & cmts.; compare the LOS approach in LOS Convention, arts. 91-94; High Seas 
Convention, arts. 4-7, considered customarY law. See Part IV.B.2. During war LOS principles do not apply because of 
the conventions' other rules clauses. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. 
III.952-67, IV.1O-25 and accompanying text. 
336. NWIP 10-211 501a;NWP I-14M Annotated 117.5.1; NWP9AAnnotated 117.5.1; SAN REMO MANUAL 111167-68; 
TUCKER 319-21; see also nn. 156-256 and accompanying text. 
337. NWP I-14M Annotated 117.5.2; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.5.2. 
338. See Parts C.I-C.4 
339. NWP I-14M Annotated 11 7.10; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.10; TUCKER 336-37; see also Parts C.1-C.4. 
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340. Hague Radio Rules, arL 6; NWIP 10-211503d; NWP I-14M Annotated 117.10; NWP 9A Annotated 117.10; 2 
OPPENHEIM § 409; SAN REJ.IO MANUAL 1111 98, 146, 153; TUCKER 321,325-331, 336, 338. The foregoing synthesizes 
principles in these sources. The Hague Radio Rules are customary norms. See also Parts C.I-C.4. 
341. NWIP 10-211503d n.25; NWP I-14M Annotated 117.10 0.157; NWP 9A Annotated 117.10 n.152; TUCKER 13, 
263, 325; sec also n.IV.649 and accompanyIng te.XL 
342. NWP I-14M Annotated 11117.10, 7.10.1; NWP 9A Annotated 11117.10, 7.10.1; see also Parts C.I-CA. 
343. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn.IlI.I0, 47-630,916-18,968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying te.xt; Part 
A.1-2. 
344. UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text. 
345. Sec nn. 163-64,205,226, 233, 285-88 and accompanying text. 
346. See n. 337 and accompanying text. 
347. Hague XI, arts. 5, 8; Third Convention, arL 4A(5); COLOMBOS § 611; NWIP 10-2 II 513a; NWP I-14M 
Annotated 117.10.2; NWP 9AAnnotated 117.10.2; 2 O'CoNNELL, LAw OF THE SEA 1117; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 85, 125a; 3 
PICTET 45-51, 65-66; SAN REJ.\O l.iANUAL 11166; Shearer, Commentary, n. 112, 187. 
348. Hague XI, arL 6; Third Convention, arL 4A; NWIP 10-211513; NWP I-14M Annotated 117.10.2; NWP 9A 
Annotated 117.10.2; 2 O'CoNNELL,LAwOFTHESEA 1117; 2 OPPENHEIM § 126a; 3 PICTET45-68; Shearer,Commentary, n. 
112,187. 
349. UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text. 
350. LOS Convention, arts. 90-94; High Seas Convention, arts.4-7,considered customary law;seealso Part IV.C.3. 
351. See, e.g., LOS Convention, arL 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. IlI.952-67, IV_I0-25 and 
accompanying te.xt. 
352. Compare CoLOMBOS § 559 (conclusive presumption); JAMES WILFORD GARNER, PRIZE LAW DURINGTHE WORLD 
WAR § 287 (1927); SAN REJ.IO MANUAL II 112 (same) with 2 OPPENHEIM § 89 (prima facie presumption). London 
Declaration, arL 57 (1909) says "[T)he neutral or enemy character of a vessel is detertnined by the flag which she is 
entitled to fly," a conclusive presumption. However, during World War I France and Great Britain abrogated the rule. 
GARNER §§ 106,276; 2 OPPENHEIM § 89, at 280. The Declaration was never ratified as a treaty. Except for Britain, the art. 
57 principle had been incorporated in belligerents' prize regulations or naval codes by the beginning of the war. 
GARNER §§ 106, 275. 1917 Instructions II 56, however, said "The neutral or enemy character of a private vessel is 
delermined by the neutral or enemy character of the State whose flag the vessel has a right to fly as evidenced by her 
papers," citing US bilateral treaties. 
353. CoLOMBOS § 604; GARNER,n. 352 §§ 280-86,289 (prize cases); 2 OPPENHEIM § 89; SAN REJ.IO l.iANuAL 'II 113; see 
also n. 352 and accompanying text. 
354. Although there is even less law with respect to transfer of aircraft registry, presumably the same rules will 
apply. NWIP 10-2 'II 501 n.5; NWP I-14M Annotated 117.5 n.l11; NWP 9AAnnotated 117.5 n.ll0; 2 OPPENHEIM § 91; 
SAN REMO l.iANUAL 11117, cmt. 117.1; Kalshoven, Commentary, 0.115, 267. 
355. UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also n. IV_57 and accompanying text. 
356. CoLOMBOS § 760; Helsinki Principle 5.2.5; NWP I-14M Annotated '117.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 117.4.1; 2 
O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1144; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 395,399; SAN REAlo MANUAL 11148 & cmt. 148.1; TUCKER 263. 
357. Helsinki Principle 5.2.5. 
358. See Part C.l. 
359. NWIP 10-2 II 631a; NWP I-14M Annotated 117.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 117.4.1; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 401-03; 
TUCKER 263. 
360. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO 482-83; NWIP 10-2 II 631b; NWP I-14M Annotated 117.4.1; NWP 9AAnnotated 'II 
7.4.1. 
361. NWIP 10-211 631b; NWP I-14M Annotated 117.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated'll 7.4.1; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE 
SEA 1144; TUCKER 266·67; Goldie, Targeting, n.Il.262, 18. 
362. E.g., the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars. See 66 AJIL 386 (1967); 2 von Heintschel Heinegg 94-99; 
Walker, Stale Practice 143-44. 
363. London Declaration, arts. 22-23. 
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364. !d., arts. 24-25. 
365. ld., art. 26. 
366. 2 OPPENHEIM § 393; see also HALPERN, n. 115, 202, 291. 
367. London Declaration, arts. 27-29; see also 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 394,396. 
368. See n. 173 and accompanying text. 
369. See n. 361 and accompanying text. 
370. SAN REMOMANuAt. 11150 & cmts., citing Second Convention, art. 38, Third Convention; Fourth Convention, 
art. 59; Protocol I, arts. 69-70; compare NWP I-14M Annotated 117.4.1.2; NWP 9A Annotated '117.4.1.2 (same, adding 
cultural items for prisoners of war, citing Second Convention, art. 38; Third Convention, arts. 72-75 & Annex III; 
Fourth Convention, arts. 23, 59; Protocol I, art. 70; see also BOTHE et al.. 432-37; Helsinki Principle 5.3, citing Fourth 
Convention, arts. 23, 59, 61; Protocol I, arts. 69-70 (relief to pass through blockade in accordance with humanitarian 
law); 2 PICfET 212-15; 3 id. 351-74,664-68; 4 id. 178-84,319-23; Plt.LOUD, COMMENTARY 816-29; TUCKER 263. The 
United States is not a Protocol I party but recognizes art. 70 principles as custom. Matheson, Remarks 426. 
371. Helsinki Principle 5.2.3, cmt. (although distinction formally retained, has in fact been abolished); NWP 
I-14M Annotated 117.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 117.4.1; SAN REMo MANUAt.1I148; see also 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 392-93. 
372. The US lists included items the London Declaration classified as conditional contraband and did not 
distinguish between conditional and absolute contraband. Compare London Declaration, arts. 22-29, with 1917 
Instructions 111123-25; 1941 Tentative Instructions 111126-28; 1943 id. 111126-28; see also TUCKER 266-27. 
373. NWP I-14M Annotated 11 7.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.4.1 ("To the extent that international law may 
continue to require publication of contraband lists, recent practice indicates that the requirement may be satisfied bya 
listing of exempt goods."). 
374. SAN RE!.\O MANUAt. 11149. 
375. See nn. 363-64 and accompanying text. 
376. See Helsinki Principles 5.2.3, 5.3 & emts. 
377. SAN RE!.\OMANUAL, 11149; Green, Comments, n. 210, 228. 1917 Instructions 1123; 1941 TentativeInstructions 11 
26; 1943 id. 1126, declared the United States would publish contraband items beyond those in the Instructions. The 
result would be that States, by referring to the unclassified Instructions and reading US notices, would know what was 
and what was not contraband throughout a war. If other States practiced this, as TUCKER 266-67 implies, the notice 
requirement came close to being, if it was not already, a customary norm. 
378. NWP I-14M Annotated 7.4.1.2; NWP 9AAnnotated 1I7.4.1.2;see, e.g., Fourth Convention, arts. 23,59; seealso 
4 PICfET 178-84, 319-23; It. 373 and accompanying text. SAN RE!.IO MANU.~L 1111148-49 takes the opposite position; 
contraband lists must be published; otherwise goods not on lists may not be captured, and this would include free 
goods. 
379. Helsinki Principle 3.3 & cmt.; NWP I-14M Annotated' 7.9; SAN REMo MANUAL 1I106(e); see also Part F.2. 
380. Helsinki Principle 3.3, emt.; NWP I-14M Annotated 11117.8-7.8.1; NWP 9AAnnotated 11'117.8-7.8.1; SAN REMo 
MANUAL 11108; see also Part F.1.a. 
381. Helsinki Principle 5.2.10; NWP I-14M Annotated 11'117.7.2.1-7.7.2.2; NWP 9AAnnotated '11'117.7.2.1-7.7.2.2; 
SAN RalO MANuAL 1I'1l93-94; see also Part E.2. 
382. See Part C.l. 
383. While nearly all countries have ratified the First, Second, Third and Fourth Conventions, a few, e.g., the 
United States, are not Protocol I parties; many States recognize parts of the Protocol as customary norms. See Table 
AS-I, n. III.628. 
384. See nn. 260, 269 and accompanying texL 
385. See, e.g., CoLOMBOS §§ 778-80;NWIP 10-211 631b n.18; NWP I-14M Annotated 'II 7.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 11 
7.4.1; 2 O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1143-44; TUCKER 266-67; see also nn. 361, 372 and accompanying text. 
386. See generally 7 HACKWORTH, DIGEST 212; Helsinki Principle 5.2.6 & cmt.; McDOUGAL & FELICIANO 509-13; 1 
Medlicott, n. 192,94-101; NWIP 10-211 631d n.22; NWP I-14M Annotated '117.4.2; NWP 9A Annotated 117.4.2; 2 
O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1147-48; SAN RE!.\O MANUAL 11'11 122-24; TUCKER 280-82, 312-15, 322-23; G.G. 
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Fitzmaurice, Some AspeclS of Modern Contraband Control and the Law of Prize, 22 BYBIL 73, 83-84 (194S); Mallison, 
LImIted, n. III.316, 389-90. 
387. Paris Declaration 1i~ 2-3; see also 3 HYDE § 816; 2 OPPENHEIM § 177; SAN RE1.IO MANUAL ~ 147 & cmL; Fujita, n. 
IV.624,71. 
388. London Declaration, arts. 30, 33-36;seealso COLOMBOS §§ 766-70; Helsinki Principle S.2.4, cmt.; NWIP 10-2 ~ 
631c (partially accepting London Declaration rules); NWP I-14M Annotated '117.4.1.1 n.99; NWP 9A Annotated'll 
7.4.1.1 n.99; 2 O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1146; 2 OPPENHEu.1 §§ 400-03a; STONE 486-87; TUCKER, 268 n.9; Fujita, n. 
IV.624, 71-72; Kalshoven, Commentary, n. l1S, 263-64. 
389. In recent wars the doctrine was applied to extensive absolute contraband lists or to lists of contraband of all 
kinds. CoLO.IIBOS §§ 771-74; 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1146-47; STONE 487; TUCKER 267-7S; Kalshoven, 
Commentary, n. l1S, 272. 
390. Sec Part C.l. 
391. UN Charter, arts. 2S,48, 103;seealso SAN RE.lloMANUAL '11150, cmt.lSO.3; n. IV.S7 and accompanyingte.xL 
392. See nn. 82-126 and accompanying te.XL 
393. See nn. 333-49 and accompanying texL 
394. See nn. II.I03, 280, 306 and accompanying te.'(L 
395. Cf. nn. II.103, 183 and accompanying te.'(L 
396. Sec nn. II.111-12 and accompanying te.'(L 
397. Ncarthewar's end Iran negotiated with the USSRforan oil export pipeline in USSR territory to thenorth.See 
nn. II.112-14, 182,473-74 and accompanying te.'(L 
398. See nn. IV.668-79, 685-94 for descriptions of typical documentation and sale of goods in ocean commerce. 
399. See nn. II.l77, 274-78, 288, 296·99, 306, 366, 420, 447, 491-92 and accompanying texL 
400. Sec nn. 337-44 and accompanying texL 
401. Sec nn. II.332, IV.825, V.350-55 and accompanying te.XL 
402. Sec n. 356 and accompanying te.'(L 
403. See nn. 387-90 and accompanying texL 
404. Iran Prize Law, n. II.I44; but see NWP I-14M Annotated 'II 7.4.1 n.96. See also nn. II.422-23 and 
accompanying te.'(L 
405. NWP I-14M Annotated '11'117.5.1, 8.2.2.2; NWP 9AAnnotated '11'117.5.1, 8.2.2.2; compare SAN RE1.loMANUAL 'II 
60(g); sec also Parts C.l, D.l. 
406. Cf. Helsinki Principle 5.2.3; sec also Part D.3. 
407. See nn. 356, 387-90 and accompanying texL 
408. See nn. II.3S0-S3 and accompanying texL 
409. See generally nn. 114-18 and accompanying texL 
410. See nn. 373-85 and accompanying te.,(L 
411. Sec nn. 368-70, 386 and accompanying texL 
412. Sec nn. 344, 355, 391 and accompanying texL 
413. See Parts A.l, A.2, A.5. 
414. See nn. II.91, 110,200 and accompanying te.'(t; see also n. II.236 and accompanying texL The United States 
once considered blockading Kharg but did not do so; see n. II.230 and accompanying te.XL The United States did not 
recognize Iraqi regulations, etc., as law but warned of the danger of the Kharg area through NOTAMs and 
NOTlI1ARs; sec n. II.28B, 420 and accompanyingte.xL Kharg facilities were a frequent Iraqi target; see, e.g., nn. II.232, 
240,272,283. SAN RE1.IOMANUAL,Preliminary Remarks, 176-77, notes MANUAL drafters differed on whether blockade 
law continues today or whether it is in desuetude. It says its rules apply "to blockading actions .•. regardless of the 
name given to such actions," trying to modernize the Paris and London Declaration rules. Other sources cited in this 
Part adhere to interpretations of the traditional blockade law as though itwasstill viable; that is the thrust of this Part, 
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although it cites the MANUAL where it coincides. Helsinki Principle 5.2.10, crnt. says the law of blockade is not in 
desuetude. For desuetude principles, see nn. III.930, IV.28 and accompanying text. 
415. See GOODRICHet al. 314-17; SIMMA 628-36 (using UN Charter, art. 42, has been proposed only once); see also 
NWP I-14M Annotated'll 7.7.2 n.131; NWP 9A Annotated'll 7.7.2 n.129. 2 OPPENHEIM § 49 believes art. 42 could be 
used for pacific blockade, i.e., a blockade during time of peace. See also id. §§ 44-48, 52b-52e, 521; nn.416-21. 
416. S.C. Res. 221, UN Doc. S/RES/221 (1965), in 5 ILM 534 (1966); see also CABLE 193-94; O'CONNELl., THE 
INFLUENCE 137-38, 174-75; Walker,Slale Practice 142-43. 
417. 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1157-58, referring to UN Charter, art. 2(4), noting that even under traditional 
law a pacific blockade may not have enough practice to be customary law; see also CoLOMBOS §§ 484-88B (hinting at 
legality of pacific blockade); 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 44-49, 52b-52e, 521 (same); NWIP 10-2 'II 632a, n.26. A related method, 
naval demonstration, i.e., sending warships into neutral coastal waters to threaten a coastal State, violates UN Charter, 
art. 2(4), LOS principles governing innocent passage in the territorial sea, and the LOAC regarding belligerent 
conduct toward neutrals. LOS Convention, art. 19; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4); Hague XIII, arts. I, 5; 
COLOMBOS § 489; see also nn. III.47-157, IV.337-50, V.73 and accompanying text. Reprisals involving use offorce, e.g., 
firing on a neutral coast or other neutral territory to signal a belligerent's displeasure with a neutral's conducl, is 
equally invalid under UN Charter, art. 2(4); see also COLOMBOS § 491; nn. 111.47-157 and accompanying text. A 
displeased belligerent may undertake nonforce reprisals or retorsions to influence neutral behavior, e.g., embargo in 
violation of a trade treaty or withdrawing diplomatic relations, an unfriendly but lawful act. See COLOMBOS §5 481-83; 
nn. 111.396-417, 644-48 and accompanying text. Belligerents may also exclude merchantmen and civil aircraft from 
the immediate area of naval operations and may declare exclusion zones in high seas areas off any nation's coast. Sce 
Parts F.I-F.2. There is also nothing wrong with a country's using high seas off another country's coasts for freedom of 
navigation and overflight ofits warships and military aircraft, or using these high seas areas for naval exercises. LOS 
Convention, an. 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. IV.68-79 and accompanying text. 
418. Cf. UN Charter, arts. 25, 48,103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text. 
419. The UN Command considered but rejected a blockade of the PRC as well. See generally Walker, State Practice 
125-28. The Republic of China on Taiwan had declared a blockade against the PRe. Janis,Neutrality, n. III.831,149. 
See also nn. 111.220-23 and accompanying text. 
420. UN Charter, arts. 25,48, 103; NWP I-14M Annotated '117.7.2.1 n.131;NWP9AAnnotated '117.7.2.1 n.129;sce 
also n. IV.57 and accompanying text. 
421. Helsinki Principle 1.2; NWIP 10-2 'II 632 n.30; NWP I-14M Annotated'll 7.7.2 n.131; NWP 9A Annotated'll 
7.7.2 n.129. 
422. NWP I-14M Annotated'll 7.7.5; NWP 9A Annotated '117.7.5. 
423. See n. 356 and accompanying text. 
424. COLOMBOS §§ 813,842, 844; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 368,370,372; OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, art. 30; NWP I-14M 
Annotated'll 7.7.1; NWP 9A Annotated'll 7.7.1; 10 WHITEMAN, DIGEST 861-64; Clark, n. III.322, 160; Swayze, n. 
III.322, 154. See generally COLOMBOS §§ 814-17; 2 O'CoNNELl., LAW OF THE SEA 1150; TUCKER 283-87; Clingan, 
Submarine Mines, n. III.840, 353; Goldie, Maritime War Zones, n.II.519, 161-71; for histories of blockade. See also n.417 
and accompanying text, discussing legality of pacific blockades, naval demonstrations, reprisals and retorsions as 
related means of economic warfare. 
425. A US decision to impose a blockade lies with the executive and not with naval force commanders. London 
Declaration, arts. 8-9; NWIP 10-2 'II 632b & n.30; NWP I-14M Annotated '117.7.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated '117.7.2.1; 2 
O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1151; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 375-76; SAN REMo MANUAL'll 93; TUCKER 287; Kalshoven, 
Commentary, n. 115,260,274; Swayze, n. III.322, 154-55. 
426. The grace period has ranged from 2 to 10 days; ships were given 3 days to leave Haiphong in 1972 during the 
Vietnam War. London Declaration, arts. 8-9, 11-13, 16; ALFORD, n. IV.638, 345-51; CoLOMBOS §§ 824-26; Helsinki 
Principle 5.2.10; CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, BLOCKADE 24, 36-37 (1918); NWIP 10-2 'II 632c & n.31, 32 (usual to notify 
local authorities); NWP I-14M Annotated 'II'II 7.7.2.1, 7.7.5 (same); NWP 9A Annotated'll 7.7.2.1,7.7.5 (same); 2 
O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1151, 1156 (erroneously reporting Haiphong ships had only three hours to leave); SAN 
REAIO MANUAL '11'11 93-94, 101 (inter alia stating no requirement to notify local authorities); TUCKER 287·92; Harry 
Almond, Comments on HughLynch's Paper, in Grunawalt 264, 289; Clark, n. III.322, 172; Goldie,Maritime War Zones, 
n. II.519, 166-71; Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 115,260,274; Levie, Submarine Warfare, n. III.439, 33; Swayze, n. 
III.322, 154-55. The Korean War aside, there have been no fonnal blockades of consequence since 1945. The Republic 
of China declared one against the PRC in 1949, India proclaimed one in 1971, Egypt tried to blockade the 
Bab-el-Mandeb Straits in 1973, and Israel imposed one on the Lebanese coast in 1982.1 ANTHONY H. CoRDESMAN & 
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ABRAHAM R. WAGNER, THE LESSONS OF MODERN WAR 104-08, 216 (1990); CHAUI HERZOG, THE WAR OF ATONEMENT 
266-69 (1975); 2 O'CoNNELL 1154-55; O'CoNNELL, THE INFLUENCE 101-02; Janis, n_ III_831, 149; Walker, State Practice 
137-38, 144. There were naval quarantines during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War. See generaUy 
HOWARD S. LEVIE, MINE WARFARE AT SEA 151-57 (1992); Clingan, Submarine Mines, n. III.840, 353, 358; Goldie, 
Maritime IVar Zones, n. II.519, 157; Janis 151; Lowe, Commander's Handbook, n. III.318, 128; Mallison & Mallison, 
Nll1Jal Targeting, n. III.262, 262-68; Walker 141, 145. The tendency has been to proclaimexc!usion zones. See Pan F. 
427. Paris Declaration '114; CoLOMBOS § 818; Helsinki Principle 5.2.10, cmt.; NWIP 10-2 '!I 632b n.32; 2 OPPENHEIM 
§§ 177,378; Fujita, n. IV.624, 69. The UN Security Council may proclaim a paper blockade, at least in theory. UN 
Chaner, arts. 25,42,48,103; see nn. 415-21 and accompanying text. 
428. London Declaration, arts. 4, 12; HYDE,n. 426, 41-42; NWIP 10-2 '!I 632d & n.33; NWP I-14M Annotated '!I 
7.7.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated '117.7.2.3; 2 O'CoNNELL,LAWOFTHE SEA 1151; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 378,382; TUCKER 288-89; 
Kalshoven, CommentalY, n. 115,260, 274; see also n. 426 and accompanying text. 
429. Lieber Code, arts. 135-37, 141-42; OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, an. 92; see also Levie, The Nature, n.109, 903-06; 
Verri, Commental)', n.lV.71, 337. 
430. 2 OPPENHEIM § 239, citing 1899 Hague II, Regulations, art. 40; Hague IV, Regulations, an. 40; Lieber Code, 
art. 145; see also Levie, The Nature, n. 109,901-03. 
431. London Declaration, am. 2-3; CoLOMBOS §§ 818-21,843-43; HYDE,n. 426, 5-6, 12-14; NWIP 10·2 '!I 632d & 
n.33; NWP 1·14M Annotated '117.7.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated '117.7.2.3; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 379-82; SAN REMoA1ANuAL '11'11 
95-97; STONE 496; TUCKER288-89; Kalshoven, Commental)', n.115, 260, 274; Swayze, n. III.322, 154. The old rule, that 
at least one surface warship must be present, has been discarded. Helsinki Principle 5.2.10, cmt.; NWP I-14M 
Annotated'll 7.7.5; NWP 9A Annotated'll 7.7.5; compare 2 OPPENHEUI 380a. Paris Declaration'll 4 invalidated 
Napoleonic era "paper" or constructive blockades that a State imposes by decree but does not have forces to enforce it. 
See n. 427 and accompanying text. 
432. Paris Declaration '114; COLOMBOS §§ 837-41,845-63; Helsinki Principle 5.2.10; HYDE, n. 426, 13-14; NW1P 
10-2 '!I 632a n.27-28; NWP I-14M Annotated '117.7.5; NWP 9A Annotated '117.7.5; 2 O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 
1151-56; 2 OPPENHEIM § 177; SAN RaIO MANUAL'll 96 (force maintaining blockade may be stationed at distance 
determined by military requirements); TUCKER 290, 305-15, 317; Almond, n. 426, 289; Fujita, n. lV.624, 69, 73; 
Goldie, Maritime !Var Zones, n. II.519, 164-71, 178; Jacobson, n. 166,233; Kalshoven, Commental)', n. 115,260,274; 
Levie, Submarine !Varfare, n. III.439, 33; n. 173 and accompanying text. 
433. LOS Convention, arts. 25(3), 45; Territorial Sea Convention, an. 16(3); see also nn. IV.337, 349 and 
accompanying text; Pan lV.B.6, analyzing nonsuspendable straits passage. 
434. 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1156. 
435. Hague VIII, arts. 2-3; CoLOMBOS §§ 821, at 720; 837-41, 845-63; OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, art. 22; Goldie, 
Maritime!Var Zones, n. II.519, 166-71; Howard S. Levie, Commental)', in LAw OF NAVAL WARFARE 140,143-44; Lowe, 
The Commander's, n. III.318, 137-38; Swayze, n. III.322, 163-65; cf. Nwogugu, n. III.439, 333, 340; but see Nicaragua 
Case, 1986 ICJ 112, 147-48, involving mining and not wanime blockade issues. 
436. MANUAL commentary suggests the requirement is mandatory, not hortatory, as "should" might indicate. SAN 
RaIO MANUAL'll 85 & cmts. 
437. If a blockading force officer acknowledges a distress situation, a neutral-flag ship may be allowed to enter a 
blockaded place and leave it, provided the vessel neither discharges nor ships cargo. London Declaration, am. 5-7; 
Helsinki Principle 5.2.10; CoLO.IIBOS §§ 813,822-23; HYDE, n. 426, 14, 35-36; NWIP 10-2 '11'11 632f & n.35, 632h; NWP 
I-14M Annotated '11'117.4.1.2, 7.7.2.4, 7.7.3; NWP 9AAnnotated 'Ii'll 7.4.1.2, 7.7.2.4, 7.7.3; 2 O'CONNELL,LAWOFTHE SEA 
1151; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 370; SAN REMo l\iANuAL 'Ill 00; TUCKER 291-92; Kalshoven, Commental)', n. 115,260,274; see also 
nn. IV.494-506 and accompanying text. 
438. The United States appears to have a viewthatneutral diplomatic agents are entitled to leave a blockaded place. 
CoLOMBOS § 813; HYDE, n. 426, 37-39; 7 MOORE 854; NWIP 10-2 '!I 632h(1); TUCKER 291; During the Korean War 
blockade, foreign warships exceptNonh Korea's could enter and leave Nonh Koreanpom. Walker,StatePractice 126, 
citing inter alia US Deputy Director of State Department Office of Nonheast Asian Affairs U. Alexis Johnson 
Memorandum of Conversation, July 8, 1950,7 FRUS 1950,332-33. Since imposing a blockade is a US executive 
decision, it is likely the executive will also make these decisions. US naval commanders, and force commanders with 
like national rules, perhaps stated in rules of engagement, should consult those rules and refer to higher authority as 
directed. See nn. III.258 and accompanying text for ROE analysis. 
439. Second Convention, art. 38; Third Convention, am. 72-75 & Annex III; Founh Convention, arts. 23, 59, 61; 
Protocol I, am. 69-70; Helsinki Principle 5.3; NWP I-14M Annotated '117.4.1.2; NWP 9A Annotated '117.4.1.2; SAN 
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REl.loMANUAL 1I11102(a), 103-04, 150; TUCKER 263; Frits Kalshoven,NoncombatantPmons, in Grunawalt300, 312·13; 
see also BOTHEet al • .430·37; HYDE, n. 426, 39-41; 2 PiCTET 212·15; 3 id. 351·74,664-68; 4 id. 178·84,319·23,325·28; 
PILLOUD. COMMENTARY 812-29. Protecting Powers, a third, neutral State or an international organization parties to a 
conflict appoint to safeguard their interests, including interests of prisoners of war, etc., are discussed and defined in 
First Convention, arts. 8·1I, 23; Second Convention, arts. 8, II; Third Convention, arts. 8, II; Fourth Convention, 
arts. 9, 12, 14; Protocol I, arts. 2(c), 5-6, II, 33, 45, 60, 70; Cultural Property Convention, art. 21. See also BOTHE et 01 •• 
54-55,64-84, 1I0·16, 172·75,260·62,387·89,432-37; GREEN ch. 13; I PICTET 86·131, 206·26; 2 ill. 60·65,79·82; 3 ill. 
93·103,123·27; 4id. 81·92, 1I3·17, 120·28; PlllOUD. Co~\1o\ENTARY 58·59, 61·62, 76·102, 150·63, 350-63,544-59, 708-16, 
816-29; TOMAN 222-26; Howard S. Levie,Prisonm oJ War and the Pro/wing Puwer, 55 AJIL 374 (1961). The United 
States evacuated civilians from North to South Vietnam in that conflict during offshore interdiction operations. 
Wounded and sick French armed forces members were repatriated to France and Morocco. I EDWIN M. HOOPERet al •. , 
THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE VIETNAM CoNFLICT ch. 12 (1976); Daniel M. Redmond, Gelling Them Out, 1I6 
PROCEEDINGS 44 (No.8, 1990). 
440. London Declaration, art. 18; CoLOMBOS § 833; Helsinki Principle 5.2.10; NWIP 10-211 632e; NWP I-14M 
Annotated 117.7.2.5; NWP 9A Annotated 117.7.2.5; 2 OPPENHEIM § 373a; SAN REl.IO MANUAL 1199; TUCKER 289·90; 
Kalshoven, Commentary, n. 1I5, 260, 274; see also Parts E.2-E.3. 
441. COLOMBOS § 844; W.E. HALL, LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 205-06 (1921); Helsinki Principle 5.2.10; HYDE,n. 426, 
29-33; NWIP 10-211 632g(2); NWP I-14M Annotated1l7.7.4; NWP 9A Annotated 117.7.4; 2 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTHE 
SEA 1157 (noting this is UK-US policy,and that continental States follow an analogue of hot pursuit after a ship breaks 
a blockade cordon); 2 OPPENHEtM §§ 385, 389 (noting differences in State practice); SAN ReMoMANUAL 111198,146(1), 
153(1); TUCKER 292-95. See also LOS Convention, art. Ill; High Seas Convention, art. 23; nn. IV.298, 326 and 
accompanying text (hot pursuit under LOS). 
442. Declaration of London, arts. 14-15; COLOMBOS §§ 827-28; NWIP 10-211632g & n.36; NWP I-14M Annotated 
117.7.4; NWP 9A Annotated 117.7.4; 2 OPPENHEtM §§ 383-84; TUCKER 292-93. 
443. See nn. 387-88 and accompanying text. 
444. Declaration of London, arts. 14-15; Hague Air Rules, art. 52, as interpreted by its drafters; CoLOMBOS § 
835-36,844; NWIP 10-2 11 632g & n.36; NWP I-14M Annotated 117.7.4; NWP 9A Annotated 117.7.4; 2 O'CONNELL, 
LAWOFTHESEA 1I57; TUCKER 292-93, 316-17. See also Declaration of London, arts. 17, 19,considered byNWP 1·14M 
Annotated 11 7.7.4 n. 140; NWP 9A Annotated 11 7.7.4 n.138, as obsolete in light of State practice; Kalshoven, 
Commentary, n. 1I5, 261-62, 274. 
445. 2 OPPENHEtM § 386; see also nn. IV.494-506, V.437 and accompanying text. 
446. UN Charter, arts. 25,42, 48,103; Helsinki Principle 1.2; see also n. III.58 and accompanying text; Part E.l. 
447. SAN REAlo MANUAL 11 102(b) & cmts. 102.3-102.4; Goldie, Maritime War Zones, n. II.519, 178 (necessity 
behind changes in traditional blockade law); see also Parts A.I-A.2 and accompanying text. 
448. See nn. II.91, 1I0, 200, V.414 and accompanying text. 
449. A similar situation arose in the 1990-91 Gulf War; see Walker, Crisis Over Kuwait 36 n.53, commenting on S.C. 
Res. 66, UN Doc. SIRES 665 (1990), in 29 ILM 1329,1330 (1990), authorizing interception ofIraq-bound cargoes, and 
the response of Comprehensive Mandatory Sanctions Imposed Against Iraq, 27 UN Chron. 5,6-7 (No.4, 1990); Nat'al 
BlockadeEndorsed, id. 17, characterizing the operation asa blockade. See also Vessels Intercepted, id. 15. The UN Security 
Council never formally authorized a blockade; Coalition members never instituted one or treated Council 
authorizations under,e.g., S.C. Res. 678, UN Doc. No. SIRES/678,in I Dispatch 298 (1990),as authority to impose one. 
450. See nn. 1.27-33 and accompanying text. 
451. See nn. 425-26 and accompanying text. 
452. Several Iranian warships, on order in Italy, never left the Mediterranean Sea; the rest of the Iraqi navy was 
bottled up in the Shalt aI-Arab early in the war. There is no evidence Iraq used helicopters, which could have enforced 
a blockade, against Gulf shipping. See nn. 11.130, 236, 322 and accompanying text. 
453. Paris Declaration, 114; see also n. 427 and accompanying text. 
454. See nn. II.153-56 and accompanying text. 
455. See n. 426 and accompanying text. 
456. Cf. LOS Convention, art. 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(3); see also nn. IV.337, 349 and 
accompanying text. 
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457. Helsinki Principle 3.3, cmt.; NWP I-14M Annotated '11'117.8-7.8.1; NWP 9A Annotated '11'11 7.8-7.8.1; SAN 
REMO MANUAL '11146; see also Part F.!.a. 
458. The record is nonexistent on these points. 
459. See nn. II.179, 233, 250-60, 334, 354, 357, 359, 362, 368, 373, 393-94, 412, 420-21, 446, 469, 519 and 
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restrict neutral traffic, nn. 486-87 and accompanying text, the LOAC applies through LOS other rules principles in, 
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570. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. I1I.lO, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
571. See n. 556 and accompanying text. 
572. See nn. 544-45, 553 and accompanying text. 
573. Cf. NWP I-14M Annotated II 7.9 (" ... [AJn otherwise protected platform does not lose that protection by 
crossing an imaginary line drawn in the ocean by a belligerent."); see also n. 556 and accompanying text. 
574. See n. 570 and accompanying text. 
575. Ronzitti, The Cris4 40, who is not correct in saying that the TEZ declaration limited Britain's belligerent 
rights. It was a warning and not a limitation. Enemy warships like Belgrano are legitimate targets wherever found, 
except in neutral territory, and even there under certain circumstances. See nn. 57, 151 and accompanying text. 
576. See n. 561 and accompanying text. 
577. In 1982 probably only the US and USSR navies could have validly asserted such a broad claim, and then only 
on the basis of to tal forces that might have been brought to bearin a conflict. Becauseofthesize and localization of the 
1982 war for the islands, either belligerent's claim for all of the South Atlantic in a local war over the islands would 
have been excessive. If, on the other hand, there had been a general conflict between the two powers in the South 
Atlantic, a war zone of the entire ocean might have been lawful under these hypothetical circumstances. Similarly, if 
the United States and the Soviet Union had been engaged generally worldwide, given the probable range of aircraft, 
weapons and warships of the hypothetical protagonists, itis conceivable that all of the world's oceans could have been 
declared war zones. Even here rules applicable to targeting, etc., would have applied. See Parts B-D. 
578. Helsinki Principle 3.3; NWP I-14M Annotated II 7.9; SAN REz,\O MANUAL 1111 105-06. 
579. See n. 562 and accompanying text. 
580. If visit and search or blockade can continue after an armistice or ceasefire, absent belligerents' agreement 
otherwise, war zone declarations can also continue. See nn.l09, 429 and accompanying text. See generally Levie, The 
Nature, n. 109, 888-906. 
581. Whether announcing a bubble, analyzed herein as a high seas SDZ, is a policy matter and not a legal 
requirement. See Parts F.1.b-F.1.c. When there is no state of belligerency , or if a country is neutral, a defensive bubble 
announcement is but an assertion of self-defense rights. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.lO, 47-630, 916-18, 
968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
582. See nn. 109,429,580 and accompanying text. 
583. See nn. IV.309, 357-58 and accompanying text. 
584. LOS Convention, art. 57; see also nn. IV.147-57 and accompanying text. 
585. The LOS is subject to other rules ofinternational law, i.e., the LOAC, through the other rules clauses of, e.g., 
LOS Convention, aIL 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. III.952-67, IV.I0-25 and accompanying text. 
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586. LOS Convention, arL 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, arL 16(3); see also nn. IV.337, 439 and 
accompanying texL 
587. See Part F.1.a. 
588. Helsinki Principle 2.3 & cmL; NWP I-14M Annotated'll 7.3.5; NWP 9A Annotated'll 7.3.5; SAN REMo 
MANUAL '11'1127-30; Part IV.B.6. 
589. For example, to exercise a right of anticipatory self-defense, there must be no other alternative to self-defense. 
Sec UN Charter, arts. 51,103; sec also nn.111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84,IV.6-25, V.22 and accompanying texL 
590. Accord, SAN RE!.loMANUAL '11106, cmL 106.2; Fenrick, TheExclusion Zone, n.11.109,116,125; Goldie,Marilime 
War Zones, n.11.519, 174; Leckow, n.11.147, 635-36 (only UK zones considered); Walker, Slale PraClice 154-55. 
591. TUCKER 301. 
592. Fenrick, TheExclusion Zone, n.l1.109, 124-25; accord, Vaughan Lowe, ThelmpaCl oftheLawoflhe Sea on Naval 
IVaifarc, 14 SYRACUSEJ.INT"LL. & CoM. 657,673 (1988); compare COLOMBOS § 561; TUCKER298,301. SANREMoMANuAL 
'11106(e) requires belligerents to publicly declare and appropriately notify beginning, duration, location and extent of 
the zone, as well as restrictions imposed. See also ill., cmts. 106.3, 106.6, the latter stating that notification should 
include diplomatic channels and appropriate international organizations, in particular lCAO and IMO. Prudent 
belligerents should also instruct their UN Permanent Representatives and notify the Security Council, since some 
State will undoubtedly notify the Council and perhaps the General Assembly. See UN Charter, arts. 11-12, 14, 25, 
31-42,48,51,103; Chapter Ill; nn.lV.6-25 and accompanying texL 
593. Helsinki Principle 3.3 & cmt.; SAN RE!.lol\1ANuAL '11106(a) & cmL 106.1; see also UN Charter, arts. 51,103; see 
also nn.Ill.IO, 47-630,916-18, 968-84,lV.6-25 and accompanying texL SAN REMo MANUAL '11108 illustrates the point of 
continuing LONW applicability in its correct statement that a war zone declaration does not derogate from a 
belligerent's customary right to control neutral vessels and aircraft in an immediate vicinity of naval operations. On 
this point, sec also TUCKER 300; Parts A-E. 
594. Helsinki Principle 3.3 & cmL; SAN RE!.IO l\1ANUAL, 'III06(b) & cmL 106.2; Fleck, CommenlS, n.l11.439, 82. 
TUCKER 301 rightly complained in 1955 of the problem of zones with no duration or statement of area covered. 
Jacobson, n.166, 234 suggests a treaty to establish negotiated rules balancing needs of protecting belligerent forces in 
an age oflong-distance targeting, neutral shipping interests and humanitarian principles. It is a worthy thought but 
not practically attainable. 
595. NWP I-14M Annotated '117.9. 
596. Sec Part E.2. 
597. Sec nn. 555-56 and accompanying te.XL 
598. LOS Convention, arL 57; sec also nn.lV.147-57 and accompanying texL 
599. Cf. Helsinki Principle 3.3 & cmL; SAN RE!.IO MANUAL'll 108 & cmL 108.1 (war zone rules do not affect 
belligerent's right to e.xclude neutrals from immediate area of naval operations; in a particular case an immediate area 
might be larger than a war zone, or the two might overlap in part); sec also TUCKER 300; Part E.2. 
600. See nn.lV.309, 357-58 and accompanying texL 
601. See n.lV.7S and accompanyingtexL For LOAC due regard analysis, sec nn. 58,62and accompanyingtexL 
602. Helsinki Principles 3.3, 5.2.9 & cmts.; SAN RE!.\Ol\1ANuAL 'III06(c) & cmts.l06.2,106.4; sec also NWP I-14M 
Annotated 'II 7.9. 
603. Helsinki Principles 3.3, 5.2.9 & cmts.; SANRE!.IO l\1ANuAL 'I1106(d) & cmts. 106.3, 106.5; see also NWP I-14M 
Annotated '117.9. 
604. LOS Convention, arts. 25(3), 38, 44-45; Territorial Sea Convention, arL 16(3); COLOMBOS § 561; Helsinki 
Principles 3.3, 5.2.9 & cmts.; NWP I-14M Annotated '117.9; SAN RE!.IO l\1ANuAL '11'11 23, 27-32, 106(d); cf. Helsinki 
Principle 6.2 & cmL; NWP I-14M Annotated '119.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated '119.2.3; SANREMo MANUAL, '!I'I185, 87-89 & 
cmts.; STONE 574 (whatever status of zones are for the high seas, "the right ofa belligerent to establish such zones in 
neutral territorial waters cannot be seriously contended for"); TUCKER303-04; nn. 586, 588-89 and accompanyingtexL 
To this extent a war zone differs from blockade. A blockading force may bar entry or exit of all ships and aircraft; 
neutral warships or military aircraft may pass a blockade with blockading force discretion. See Helsinki Principle 
5.2.10 &cmL; NWP I-14M Annotated '11'117.7.1, 7.7.3; NWP 9A Annotated '11'117.7.1, 7.7.3; SAN RE!.\Ol\1ANuAL '11100 & 
cmL 100.1; TUCKER 298; n. 438 andaccompanyingtexL Thus a war zone might be considered "effective," sec Fenrick, 
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The Exclusion Zone, n. II.109, 124-25, while a blockade of the same area might not be considered "effective" under law 
of blockade standards. TUCKER 298. 
605. COLOMBOS § 561; Helsinki Principles 3.3, 5.2.9 & cmts.; NWP I-14M Annotated 117.9; SAN RE.IIO MANUAL 11 
105 & cmt. 105.1; TUCKER 298 n. 38,299 n.39. 
606. NWP I-14M Annotated 117.9. 
607. Rules of engagement may give an enforcing belligerent's forces ranges of options and limitations on enforcing 
a war zone. Most States do not publish ROE. SAN RaIOMANUAt.1I106,cmt. 106.1; n.III.258 and accompanying text. 
608. SAN REl>IOMANUAL1I107 & cmts.107.1-107.2; this is the same rule applied to navicerts and aircerts. Helsinki 
Principle 5.2.6 & cmt.; NWP I-14M Annotated 117.4.2; NWP 9A Annotated 117.4.2; SAN RaIO MANUAL 11 123 & CMT. 
123.1; n. 386 and accompanying text. 
609. E.g. SAN RaIO MANUAL 11107, cmt. 107.2 says a belligerent may not force neutral merchantmen to join a 
convoy escorted by that belligerent's warships; this would subject the merchantmen to attack on sight. Sec n. 337 and 
accompanying text. On the other hand, forcing transiting neutrals to use navicert procedures should not be 
considered an act harmful to the enemy. SAN R!;.\I0MANUAt. '11'11107, cmt. 107.1; 123 & cmt. 123.1; see also n. 386 and 
accompanying te:"t. 
610. UN Charter, arts. 25, 48, 103; see also n. IV.57 and accompanying text. 
611. Rainier Lagoni,Remarks, in Panel, Neutrality, The Rights o/Shipping and the Use o/Force in the Pmian Gu/fWar 
(Part I), 1988 ASIL PROC. 161, 163 (war zones lawful only if tied to coast of a State establishing it); MaslnY, n. 555, 49 
(USSR protest of UK zones during Falklands/Malvinas War); Ronzitti, The Crisis 10,40 (USSR, Latin American 
States' protests; war zones enforced against neutrals unlawful even under pre-Charter law). 2 OPPENHEL\I § 3193, 
writing in the World War I context but publishing in 1952, seems to be the last major treatise to condemn them, saying 
they can only be imposed as reprisal; see also Howard S. Levie,Mine War/are and International Law, NWCREV. 27, 31 
(Apr. 1972). 
612. Helsinki Principle 3.3 & cmt.; NWP I-14M Annotated 117.9; 2 O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1111-12; SAN 
REMoMANUAL '1111105-08 & cmts.; Fenrick, n. II.109, 94,113,121; Goldie,Maritime War Zones, n. 11.519, 194; Walker, 
State Practice 155. O'Connell may have changed his view after publishing THE INFLUENCE 167 (1975) and the 
Falklands/Malvinas War. Ronzitti, The Crisis 4041 cites O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE for Ronzitti's view that high seas 
war zones during limited war, if permitted at all, are allowed only for belligerent operations among belligerents and 
not to molest neutrals, inferring the UK TEZ was inadmissible for that purpose. The UK TEZ did not affect neutral 
rights more than they would have been without a TEZ. See generally nn. 555-83 and accompanying text. O'CoNNELL, 
THE INFLUENCE 167 wrote in the World War II context; Ronzitti quotes him in the Falklands/Malvinas context to 
support his view, Ronzitti, The Crisis 10, that these zones are unlawful. 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1111-12 was 
published in 1984, and The Crisis in 1988. O'Connell,InternationaILaw, n. III.252, 54-56, published in 1970, supports a 
view that O'Connell sawall postwar zones, properly limited, as lawful; THE INFLUENCE 167 undoubtedly refers to the 
excessive World War II claims. 
613. Compare LOS Convention, arts. 2(2), 25(3), 44-45; Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 2, 16(3) with ICAO 
Convention, arts. 1-3,8-9, not applicable to military aircraft; see also BROWNt.lE,INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (who errs in 
saying aircraft straits passage requires a treaty); 1 OPPENHEIM § 220; AFP 110-31 'II'II2-5a, 2-6a; NWP I-14M Annotated 
'11'112.5.1,4.4; NWP 9A Annotated '11'112.5.1. 4.4; Parts IV.B.3, V.B.5. Treaties regulate admitting military aircraft. See, 
e.g., Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation & Security Regarding Facilities & Areas & 
Status of US Armed Forces inJapan,June 23, 1960,Japan-US,art. 5, 11 UST 1652, 1654, 373 UNTS 248, 252. During 
peacetime no military aircraft may enter another State's territorial airspace without specific permission or authority 
under a treaty; the same rules apply to neutral airspace. AFP 110-31 'II'II2-5a,2-6c; NWP I-14M Annotated'll' 2.5.1,4.4; 
NWP 9A Annotated '11'112.5.1, 4.4. Special LOAC principles apply to medical aircraft; these also include notification 
and agreement rules. See First Convention, arts. 36-37; Second Convention, arts. 3940; Fourth Convention, art. 22; 
ProtocolI, arts. 8(j),26-27, 29, 31; BOTHEet aL 95-96, 101, 153-56, 159-61, 165-67; 1 PICTET285-96; 2 PICTh-r215-25; 4 
PICTET 173-77; PILLOUD,CoMMENTARY 115-16, 131-32, 288-92, 294-98, 308-13, 326-37. These principles apply to LOS 
situations through the LOS other rules clauses. See, e.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention,art. 2; see 
also nn. III.952-67, IV.1O-25 and accompanying text. 
614. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 2(3); Territorial Sea Convention, art. 1(2); see also nn. III.952-67, IV.10-25 and 
accompanying text. 
615. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.lO, 47-630,916-18,968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
616. Whether coastal States can apply these regulations to aircraft passing through an ADIZ and not inbound is 
not settled. AFP 110-31 '11'112-1g; NWIP 10-2 'II 422b; NWP I-14M Annotated 112.5.2.3; NWP 9AAnnotated' 2.5.2.3; 
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REsTATEMENT (THIRD) § 521, r.n. 2; 4 WHITEMAN, DIGEST 496-97; Note, Air Defense Identification Zones: Creeping 
JurisdICtion in the Airspace, 18 VJIL 485 (1978). US ADIZ are published in 14 CFR part 99. Cf. ICAO Convention, arts. 
3, 8, II, not applicable to State and military aircraft, requiring piloted and unpiloted aircraft to submit to rules for 
entering another State's territory. 
617. AFP 110-31'11 2-lf; NWIP 10-2'11 422b; compare LOS Convention, arL 33; Territorial Sea Convention,arL 24, 
declaring contiguous zones are high seas areas subject to cenain coastal State rights to use them for police purposes; see 
also 2 Nordquist 'II'll 11.8, 33.1; REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 511, cmL k; 521, r.n. 2; nn. IV.296-300, 324-27 and 
accompanying texL 
618. LOS Convention, arL 87(1); High Seas Convention, arL 2; AFP 110-31, 'II 2-1g; see also nn. IV.68-79 and 
accompanying te.'L 
619. 2 O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 797_ 
620. AFP 110-31'11 2-lg; NWP I-14M Annotated'll 2.5.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated'll 2.5.2.3. 
621. NOTAMs or NOTMARs may announce these. AFP 110-31 'II 2-lg & n. 13; see also n. IV.67 and 
accompanying te.'L 
622. NOTAMs or NOTMARs may announce these. See Pan F.1.a. 
623. NOTAMs or NOTMARs may announce these. See Pan E.2. 
624. NOTAMs or NOTMARs may announce these. See NWP I-14M Annotated'll 2.5.2.3, 2-32, referring to id. 'II 
2.4.4 n.68; NWP 9A Annotated'll 2.5.2.3, 2-41, referring to id. 'II 2.4.4 n.56; Parts F.1.b-F.1.c. 
625. NOTAMs or NOTMARs may announce these. See Pan F.2. 
626. UN Charter, ans. 51, 103; see also ICAO Convention, arL 3(d), requiring States to have due regard for safety of 
civil aircraft navigation; id. arL 3 bis, requiring States to refrain from using weapons against civil aircraft, and in cases 
ofintercepting intruding aircraft, acting so that lives of those on board and safety of the aircraft are not endangered; 
First Convention, ans. 36-37 (medical aircraft); Second Convention, ans. 39-40 (same); Fourth Convention, an. 22 
(same); Protocol I, ans. 8(j), 24-31, Annex I,ans.l(2),3-9 (same); AFP 110-31'11 2-1g; BOTHEetal._ 95-96, 101, 150-67, 
578-90; NWP I-14M Annotated 'II'll 4.4; 8.2.1; 8.2.3, 8-13, 8-15, 8-16, 8-18; 8.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated 1111 4.4; 8.2.1; 
8.2.3; 8.2.3, 8-13, 8-20; 8.4.1; 1 PICTET 285-96; 2 id. 215-25; 4 id. 173-77; PILLOUD, COMMENTARY 115-16,279-342, 
1137-51,1159,1174-1263; SAN REMOAiANuAL '1111 62-66,70-71,174-83; Gerald F. FitzGerald, The Use of Foree Against 
CiVIl Aircraft: The Aftermath of the KAL Fiiglu 007 Incident, 1984 CYBIL 291; UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 
III.I 0, 47-630,916-18,968-84, IV.6-25, V.58, 62 (LOAC due regard analysis) and accompanying tcxt; Parts A.I-A.2. As 
in other circumstances necessity and proportionality principles in self-defense situations are different from these 
principles in LOAC situations. See n. 22 and accompanying tCXL 
627. See ICAO Convention, arL 3(d), 3 bis; nn. 613, 626 and accompanying tCXL 
628. See Pan F.2. 
629. ICAO Convention, arL 3 bis; see also nn. 613, 626 and accompanying te.'L 
630. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn_ 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25, V.613, 626 and accompanying 
texL 
631. See Parts A.I-A.2; nn. 613, 626 and accompanying te.XL 
632. See generally n. IV.68 (high seas military operations), PartE.2 (blockade areas), Part F.1.a (vacating immediate 
area of naval operations), Part F.1.b (SDZs), Pan F.2 (war zones). 
633. ICAO Convention, arL 25; see also nn. IV.494-506 and accompanying tCXL 
634. Hague V, arts. 11-15; Second Convention,ans. 5,15; ProtocolI, arL 31; Hague Air Rules, ans.40, 42-43, 46; 
scealso AFP 110-31'11 2-6c; NWP I-14M Annotated'll 7.11; NWP 9A Annotated'll 7.10; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 337-38, 341a, 
348a; 2 PICfET 41-45, 107-12; SAN RE!.IO AiANUAL 'II 168; STONE 386, 614; TUCKER 251-52; nn. 613, 626 and 
accompanying te.XL 
635. Third Convention, arL 4; Fourth Convention,arL 42; ProtocolI, art. 75; Hague Air Rules, arts. 32-38;see also 
BOTHEetal. 456-66; NWP I-14M Annotated 'II'll 7.10.2,8.2.2.1; NWP9A Annotated '11'117.9.2, 8.2.2.1; 3 PICfET45-73; 4 
id. 257-59; PILLOUD, CoMMENTARY 863-90; SAN REMo MANUAL '1111 165-67; STONE 614, 619. 
636. FirstConvention,arL 23; Fourth Convention, ans. 14-15 & Annex I (form draftagreement);seealsoG.A. Res. 
2675'11 6 (1970), in SCHINDLER & TO.IIAN 267, 268; AFP 110-311111 12-2B, 14-3; NWP I-14M Annotated 118.5.1.5; NWP 
9A Annotated 118.5.1.5; 2 OPPENHEIM § 124b; 1 PICTET206-16; 4 id. 120-33,627-39; STONE 669-70 (First Convention, 
arL 23 an innovation at the time), 689-90. Howard S. Levie, Civilian Sanctuaries: An ImpracticalProposal, I ISRAEL Y.B. 
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HUM. RIGHTS 335 (1971) criticized civilian sanctuaries or refuges as G.A. Res. 2444 (1968), in SCHINDLER & To.'.IAN 263, 
proposed, saying existing humanitarian law supplied enough protection. These resolutions are not law but may recite 
law or evidence trends in the law. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03; see also n. III.I0 and accompanying texL 
637. See Part A.4. 
638. See n. III and accompanying text. 
639. SVLVlE-STOVANKA JUNOD, PROTECTION OFTHE VICTIMS OF ARMED CoNFUCT FALKLAND-MALVINAS ISLANDS (1982) 
26,33-34 (Int'l Comm. Red Cross ed. 1984); NWP I-14M Annotated 118.5.1.5 n.12l; NWP 9A Annotated 11 8.5.1.5 
n.l0l; SAN REMO MANUAL 11160, cmts. 160.1-160.3. 
640. SAN REAIO MANUAL'll 160 & cmts. 160.3-160.4; see also NWP I-14M Annotated'll 8.5.1.5 n.12l; NWP 9A 
Annotated'll 8.5.1.5 n.lO!. 
641. Compare First Convention, art. 23; Fourth Convention, arts. 14-15 & Annex I with SAN REMoMANUAL 11160 & 
cmts; see also nn. 636, 640 and accompanying text. 
642. Insofar as possible a high seas Box should have the same terms, and be developed the same way, as those 
created under First Convention, art. 23; Fourth Convention, arts. 14-15 & Annex I. Suppose,e.g., belligerents wish to 
create a Box whose area overlaps a belligerent's territorial sea or an area of territorial sea seaward of an occupied area. 
See nn. 636-37 and accompanying text. There should not be one standard forthe territorial sea partand another for the 
high seas part. Given pervasive claims for a 12-mile territorial sea and its recognition for LOAC purposes (see Part A.4) 
and the nature of vessels available for hospital ships (e.g., US hospital ships are converted oilers) or seaborne transport, 
there is more likelihood today than in earlier times (e.g., 1949, when the First and Fourth Conventions were signed) 
that belligerents or perhaps neutrals as suggested above might wish to establish a zone including high seas and 
territorial sea areas. Hospital ships on the high seas, and limited to operating there because of their draft, might 
conduct triage and send patients to shore for further treatment, for example, in a zone that extends from the high seas 
to shore. 
643. See n. II.4 and accompanying text. 
644. See nn. II.224, 305, 345, 347 and accompanying text. 
645. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. II1.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
646. LOS Convention, arts. 19,38,45; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 16(4);see nn. II.364(Iran naval maneuvers, 
Gulf high seas), 365 (Saudi territorial sea), 379-81 (Gulf of Oman, Iran territorial sea, may have included Strait of 
Hormuz),411 (Iran territorial sea, Gulfhigh seas), 457 (Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman), IV.17, 68 and accompanying 
text; Parts IV.B.4, IV.B.6. 
647. The United States paid for the Airbus claims, and presumably did so for other mistaken attacks, e.g., on 
fishing vessels and dhows, where there was loss oflife, injury or property damage. See also UN Charter, arts. 51,103; see 
also nn. II1.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
648. See nn. 114-16 and accompanying texL 
649. See Parts F.l.b-F.1.c. 
650. Whether it would have been wise for Iran to do so, and thereby announce presence, is another matter. See nn. 
II.I03, 280, 306, 364-65, 379-81, 411, 458, V.515, 518, 539 and accompanying text. 
651. See Parts C.3, D.1. 
652. UN Charter, art. 2(4); LOS Convention, arts. 19,87(1),88; High Seas Convention, art. 2; Territorial Sea 
Convention, art. 16(4); see also nn. IV.68, 75,301-13,337-50 and accompanying text. 
653. LOS Convention, arts. 2, 87(1); High Seas Convention, art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, art.l;seealso Parts 
IV.B.l,IV.B.4. 
654. See nn. II.89-90, 101 (US NOTAM warning), 102, 109, 176 (US NOTMAR warning), 199-202,208,232,288 
(US NOTAM, NOTMAR warning on zones), 301, 420 (US NOTAM, NOTMAR warning of zones) and 
accompanying text. This satisfied one requirement. See nn. 592-96 and accompanying text. SAN REMO MANUAL 11106, 
cmt. 106.6 says notification should notify international organizations, but this does not appear to bc a customary 
requirement. There is no record that the belligerents did not notify these organizations. The UN Security Council 
certainly knew about them. 
655. Walker,StatePraClice 169; see also nn. 592-96,612 and accompanying text. Yoram Dinstcin,Reml'Tks, in Panel, 
n. 11.144, 608, said the zones were disproportionate in terms of naval assets and therefore disproportionate. However, 
he did not take into account belligerent air assets, which can be used to enforce a zone without use of surface or other 
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forces. The zones were therefore proportionate in area. Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone, n. 11.109,124-25; Walker 169; see 
also nn. 592-96,612 and accompanying texL 
656. Sec nn. 592-96,604,612,657 and accompanying te:~L 
657. Sec n. 600 and accompanying texL 
65S. NWP I-14M Annotated 117.9; Almond, n. 426, 3l3-14; Boczek,Law o/Warfare, n. 11.154, 258; Fenrick,The 
Excluswn Zone, n. 11.109, 121-22; Goldie, Maritime War Zones, n. 11.519, 176; Goldie, Targeting, n. 11.262, 16-17; 
McNeill, Ncutral Righls, n. II.354, 636; Robertson, U.S. Policy, n.III.439, 344-45; Ronzitti,The Crisis 41; Walker,State 
Practice 168-69; nn. 605·09, 612 and accompanying texL Leckow, n. 11.147,639, says Iran's zone was lawful because it 
was more "defensive" in nature. 
659. NWP I-14M Annotated 119.7; NWP9AAnnotated 119.7; SAN REMo MANUAL 111180,87-89; Clingan,Submarine 
Mines, n. III.840, 359-60; Dinstein,Remarks, n. 648, 608; see also Part G.2and nn. VI.222-30 and accompanyingtexL 
660. S.C. Res. 552, 582,598, UN Docs. S/RES/552 (1984), S/RES/582 (1986), S/RES/598 (1987), in WELLENS 452, 
473,454; sec also Ronzitti, The Crisis 41. 
661. Sec nn. II.261, 292, V.476 and accompanying text. 
662. See Part F.3. 
663. See nn. II.261, V.476 and accompanying texL 
664. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103;seealso nn.III.10,47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text; PartF.3. 
665. Sec nn. 11.116, V.476 and accompanying texL 
666. Sec nn. 633-35 and accompanying texL 
667. See n. 613 and accompanying texL 
668. See Part III.C. 
669. See nn. 1I.81-S5 and accompanying texL 
670. See nn.111 and accompanying texL 
671. Sec nn. 645-50 and accompanying texL 
672. Iraq also used gas against its own citizens.SeegeneralOr Geneva Gas Protocol;seealso nn. 11.14-15,84,300,375, 
486 and accompanying tCXL 
673. The record is not clear on methods or means of some attacks, e.g., Iranian attacks on Iraqi shore facilities, 
which probably included aircraft-launched weapons after flights over the Gulf. See generalOr Chapter II. 
674. See nn. 11.179,233,250,334,354,357,359, 368-72,420,436, 442,454-56,493 and accompanying texL Melia,n. 
II.6, 116-27, describes mine countermeasures operations from a US Navy perspective, reporting rumor that North 
Korean-manufactured influence mines were laid; none were discovered. 
675. Cf, UN Charter, arts. 51,103; see also nn. III.lO, 47-630,916-18,968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
676. See generalOr Parts A.I-A.2 and accompanying texL 
677. Hague IX, art. 2. Other provisions regulate bombarding unfortified towns and notice to community 
authorities and prohibit pillage. Hague IX, arts. 1-7. See also Cultural Property Convention, establishing cultural 
property protections during war, to which the United States is nota party; Roerich Pact, a Western Hemisphere treaty 
to which the United States is party, also protectioning cultural property; TOMAN; nn. V.ll0, 262, VI.272-77, 300-52 
and accompanying te.XL 
67S. Compare Hague Air Rules, arts. 22-26 with Hague IX, arts. 1-7. 
679. CoLOMBOS §§ 580-87 (inferring customary acceptance despite breaches of Hague IX rules); NWIP 10-21111 
621b, 623 (recitation of treaty law as custom, statement of military objective principle, warning if military situation 
permits); NWP I-14M Annotated 11118.5.1-8.5.1.3, 8.5.2 (recitation of treaty law as custom, citing Protocol I, arL 52(2) 
by reference, warning if military situation permits, terror bombing forbidden); NWP 9A Annotated 11118.5.1-8.5.1.3, 
S.5.2 (same); 2 O'CoNNELl., LAWOFTHESEA 1103, 1139 (same conclusion as COLOMBOS, Hague IX obsolete but restates 
military objective principle); 2 OPPENHEUoI § 213 (Hague IX states military objective test); OXFORD NAVALMANuAI., 
arts. 25-29 (repeating Hague IX rules); SAN RE!>\OMANUAL 1140 & cmts. (Hague IX not cited; citing inter alia Protocol I, 
art. 52); STONE 588 (Hague IX's art. 2 military objective principle); TUCKER 143-45 (military objective principle); 
O'Connell, Intenwtwnal Law, n. III.252, 19; Robertson, Commentary, n. III.930, 166 (Hague IX in desuetude, citing 
military objective principle in Hague IX, arL 2; Hague Air Rules, art. 23; Protocol I, arL 52); Russo, Targeting, n. 
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111.624,20 (rejecting Hague IX as custom); Verri, Commentary, n. IV.7l, 333 (Oxford Naval Manual broke new ground 
in forbidding bombardment of unfortified undefended ports, etc.); see also First Convention, art. 50; Second 
Convention, art. 51; Fourth Convention, arL 147; Protocol I, arts. 51(2), 57(2)(c), 85(2); AFP 110-31 (general 
discussion, Hague Air Rules, arts. 22, 24-26 do not represent custom as total code); BOTHE et aL 299-301, 320-26, 
360-61,367-68,511-14; Hague Air Rules, arts. 22-26; NWP I-14M Annotated 117.3.7 n.82 (Hague Air Rules state 
custom); 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 214a-214e; 1 PICfET 370-72; 2 id. 267-70; 4 id. 597-602; PILLOUD, CoMMENTARY 610, 612, 
630-37,678-79,686-87,991-93; SAN REAIO MANUAL '11'11 83, 90, 106(e)(noticerequired forminefields, exclusion zones); 
Matheson, Remarks 426-27; Parts V.I-A.2; n.112 and accompanying text. Neither Iran nor Iraq are parties to Hague 
IX, although most other Gulf War participants were. The Ottoman Empire, predecessor sovereign to what is now Iraq, 
and Persia, now Iran, signed but did not ratify Hague IX. Signatures, Ratifications and Accessions, SCHINDLER & TOMAN 
815,816; TIF 442. To the e. .. tent Hague IX states customary law, all participants were bound by its terms. 
680. Hague V, Regulations, arL 27; Hague IX, art. 5; First Convention, arts. 19,21; Second Convention, arL 34; 
Fourth Convention, arts. 18-19; Protocol I, arts. 12(4), 13; BOTHE et aL 118, 121; NWP I-14M Annotated'll 8.5.1.4; 
NWP 9A Annotated'll 8.5.1.4; 2 OPPENHEIM §§ 120,158; 1 PICfET 194-99, 200-02; 2 id. 189-93; 4 id. 141-56; PILLOUD, 
COMMENTARY 166·69, 174-80; STONE 657-77, 669, 687. 
681. This analysis does not consider the land campaigns and air attacks incident to them. See Chapter II; n. 673 and 
accompanying texL 
682. See nn. 675-79. Incidental terror to civilians is not prohibited; civilians will feel some fear and terror when a 
nearby military objective is hit. BOTHE et aL 300·01; 1 LEVIE, CoDE 217-18; NWP I-14M Annotated 118.5.1.2 n.112; 
NWP 9A Annotated'll 8.5.1.2 n.92; see also n. 679 and accompanying texL Thus ifIran or Iraq bombed an otherwise 
legitimate target, e.g., an oil pumping facility with resulting fright to civilian population, that attack was lawful. 
683. Hague VIII has been described as one of the least successful results of the 1907 peace conference. COLOMBOS §§ 
508,563-67; LEVIE 52-53; 2 O'CONNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 1138 (Hague VIII obsolete, but its principles are not); STONE 
584 ("modest" provisions); TUCKER 303 ("worthless"); Levie, Commentary, n.435, 140. Seabed Arms Conttol Treaty, 
arL 24 forbids laying nuclear-armed mines beyond the territorial sea limit; since none of these weapons were involved 
in the Tanker War, the Treaty will not enter into the analysis, except in terms of environmental concerns. The tteaty 
does not affect the law affecting conventional mines. Nor does thetteatyprohibit placingnuclearweaponsin the water 
column above these waters, e.g., nuclear-armed depth charges or torpedoes. LEVIE, MINE WARFARE, n. 426, 135-37; 
NWP I-14M Annotated'll 10.2.2.1; NWP 9A Annotated'll 10.2.2.1. See also Part IV.B.3; nn. VI. 222-30 and 
accompanying texL The Tanker War did not involve Seabed Treaty principles; no nuclear mines were laid. Mine 
Protocol, art. 1 says it applies to mines laid on the land, including those laid to interdict beaches or waterway or river 
crossings but does not apply to anti-ship mines at sea. See also LEVIE 137-38; NWP I-14M Annotated 119.3. There is no 
evidence Tanker War belligerents mined beach approaches as Iraq did in the 1990-91 Gulf War. See MELIA, n. 11.6, 
127-31. Whether belligerents mined river or water crossings, e.g., in the Shatt ai-Arab, is an issue beyond this book's 
scope. 
684. Hague VIII generally remains valid as a restatement of custom applied to all kinds of sea mines. Some States 
might dispute applying it to other than automatic contact mines. 2 O'CONNELL, LAW OFTHE SEA 1138; O'CoNNELL, THE 
INFLUENCE 93 (UK admiralty questioned in 1939 whether it applied to magnetic mines); STONE 584 (acoustic, 
magnetic mines literally not within its coverage); Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 146. However, NWIP 10-211611 n.3 says 
Hague VIII must be exttapolated to include acoustic, magnetic and other new devices to achieve a goal of protecting 
peaceful shipping. Levie, Mine Warfare, n. 611, 29 reports that no World War I or II belligerent raised this poinL 
Whether Hague VIII applies as tteaty law to other types of mines, its terms can be used as a general principle along 
with other general principles of the LOAC, necessity and proportionality, to achieve the same resulL ICJ Statute, art. 
38(1); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 102-03; n. 111.10 and accompanying text; cf. NWIP 10-2 'II 611 n.3. 
685. See generaUy MELIA, n. 11.6 for a history of US Navy mine countermeasures operations from the American 
Revolution through 1991 and the 1990-91 war in the Gulf. Mines have been proposed for naval warfare since 1585; 
belligerents' unconttolled use of mines during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) led to Hague VIII. LEVIE, MINE 
WARFARE, n. 424, 9-23; NWP I-14M Annotated'll 9.2; NWP 9A Annotated'll 9.2. 
686. Other modem mines include acoustic influence mines, which detonate upon "hearing" a ship's underwater 
noise; mines that can count, i.e., can be preset to detonate after screening ships have passed in order to attack a major 
target; pressure influence mines, which detonate with change in water pressure a passing ship causes; magnetic 
influence mines, actuated by a ship's magnetic signature; devices that choose between false and real targets; 
remote-conttol mines, a throwback to shore-based mines employed for centuries; and stealth mines, designed to 
blend into the underwater environmenL Mines can be moored to the boltom; can rise on a cable or, like CAPTOR, 
attack like a torpedo; or be free-floating. Moored mines sometimes come loose from their tether and become 
free-floating. Mines can either be self-actuating, i.e., once laid, they detonate in accordance with their sensors and 
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internal programming, or controlled, i.e., an outside agency, e.g., a shore station or ship, mustsend the actuation signal 
to the mine. Mines can have several characteristics, e.g., an acoustic mine can be programmed to COUnt ships and 
detonate below a more desirable target. See generally LEVIE, MINE WARFARE, n. 424, 97-133; MELlA,n. II.6, 5, 41-66,114, 
136; NWP I-14M Annotated '11'119.2-9.2.1; NWP 9AAnnotated '11'119.2-9.2.1; Levie, Commentary, n. 435,142. The 1907 
conference that produced Hague VIII gave litde thought to the possibility ofimproved technology and development 
of new types of mines. Levie, Mine l~aifaTe, n. 611,29. As in other weapons development areas, it was a case of 
technology outrunning treaty law. See n. 173 and accompanyingte.xt. 2 O'CoNNELL, LAWOFTHE SEA 1101 wrote in 1984 
that there had been and would be litde future use of mine warfare; he was not correCL Mines are an ine.xpensive, easily 
developed substitute for other forces (e.g., surface or air assets) that can be laid coveruy with a possibility for great 
psychological effect. LEVlE,MINEWARFARE,n.426, 173 & n.I46, quoting Charles C. Petersen, Soviet Military Objectives 
in theATetie Theater, NWC REv. 3, 8-9 (Autumn 1987). Mines can be very indiscriminate in their effect, however. 
687. Sec nn. 11.179,233,250,334,354,357,359,368-72,420 and accompanying text. 2 O'CoNNELL, LAW OFTHE SEA 
1138 says contact mines are obsolete; this has not proven to be true. 
688. Hague VIII, art. 3; Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 22; Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 46-48,112,147-48; NWIP 10-2 '11611 
(limited to automatic submarine contact mines, but see id. n. 3); LEVIE, MINE WARFARE, n. 426,44-47; NWP I-14M 
Annotated'll 9.2.3 (Hague VIII, art. 3 military exigencies latitude remains the law, criticizing, at n. 25, SAN REMO 
MANUAt.approach); NWP 9A Annotated '119.2.3 (same); 2 O'CoNNELL, LAW OFTHE SEA 1138; 2 OPPENHEIM § 182a;SAN 
REMO MANUAL '1183 & cmt. 83.3 (omitting military exigencies latitude in Hague VIII, art. 3, felt "not justified in the 
light of the general requirement imposed upon belligerents to limit as far as possible the effect of hostilities"; the 
MANUAL provides for this separately); Levie, Commentary, n. 435,144. SAN REi.IO MANUAL '!I 83 adds that there is no 
need to notify if deployed mines can only detonate against military objectives. This is consonant with the Hague VIII, 
art. 3 exigencies requirement, and would cover a circumstance, e.g., when a belligerent warship is being chased by 
opposing belligerent forces and deploys mines instead of, e.g., firing missiles or guns. Under these circumstances, 
however, the notification requirement would arise after the engagement, when e.xigencies permit, for mines deployed 
and not detonated. SAN REi.IO MANUAL '!I 83, emt. 83.2 says notification can be accomplished by NOT AM publication 
and communication with international organizations, naming IMO. Although Hague VIII deals only with automatic 
submarine contact mines, see Levie, Commentary 141-42, Hague VIII's principles have been applied through custom to 
other kinds of mines and are thus employed here for LOAC sea mine principles generally. They have been applied by 
analogy for defensive mining. See nn. 705-06 and accompanying text. 
689. Hague VIII, arts. 1-2; LEVIE, MINE WARFARE, n. 426, 27-42; NWP I-14M Annotated'll 9.2.3; NWP 9A 
Annotated '119.2.3; 2 OPPENHEIM § 182a; SAN REi.IO MANUAL '!I 86; Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 142-43. OXFORD NAVAt. 
MANUAL, art. 20, would generally forbid laying automatic contact mines, anchored or not, in the "open sea." Post-1913 
State practice exploded any authority art. 20 may have had. 
690. Although Hague VIII does not speak to it, conceivably a mine can lose its mooring and still be under 
belligerent control. Hague VIII, art. 1(2); CoLOMBOS § 563; LEVIE,MINE WARFARE, n. 424, 101-02 (control by acoustic, 
eleCtrical signal); NWIP 10-2 '11611 (limited to automatic contact mines, but see id. n. 3); NWP I-14M Annotated '11 
9.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated '119.2.3; 2 OPPENHEIM § 182a; OXFORD NAVAt.MANUAL, arL 21(2); SAN REi.IOMANuAL '!I 81; 
STONE 584; Levie, Commentary, n. 435,142-43. 
691. Hague VIII, art. 1(1), declaring they must become harmless after an hour, the hour rule being superseded by 
practice; CoLOMBOS § 563; LEVIE, MINE WARFARE, n. 424, 27-31;NWIP 10-2 '11 611 (limited to automatic submarine 
contactmines,butseeid. n. 3); NWP I-14M Annotated 'il9.2.3, 9-8 {US mines have self-neutralizing devices); NWP9A 
Annotated 'il 9.2.3, 9-7 (same); 2 OPPENHEIM § 182a; OXFORD NAVAL .MANUAL, art. 21(1); SAN REi.IO MANUAL '11 82 
(adding that mines must be directed toward a military objective, a truism for any weapons deployment); STONE 584; 
Levie, Commentary, n. 435,142-43; see also Parts A.I-A.2. 
692. Contra, STONE 585 ("Nor can any restriction on aerial as distinct from naval mine sowing be spelled out of 
treaties or practice.") Many commentators would disagree; e.g., Helsinki Principles; LEVIE, MINE WARFARE, n. 424; 
NWP I-14M Annotated; NWP 9AAnnotated; SAN REi.IOMANUAL make no distinction amongminelayingplatforms. 
693. Hague VIII, art. 5; see also BOTHEetaL 172-75; LEVIE, MINE WARFARE, n. 426,49-51; NWP I-14M Annotated '11 
9.2.3,9-8; NWP9A Annotated 'il9.2.3, 9-23; OXFoRDNAVALl\iANuAL,art. 24; 3 PICTET541-53; P1UOUD, COMMENTARY 
350-63; SANREMol\l.ANUAL 'il'il84, 90-91 & emts. (citing inter alia Third Convention, art. 118; ProtocolI,art. 33); STONE 
584; Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 144-45; see also n. 715 and accompanying text. 
694. NWP I-14M Annotated '!I 9.2.3 n.29 (citing the right of self-defense); NWP 9AAnnotated '!I 9.2.3 n.23 (same); 
SAN REi.IOMANUAL 'il92 (declaratory of customary law); see also Helsinki Principle 6.2; UN Chaner, arts. 51, 103; see 
also nn. 111.10,47-630,916-18,968-84, IV.6-25 and accompanying text. 
695. E.g., a naval force may not enter a neutral coastal State's territorial sea to clear mines without that State's 
permission. Cf. LOS Convention, art. 19; Territorial Sea Convention, art. 14(4);seegeneral(y Part IV.B.3. An exception 
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to this in the mines context might be a CAPTOR-like mine laid in a coastal State's territorial sea, n. 686, that could 
actuate and attack the force, thereby triggering a right of self-defense for a neutral force or a right of necessity under the 
LOAC for a belligerent's force, if a coastal State is powerless to remove the CAPTOR or like device. Under these 
circumstances the force could enter a coastal State's territorial sea specifically and solely to deactivate or remove the 
CAPTOR as a self-defense measure. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Helsinki Principle 2.1 & cmL; NWP I-14M Annotated 
'117.3.4.1; NWP 9A Annotated '117.3.4.2; SAN REAIOMANuAL '1122; UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.10, 47-630, 
916-18,968-84, IV.6-25, V.694 and accompanying texL 
696. NWP I-14M Annotated '119.2.3, 9-9; NWP 9A Annotated '119.2.3,9-9; 2 OPPENHEIM § 182a (commenting on 
contrary German World War I practice, Allied reprisals); cf. SAN REAIO MANUAL 1187; see also Part IV.B.s. The 1907 
diplomatic conference considered but did not adopt a provision to ban straits mining. See LEVIE, MINE WARFARE, n. 
424,42-44. 
697. Paris Declaration '114; Hague VIII,art.2; London Declaration, arts. 1,4-5; COLOMBOS §§ 563,821 (Hague VIII, 
art. 2 useless on this point); NWlP 10-2 '11611 (limited to automatic submarine contact mines, but see id. n. 3); LEVIE, 
MINE WARFARE, n. 424, 32-34; NWP I-14M Annotated 119.2.3; NWP 9A Annotated 119.2.3; 2 OPPENHEtM §§ 182a 
(commenting on contrary German World War I practice, Allied reprisals), 380a; SAN RaIO MANUAL 1188; TUCKER303; 
Fujita, n. IV.624, 70; cf. OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, art. 22; see also LEVIE 144-47, 153-55 (Haiphong harbor mine 
blockade); Swayze, n. III.322, 163 (same); Parts IV.B.3-IV.B.4. 
698. LOS Convention, arL 87(2); High Seas Convention, arL 2; NWP I-14M Annotated'll 9.2.3; NWP 9A 
Annotated 119.2.3; 2 OPPENHEtM § 182a (commenting on contrary German World War I practice, Allied reprisals); SAN 
REMOMANUAL 1180 &cmt. 80.1; TUCKER 303; but see LEVIE,MINEWARFARE,n.426, 34-42; Levic,Mine Jl?aifare, n.611, 
31-32; see also nn. IV.75 (LOS due regard), V.S8, 62 (LOAC due regard) and accompanying text; Part F.2. The Seabed 
Arms Control Treaty does not apply to conventional mines. See n. 683. STONE 584 says Hague VIII does not forbid 
high seas mining, but this may lead to "exhortation. " 
699. UN Charter, arL 2(4); Hague VIII, arts. 1-2; NWP I-14M Annotated 119.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated '119.2.2; SAN 
REMO MANUAL'll 85; Levie, Commentary, n. 435, 142-43; see also LOS Convention, arts. 2, 8 (territorial sea, inland 
waters part of coastal State sovereign territory); Territorial Sea Convention, arts. 1,5 (same); Parts IV.B.3-IV.B.4. 
700. The 1907 conference that produced Hague VIII considered but did not adopt a prohibition on straits mining. 
See n. 696 and accompanying text. 
701. Hague VIII, art. 4 (notice for mines laid off neutrals' coasts, does not require notification for inland waters 
mining). There is no customary requirement, except necessity and proportionality principles applicable to 
self-defense, for notice. Other treaties might apply. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; Hague VIII, art. 4; COLOMBOS § 568; 
LEVlE,MINE WARFARE,n.426, 47-49; NWP I-14M Annotated '119.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated '119.2.2; 2 OPPENHEtM § 363a; 
Levie, Commentary, n.435, 144; see also Stockholm Declaration, art. 2(2) (denial of warship access to mined areas, 
Nordic inner waters; wording varies); Bring, Commentary, n. III.848, 842; nn. III.lO, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, IV.6-25 
and accompanying text; Parts IV.B.4-IV.B.5. 
702. LOS Convention, art. 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, arL 16(3); see also Parts IV.B.4-IV.B.s. 
703. Hague VIII, arts. 4-5; LEVIE, MINE WARFARE, n. 426, 47-51; NWP I-14M Annotated'll 9.2.2; NWP 9A 
Annotated 119.2.2; SAN REAIO MANUAL 11 86, cmL 86.2. 
704. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; NWP I-14M Annotated 119.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated 119.2.2; Clingan,Submarine 
Mines, n.III.840,356; A.G.Y. Thorpe,Mine Jl?aifareatSea-SomeLtgaIAspectsoftheFuture, 18 ODIL255,267 (1987); 
but see Levie,Mine Jl?aifare, n. 611,31-32; UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. III.lO, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84,IV.6-25, 
V.696 and accompanying texL One necessity and proportionality factor is availability of and providing of alternate 
safe, convenient routes for neutral shipping. Cf. SAN REAIO MANUAL 11'1188-89. 
705. Cf. Hague VIII, art. 3; see also n. 688 and accompanying texL 
706. Cf. Hague VIII, arL 5; Corfu Channel, 1949 ICJ 22; Nicaragua Case, 1986 ICJ 46-48,112,147-48; see n. 693 and 
accompanying texL 
707. See nn. 685-96 and accompanying texL 
708. NWP I-14M Annotated '119.2.2; NWP 9A Annotated '119.2.2; see also Parts IV.B.1-V.B.2. 
709. E.g., LOS Convention, arL 87(2); High Seas Convention, arL 2; see also nn. IV.75 (LOS due regard analysis, 
V.58, 62 (LOAC due regard analysis) and accompanying texL The Seabed Arms Control Treaty does not apply to 
conventional mines or nuclear mines in a high seas water column. See n. 683. 
710. Cf. SAN REMO MANUAL 11'11 88-89; see also n. 698 and accompanying texL 
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711. E.g., LOS Convention, art. 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; see also nn. 1V.75 (LOS due regard analysis), 
V.58, 62 (LOAC due regard analysis), 709 and accompanying texL OXFORD NAVAL MANUAL, art. 20, would forbid 
automatic contact mines "in the open sea." State practice and the authority of UN Charter, arL 51, 103 supersede this 
general aspiration. See also nn. II1.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, 1V.6-25 and accompanying texL 
712. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. II1.10, 47-630, 916-18, 968-84, 1V.6-25 and accompanying texL 
713. See generally Parts B-D. 
714. See, e.g., nn. II.260, 361, 373, 393-94, 412, 421, 446, 469, 519 and accompanying texL 
715. See, e.g., nn. II.179, 233, 250, 334, 354, 357, 359, 368, 420 and accompanying text. 
716. Cf, Hague VIII, arts. 1,3; see also nn. 688, 690-92 and accompanying text. 
717. See n. 692 and accompanying texL 
718. Hague VIII, arts. 3, 5; nn. 688, 693 and accompanying texL 
719. UN Charter, arts. 2(4}, 103; Hague VIII, arts. 1-2; NWP I-14M Annotated '\1'\19.2.2 n. 23,9.2.3 n. 26; n. 699 and 
accompanying texL 
720. Hague VIII, arL 1(2); NWP I-14M Annotated '\19.2.3 n. 27; n. 690 and accompanying texL 
721. There may have been agreements between belligerents and mine removal forces, but there is no published 
record. Cf, Hague VIII, art. 5; Levie, The Nature, n. 109, 903·06; nn. 109,688 and accompanying texL L!!VIE, MIN!! 
WARFARE,n. 424, 88 notes that as a practical matter parties who must remove mines may not be able to do so because of 
lack of resources or internal political conditions. Undoubtedly that was the case with the Tanker War belligerents. 
722. Sec n. 700 and accompanying te:it; see also L!!VIE, MIN!! WARFARE, n. 426, 168-69. 
723. Hague VIII, art. 2; see also n. 697 and accompanying texL 
724. Hague VIII, arL 3; LOS Convention, arL 87(2); High Seas Convention, art. 2; NWP I-14M Annotated '\19.2.3 
n. 34;sccalso L!!VIE,MIN!!WARFARE,n. 426, 168-69; nn. 1V.75 (LOS due regard), V.58, 62 (LOAC due regard analysis), 
698,709,711 and accompanying texL 
725. Sec, e.g., nn.II.436, 442, 454-56, 493 and accompanying texL 
726. There were apparently no such threats during the Tanker War. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn.1I1.10, 
47-630,916-18,968-84, 1V.6-25, V.694-95 and accompanying texL 
727. See nn. II.264, 384 and accompanying texL 
728. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 51, 103; Hague VIII, arts. 1-2; see also nn.1I1.10, 47-630,916-18,968-84, IV.6-25 and 
accompanying texL 
729. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. II.368-72, UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also nn. 111.10, 47-630, 916-18, 
968-84, 1V.6-25 and accompanying texL 
730. See nn. 693-98 and accompanying texL 
731. See generally Parts A-G.l. 
732. The Ottoman Empire, predecessor sovereign of the area that is now Iraq, and Persia, now Iran, signed Hague 
VIII but never ratified iL Most Tanker War participants were parties. See Signatures, Ratifications and Accessions, 
SCHINDLER & TOMAN 807, 808; TIF 441-42. 
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